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1. Introduction
Statistics has always been concerned with ‘causality’. With the exception of the
more technological applications that require nothing else than the summary of
data or the making of predictions, applications of statistics to scientific problems
are bound up with the explanation of certain phenomena at some level of detail
and hence with ideas of cause and effect. And this is true in a less obvious sense:
On the one hand, every application of statistics is founded on probability models,
and every model, however simple it may be, tells a story of how empirical data
are supposed to come into being; in particular, limit theorems and theorems
characterizing distributions and random processes involve formalized notions of
causality, with certain variables causing certain effects or resulting from certain
chains of events (see, for example, the books [21], [37], [62], [26], [38], [9], [6],
[8]). On the other hand, the methods used to estimate and assess such models
(through diagnostic or goodness-of-fit techniques, through forecasting exercises)
usually take their aspects of cause and effect into account, and, to the extent that
the models are correct and incorporate the factors pertaining to the phenomena
being studied, conclusions drawn from their statistical analysis express relations
of cause and effect (see for instance the books [39], [40], [5], [4], [29] on statistical
methods and [14], [12], [72], [28], [10], [7] on applications).
Admittedly, the best possible contribution of statistics to a scientific problem
is often the establishment of associations and the provision of estimates or pre-
dictions rather than the revealing, in one stroke, of which factors cause what.
But that is only natural because theories are normally established in stages and
at any given stage the knowledge built into probability models and statistical
analyses is necessarily guided and restricted by the knowledge available in the
field where they are being applied (cf. pp. 163–4 of [41]). It is also true that
the use of statistics is typically far from being the best possible (as cogently
argued in [23] and [17] and in part made patent in [32]), and in the midst of all
visible efforts one can count relatively few significant applications of statistics.
But that is perhaps what one can expect from science in general—and especially
from modern science and from a discipline like statistics whose applications are
determined by other disciplines.
Nevertheless, it it is undeniable that even ‘simple’ statistical methods based
on random samples or simple random samples of vectors (covered by Lehmann’s
classic texts [39] and [40]) incorporate elements of causality and can lead to
successful applications. In the analysis of experiments (in biology, chemistry,
medicine, etc.) and of industrial processes, the idea that ‘treatments’ may or may
not have certain effects at different dose levels and under certain background or
initial conditions epitomizes what one normally understands by ‘causality’. In
genetics, many detailed and accurate explanations would be unthinkable without
a combination of empirical observation, ‘probability modelling’, experimentation
and statistics (e.g. [71] and [21]). In observational studies, too, and despite the
regular company of the much-abused linear regression model, causality can make
a respectable appearance: apart from studies of industrial processes where the
conditions underlying the data cannot be fully controlled (exemplified in [14]),
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and from studies where one empirical quantity can be described accurately by
an equation involving other quantities known to determine it (illustrated by
the ‘trees data’ on pp. 126–134 of [35]), one must mention Gauss’s regression
analysis of planetary orbits, eloquently summarized in Diaconis’s paper [17].
In view of these observations it is surprising to learn that in the last three
decades or so a number of research groups have been developing methods de-
signed to establish causality in applications of statistics while entertaining the
idea that the discipline of statistics, or at least some wide ‘classical’ streak of
it, has always been divorced from problems of causality—and that, in part, be-
cause the traditional language and tools of statistics (which of course include
the basic notions of sets and functions) do not allow one to formulate notions
of causality.1 Had this been an opinion held by a group of isolated eccentrics
busying themselves with irrelevant questions, it would have been of little or
no consequence to the practice of statistics; but it has hindered the work of
the researchers involved, led to the creation of more or less different schools of
statistical causality which to this day cannot agree with (nor understand) each
other completely, has alienated most mainstream statisticians from the work
being carried out by those schools, and confused many potential users of their
work, and for that reason it is unfortunate and requires some explanation.2
It would be a task for the historian of ideas in statistics to try and elucidate
the social and technical factors behind this state of things, and we shall not
embark on that. However, two of the more technical explanatory factors are
so obvious and so fully acknowledged in this paper that they must be spelled
1This idea is expressed, in full or fragmented form and with varying degrees of nuance, in
many papers and books, but the preface of [54], the first two sections of [48], the discussion
of [45] and the comment [50] provide a good summary of it. That other researchers have
partly accepted this point of view or brought up similar misconceptions in poorly conducted
discussions and in quotations taken out of context seems clear from Lindley’s review [42] of
Pearl’s work. It has been observed and adduced as sign of this disengagement on the part of
statistics that words like ‘causal’, ‘causality’ and ‘causation’ hardly appear in statistics books,
but one may equally note that these words seldom appear in books on classical mechanics
such as [27], where even ‘cause’ is used sparingly and usually in a rather informal way; it
may be said that in applied mathematics causality is implied already by the formulation of a
model—whether one needs to take or actually takes one’s formulation seriously when applying
the model is another matter.
2It is well known that there are different schools of statistical causality, the most influential
of which are those associated with J.Pearl and D.Rubin; indications of their positions, of the
disagreements between them, of the alienation of mainstream statisticians from the newest
research in statistical causality, and of the confusion of potential users of it, are sprinkled
in Pearl’s review [48] and in the literature cited in it. Some of the authors we cite speak of
‘statisticians’, ‘serious statisticians’, etc., and they often speak in the name of statisticians.
We follow this custom here but try to give a reasonably precise definition of ‘statistician’:
Our statistician is someone who has studied, at a university or independently, the equivalent
of three to five years of essentially mathematical subjects and who has done some applied or
theoretical work in statistics. In this sense, those who have studied non-mathematical subjects
and then gained some sort of statistical status through statistical work or through postgrad-
uate studies without having studied a substantial amount of undergraduate mathematics do
not qualify as statisticians. Our purpose is not to discriminate but to be clear. Using this
definition one can, for example, make the observation that nowadays the vast majority of
statistical work is carried out by non-statisticians, or emit the opinion that in order to use
statistics well one does not need to be a statistician.
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out. One is a general discomfort on the part of the schools indicated above
with the notion of random variable, patent, in different forms and varying de-
grees, in nearly all their works. The lack of clear and consistent notation, the
lack of agreement in the use of notation, the avoidance of standard notation,
the shunning of the mathematical definition of random variable (which is not
only natural but also completely elementary in the discrete case) and of its re-
lationship with empirical data in most accounts of statistical causality, are all
symptoms and consequences of that discomfort, and they have been the reason
for much aversion on the part of mainstream statisticians for all things ‘causal’.
Now if f is a real-valued function of four variables—say defined on {0, 1} ×
R3—and T , B1, B2 and ε are random variables defined on a sample space Ω,
then the functions R, R1, R2 and R3 defined for ω ∈ Ω by
R(ω) := f(T (ω), B1(ω), B2(ω), ε(ω)), R1(ω) := f(t, B1(ω), B2(ω), ε(ω)),
R2(ω) := f(T (ω), b1, B2(ω), ε(ω)), R3(ω) := f(t, b1, b2, ε(ω)),
for fixed numbers t, b1 and b2, are all random variables on the same space, and
they may be taken to represent a response measured with random error ε on an
individual following respectively exposure to a randomly determined treatment
T under randomly determined background conditions (B1, B2), exposure to a
fixed treatment t under random background, exposure to a random treatment
under partly fixed and partly random background, and exposure to a fixed treat-
ment under a fixed background. Moreover, the possibility that f(t, b1, b2, ε(ω))
may vary with t for some numbers b1 and b2 and for ω in a set of positive proba-
bility corresponds to the empirical notion that a treatment may have an effect—a
causal effect—on a response; and to investigate the existence or magnitude of
such an effect from ‘observations’ on (R, T,B1, . . .) is to investigate whether or
to what extent variations in R arise from variations in T proper rather than from
variations in (B1, B2, ǫ) via some additional (known or unknown) relationship,
such as T = τ(B1, B2, ǫ, . . .)—a relationship that confounds the workings of T on
R. Once one realizes this and, in a given real-life problem, sets out to relate the
theoretical objects with empirical data and the phenomena underlying those
data, deciding which random variables are to be regarded as observable and
which as unobservable, which arguments are to be fixed at what values, to what
extent f is known, and so on, one is ready to formulate and try to study ques-
tions of statistical causality. Any insecurity or bewilderment over such things as
f(T,B1, B2, ε), f(1−T,B1, B2, ε), f(t, B1, B2, ε) and f(1−t, B1, B2, ε) being all
defined on the same space, and hence pertaining to the same ‘individual’, while
only one of the first two and at most one of the other two may be regarded as
observable in a real sample, will also disappear as a result.3
3In the preface to his famous introduction to probability [21], W. Feller warned against
the tendency to “reduce probability problems to pure analysis as soon as possible” which
comes with a “poorly defined notion of random variables”. That this tendency had been quite
widespread is suggested by J. Doob’s account ([19], [70]) of how he used to surprise even first-
rate statisticians by announcing that sin 2πω and cos 2πω are uncorrelated but dependent
random variables on the unit interval. That the tendency persists today and may have even
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The other factor contributing to the image of statistics as a discipline that
is unwilling and unequipped to deal with problems of causality is the nature
of the overwhelming majority of applications of statistics. Although different
schools of statistical causality will have different opinions about actual statisti-
cal practice, they all seem to agree that the most popular approach to studying
the effect of a treatment based on observational data, namely that of fitting
a regression model to the response, treatment and explanatory or confounding
variables and then testing whether the coefficient of treatment is zero, is not
‘causal’.4 Some, moreover, practically equate our discipline with this approach;
according to them, statistics has really been busy with computing correlations
and finding associations rather than with trying to establish whether a cer-
tain factor indeed causes a certain response—which should call for substantial
changes in the discipline, maybe nothing short of a revolution.5 The reasons
behind this verdict are not always clear, and they appear to differ somewhat in
different schools. They cannot be completely in tune with the careful arguments
presented in [23], [17], [24] and [25], since those arguments also apply to alter-
natives proposed by some schools of statistical causality (e.g.pp.243–278 of [25]
and subsection 2.2, p. 121, of [22]). And they do not always account for the fact
that when a model is approximately correct, as in many applications to genet-
ics, in the outstanding example of Gauss, and in the more ordinary examples
mentioned above, ‘traditional’ statistics is thoroughly engaged with causality.6
Whatever explanations one may find for it, the present situation of statistical
causality within the mainstream of statistics is regrettable. During the last few
years I have met several statisticians who were genuinely interested in learning
increased in the last years—perhaps because the majority of users of statistics are ‘discontents’
from other disciples, perhaps because undergraduate educational programmes have become
shorter and less mathematical—is suggested by our account. And yet, with so many fine
books around, one ought to be aware that any worthwhile result in statistics—including very
elementary ones—benefits from, or even relies on, the interplay between random variables and
‘ordinary’ functions like distributions functions, densities and measures.
4Implicit in this approach is the belief in what we may call the ‘law of universal regression’,
according to which the majority of random functions of several variables, no matter what the
variables are and what phenomena they pertain to, could be replaced with little loss of accuracy
by what is essentially a linear combination of those variables. Of course, it has been known for
hundreds of years that a differentiable function of several variables can be approximated by
a constant plus a linear combination of the variables in a neighbourhood of a point, and that
the constants involved in that approximation generally depend on the neighbourhood. By the
law of universal regression, most phenomena in the world could be studied by assuming that
those constants are essentially independent of the neighbourhood. This might very well be
true, but it has never been proved.
5It must be admitted that if one takes into account the sheer number of publications
written under the influence of the ‘law of universal regression’ mentioned in footnote 4 and
ignores the fact that the majority of users of statistics are not statisticians in the sense of the
definition presented in the second half of footnote 2, then it may be quite natural to equate
our discipline with that law.
6Whether the models involved in an analysis are approximately correct has always been an
important question in statistics (as witnessed by [41]), and one that underlies the possibility
of causal interpretation; but in the majority of applications it is not even considered. The
recent indictment of the p-value as a statistical tool is symptomatic: while the possibility of
p-values being unreliable due to their being calculated under the wrong models is evident to
statisticians (e.g. [77]), the claimants have hardly said a word about it (e.g. [44], [74]).
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about the works of Pearl, Robins, Rubin and others, but felt frustrated by the
difficulties in understanding them. Even some of those who did work along the
lines of Pearl and Robins have confessed to not understanding them well. Others
are positively skeptical about the worth of anything related to statistical causal-
ity. Those who are not statisticians but use or would like to use statistics react
both with credulity and puzzlement to the promises, prophetic announcements
and polemics from the various camps of statistical causality; and in the midst
of it all statisticians must feel a bit lost and guilty, not quite sure whether they
are missing out on something and wondering whether they could indeed achieve
much more in their statistical analyses. This is a pity because the various schools
of statistical causality did consider some interesting questions and obtained re-
sults that are worth knowing about and studying, which may sometimes be
applied in real-life problems, and which certainly help us to think about aspects
of causality in applications of statistics.
My purpose in writing this survey has been to explain (so that I myself could
understand) the main ideas developed by the various schools of statistical causal-
ity in a unified way and as clearly as possible. That the different approaches to
causality can be put together and made to fit in with classical statistical theory
is not very surprising, but it may be surprising to see how their unification rests
on the careful definition and interpretation of sets of random variables, as op-
posed to distributions. A probability model meant to represent causal aspects
of a real-life problem must be based on sets of random variables defined as func-
tions of ‘primitive’ random variables in a sequential order that mimics purported
relations of cause and effect, together with some structural assumptions about
the functions and some distributional assumptions about the random variables.
Distributional assumptions alone are not sufficient to specify such a model be-
cause they only contain information about correlation, i.e. about the dependence
between random variables. Backed up by definitions of random variables, they
embody and may provide information on causation, but at a price: those defini-
tions must rest on some external basis, on postulates pertaining to the real-life
problem and which cannot be verified prior to the application of the model
(though they may be at a later stage, following other research efforts)—and
this is only natural since in applications the observable data are the empirical
analogues of putative random variables observed at some point ω rather than
the random variables proper (the functions defined on the sample space as op-
posed to their values at a given ω), which are designed to represent the physical
mechanisms generating the data. In principle, then, many frequently used mod-
els, such as the linear regression and analysis of variance models, are ‘causal’,
and they have been used legitimately so in much experimental research during
the last 200 years; and queueing models, epidemic models (e.g. [33]), including
D.Bernoulli’s model and its variants (e.g. [18]), and many other models designed
for non-experimental studies, can also be ‘causal’ at some level of detail. But all
these models cease to be ‘causal’ whenever their application is not supported by
clearly formulated postulates or if the postulates on which they are based are
not justified in earnest, which is what happens in many applications of statistics
to observational studies in medicine, economics and sociology, of which Yule’s
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study on the causes of poverty is an early example (section 1.4 of [24]).7
The approach to ‘causality’ proposed here is based on the explicit—and yet
completely flexible—definition of various sets of random variables pertaining to
a real-life problem and on the calculation of expectations of functions of those
variables; so it may be legitimately placed under the heading of what (at least
since the 1960’s) is often called “applied probability” or “probability modelling”
and identified with such books as [37] and [61]. The novelties in it arise from the
particularities of the problems considered by the various schools of statistical
causality. If we exclude problems of statistical inference (which may be reduced
to more or less familiar problems of estimation and testing and will not be
treated here; see [22], for example), these problems are essentially of two kinds:
(i) specification of a causal effect pertaining to a given model and determination
of conditions under which that effect can be quantified and estimated from
observable data; (ii) calculation of probabilities pertaining to altered versions of
a given model as a means of predicting the effects of interventions—of alterations
to a ‘system’.
In view of their importance for the study of causality in statistics, we have
collected some results and observations about random variables in section 2.
Our main purpose here is to lay the foundation for the models of statistical
causality introduced later (in which the random draw ω is to make a few but
important appearances) by recalling that the very definition of random sequence
incorporates ideas akin to those normally used to describe causality; for exam-
ple, the idea of independent random variables corresponds to that of real-life
events or phenomena that do not influence, affect or cause each other, and the
idea of a random sequence defined recursively corresponds to that of a ‘chain
of events’ or sequence of interrelated events or phenomena. Another purpose is
to illuminate the connection between the mathematical ideas and the empirical
objects to which they are meant to apply, and in particular to illustrate the fact
that many real-life problems require (though many others may dispense with)
the definition of explicit functional relations between variables. Finally, a third
purpose is to provide the reader who is less familiar with random variables and
their construction with a picture that makes them look as ‘real’ or ‘concrete’
as the number π, the exponential function or any other concept involving an
infinite number of operations. Although the material in section 2 is well known
and can be found in Billingsley’s beautiful book [6] and in many other texts
on probability, our presentation is a little original and, despite being intuitive
rather than rigorous, somewhat more comprehensive than is usually the case.
Causality proper begins in section 3, but with a deterministic model of cause and
effect that serves to fix ideas and terminology. Ideas of causality are surely more
basic than ideas of probability, so the essential ideas of statistical causality must
be found already in deterministic settings. Confounding in particular, though
7If the postulates have a rational justification and are open to criticism then such models
are still ‘causal’, even if there are competing models based on alternative postulates, even if
they turn out to be incomplete, insufficiently detailed, somewhat inaccurate or simply wrong.
Like much else in science, the formulation, justification and evaluation of postulates and
theories involve a certain amount of speculation and subjectivity—but no arbitrariness.
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usually presented as a statistical phenomenon, is shown in section 3 to have a
more basic deterministic version. Section 4 treats the simplest aspects of statis-
tical causality, those needed to understand Rubin’s approach to the subject and
the corresponding views of Pearl and Robins. Here it is shown how the problems
of type (i) and type (ii) mentioned above are related in a certain sense. Section 5
treats more general aspects of causality needed to understand the problems and
methods studied by Pearl, Robins and others. Section 6 collects several exam-
ples, adapted from the literature, illustrating calculations typically required in
problems of causality. Finally, the appendix constitutes an unfinished attempt
at understanding Pearl’s ‘calculus of intervention’ (which is not used explicitly
in the rest of the paper).8
2. Background
Let Ω = [0, 1], F be the family of Borel subsets of Ω, P Lebesgue measure on
Ω, and consider the probability space (Ω,F ,P). In this space one can compute
probabilities of events such as {ω},
E :=
⋃
n
[an, bb], Ω ∩Q ≡ {ω ∈ Ω : ω ∈ Q},
or
Nj :=

ω ≡
∑
m≥1
ωm
10m
∈ Ω : lim
n−→∞
1
n
n∑
m=1
δωm,j =
1
10


(j = 0, 1, ..., 9). Indeed, P({ω}) = 0, so that the probability of drawing any
particular element of Ω is 0, P(E) =
∑
nP ([an, bb]) provided the subintervals
of Ω in the union are disjoint, P(Ω ∩ Q) = 0, so that the event ‘ω is rational’
has probability 0, and P(Nj) = 1 for all j—Borel’s normal number theorem.
We interpret each ω ∈ Ω as a possible ‘random draw’ from the unit interval and
say that the probability that the draw falls between a and b is P([a, b]) = b− a
(a ≤ b), that it is impossible to draw any particular ω, that the draw is certain
to be irrational, etc.
If X : Ω → R is a random variable, the real number X(ω) is called the
‘realization’ of X associated with the random draw ω; if A is an arbitrary Borel
subset of R, the event that a realization of X falls in A, defined as X−1(A) :=
{ω ∈ Ω : X(ω) ∈ A} and often abbreviated as {X ∈ A} or ‘X is in A’, has
probability P(X ∈ A) ≡ P(X−1(A)). In particular, if U is the identity mapping
on Ω then P(U ≤ u) = u (u ∈ [0, 1]),P(U is irrational) ≡ P(U ∈ Ω\Q) = 1, and
so on; U is said to be a standard uniform random variable, or a random variable
8In writing this paper I have benefitted greatly from studying the works of David Freedman.
Freedman did much to improve statistical practice, and he was and remains a generous and
disinterested source of enlightenment to applied and theoretical statisticians alike. He was also
one of the first statisticians to make a serious effort to understand, explain and improve the
statistical causality being produced by others. Remarkably, few of those working in statistical
causality have been able to recognize his contribution.
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with the standard uniform distribution (the distribution being the mapping
A→ P(A)).
Moreover, if Dn(ω) denotes the n-th digit in the non-terminating decimal
expansion of U(ω), so that
U(ω) =
∑
n≥1
Dn(ω)
10n
≡ 0·D1(ω)D2(ω)D3(ω) · · · , (2.1)
then D1, D2, . . . are random variables on Ω and, for instance, the probability
that the second and fourth digits equal 6 and 3, P (D2 = 6, D4 = 3), is
9∑
j,k=0
(
j
10
+
6
102
+
k
103
+
3
104
< U ≤ j
10
+
6
102
+
k
103
+
4
104
)
=
1
102
,
which, because P(Dn = j) = 1/10 for all j, shows that P (D2 = 6, D4 = 3) =
P(D2 = 6)P(D4 = 3); and since the digits 3 and 6 play no special role in
this calculation it follows that D2 and D4 are independent. More generally,
D1, D2, . . . are independent random variables, each uniform on {0, 1, . . . , 9}.
Thus a standard uniform random variable may be identified with a deci-
mal expansion like (2.1) consisting of independent random digits uniform on
{0, 1, . . . , 9}. But the digits of U can be arranged in a two-dimensional array by
the ‘diagonal method’ in such a way that for each ω the correspondence
U1(ω) ↔ 0·D1(ω) D3(ω) D6(ω) D10(ω)D15(ω)D21(ω)D28(ω) · · ·
U2(ω) ↔ 0·D2(ω) D5(ω) D9(ω) D14(ω)D20(ω)D27(ω) · · · · · ·
U3(ω) ↔ 0·D4(ω) D8(ω) D13(ω)D19(ω)D26(ω) · · · · · · · · ·
U4(ω) ↔ 0·D7(ω) D12(ω)D18(ω)D25(ω) · · · · · · · · · · · ·
U5(ω) ↔ 0·D11(ω)D17(ω)D24(ω) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
U6(ω) ↔ 0·D16(ω)D23(ω) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
U7(ω) ↔ 0·D22(ω) · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · · ·
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .
determines a sequence U1(ω), U2(ω), . . . of numbers in Ω, and thereby (the ran-
dom digitsDn making up the decimal expansions being independent) a sequence
U1, U2, . . . of standard uniform random variables, all defined on the same proba-
bility space (Ω,F ,P). This construction is concrete to the extent that numbers
such as π − 3 and e− 2, say, are concrete and that to each of them there corre-
sponds a countable sequence of irrational numbers U1(ω), U2(ω), . . . Whether a
particular U(ω) = ω is a normal number or not is quite irrelevant (and proba-
bly unascertainable); what is relevant is that a draw from the probability space
yields a countable number of independent draws with the same distribution,
that sets of draws possessing certain properties have probability 1 or 0, etc.
If F is an arbitrary right-continuous distribution function on R and its ‘in-
verse’ F−1 is defined by F−1(u) = min{x ∈ R : F (x) ≥ u} then P(F−1(U) ≤
x) = F (x), i.e. the random variable X = F−1(U) has distribution function F . It
follows that the correspondence between each U(ω) = ω and X1(ω), X2(ω), . . .,
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where Xn(ω) = F
−1(Un(ω)) for each ω and n, determines a sequence X1, X2, . . .
of independent random variables on the same probability space, each of which
has distribution function F . More generally, a sequence X1, X2, . . . of indepen-
dent random variables with distribution functions F1, F2, . . . is defined by the
transformationsXn = F
−1
n (Un). Still more generally, if F1 is a distribution func-
tion and, for each n ∈ N and each x ∈ Rn, Fn+1,x is a distribution function in R
then X1=F
−1
1 (U1) and
Xn+1 = F
−1
n+1,Xn
(Un+1), Xn = (Xn, Xn−1, . . . , X1), n ∈ N,
defines a sequence of generally dependent random variables on (Ω,F ,P) with
joint distribution functions given by G1 = F1,
Gn(xn) := P(X1 ≤ x1, X2 ≤ x2, . . . , Xn ≤ xn)
=
∫ xn−1
−∞ · · ·
∫ x1
−∞ Fn,x′n−1(xn)dGn−1(x
′
n−1),
where xn = (x1, x2, . . . , xn) ∈ Rn, n = 2, 3, . . . If for instance Fn+1,x does not
depend on n and if it depends on x ∈ Rn only through the last coordinate
then the sequence X1, X2, . . . is a homogeneous Markov chain. Evidently, the
mapping of each draw U(ω) = ω to each sequence X1(ω), X2(ω), . . . is not just a
simple rearrangement of the digits of ω, as is the case with U1(ω), U2(ω), . . .; but,
again, the unfolding of a number like π − 3 diagonally into a two-dimensional
array followed by the transformation of the rows of the array by a real-valued
function is just as concrete as π − 3 itself.
Finally, one can define an uncountable set Y = (Yt)t≥0 of random variables—
a random function or ‘continuous-time’ stochastic process on R+—on the same
probability space. Indeed, the procedure used above to get U1, U2, . . . from U
can be applied to each of the Uns to yield an independent sequence of sequences
(Vn,m)m≥1 of independent standard uniform random variables, and these in turn
can be transformed into an independent sequence of sequences (Xn,m)m≥1 of
independent random variables with any given distribution functions. But then,
for example, two such sequences, say (X1,m)m≥1 and (X2,m)m≥1, the first of
which may be assumed strictly positive, suffice to determine for each ω a right-
continuous step function9 Yt(ω) =
∑
m≥1X2,m(ω)1{X1,1+···+X1,m≤t}(ω), whose
jumps occur at the points X1,1(ω) + · · · + X1,m(ω) and have sizes X2,m(ω) −
X2,m−1(ω); in particular, if the first sequence has the same exponential distri-
bution and the second is degenerate at 1 (i.e.P(X2,n = 1) = 1 for all n) then Y
is a Poisson process.
For a second example based on all the independent sequences (Xn,m)m≥1
obtained above, consider for each n ∈ N some real-valued functions (fm,n)m≥1
on R+ such that fm,n(t) = 0 for t 6∈ ]n− 1, n] and set
Y
(n)
t (ω) =
∑
m≥1
fm,n(t)Xn,m(ω)
for t∈ [n − 1, n] and ω ∈ Ω for which the series converges and Y (n)t (ω) = 0 for
other (t, ω). Under certain conditions on the fm,ns and on the Xn,ms (e.g. [34]),
9As usual, 1E(ω) equals 1 for ω ∈ E and 0 for ω 6∈ E.
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for each n the function t→ Y (n)t (ω) is continuous on [n− 1, n] for ω in a set of
probability 1. Under such conditions, for ω in a set of probability 1 the function
Yt(ω) =
∑
n≥1

Y (n)t (ω) + n−1∑
j=1
Y
(j)
1 (ω)

1[n−1,n[(t)
is continuous on R+. For instance, if the Xn,ms are normally distributed with
EXn,m = 0 and Var(Xn,m) = 1, and if fn,m(t) =
√
2
πm
[1− cos(mπ{t− (n− 1)})],
then the Y = (Yt)t≥0 thus defined is a Wiener (or Brownian motion) process.
In applications of statistics to real-life problems one identifies empirical data
with the values X1(ω),X2(ω), . . . assumed by a sequence {Xm}m≥1 of random
vectors (say) at some point ω which may or may not be empirically observable.
Although different sequences defined in different probability spaces may be es-
sentially equivalent to each other and any of them may serve equally well in
a given application, some such sequence must be made to correspond (even if
only implicitly) with the empirical data if anything nontrivial is to be inferred
from these. For it is only thanks to some sort of ‘approximate isomorphism’
between the empirical world and the ideal world by which we make empirical
data correspond to theoretical concepts, perform operations on the latter and
deduce propositions from them, and then translate those propositions into em-
pirical terms, that we can overstep the concrete but limited realm of data. Thus,
for instance, a confidence interval for a parameter, or the very mention of the
parameter, will be meaningless without reference to some sequence of random
variables.
The probability space on which the sequence is defined is usually irrelevant,
and the particular ω is almost always irrelevant even when it exists and can
be identified. The distribution of the sequence, on the other hand, is always
important, since any probabilistic statement one may wish to apply in the real
world depends on whether its elements are independent, identically distributed,
Markov, stationary, Gaussian, etc. The extent to which the definition of random
variables—in particular the possible functional relationships between them—
matters depends on the problem. If the empirical data are drawn randomly or
almost randomly from some conceptually infinite population their definition is
quite irrelevant. But if they are obtained successively in time and data obtained
at different times are physically related—say humidity at a certain location after
midnight and humidity and other atmospheric quantities before midnight—then
it is essential that the elements of our sequence reflect those aspects by means of
such relations as Xm+1 = fm(Xm,Xm−1, . . . , θ), say, where a lot or very little
may be known or assumed about the functions fm and the parameter θ. It is for
this reason that time series and Markov chain models, and stochastic processes
in general, are most often defined by means of relationships between random
variables rather than purely in terms of their joint distributions.
One may, of course, acknowledge that there is no way of checking that a
particular probability model provides a sufficiently accurate picture of a given
real-life problem (e.g. pp. 323–334 of [25]), but often there are tests (including
Ferreira/Causality: Viewpoint of Classical Statistics 12
prediction exercises) which, together with plausibility arguments and a little
faith, provide partial, provisional checks. For example, one can verify that many
empirical (statistical) properties of a sequence of sexes of newborns in a given
population, of a sequence of ‘phenotypic determinations’ in newborns of a given
species, of the sequence of digits in the decimal expansion of π, etc., are almost
perfectly consistent with the corresponding theoretical (probabilistic) proper-
ties of a sequence of independent and identically distributed random variables.
Surely one must dismiss the idea that, since no model can be proven correct for
a situation, all models are equally wrong, from which it is not a long way to
concluding that all models are equally legitimate for a given real-life problem.
3. A deterministic model
When one says that something affects, is the cause of, or has an effect on some-
thing else, then one implies that it does so after a certain moment and in a
certain situation which may help bring about the effect and which, up to that
moment, may itself affect and be affected by the cause. Mathematically, this
idea can be expressed by the equations
R = ρ(X, T ), τ(X, T ) = 0, (3.1)
where τ and ρ are some functions,X describes the situation prior to the moment
when the effect comes into force, T stands for the cause—called treatment here
on account of problems of cause and effect typically encountered in applied
research—and R stands for the joint result of, or the response to, X and T .10
Although the second equation may define T implicitly as a function of X—and
the components of the latter implicitly as functions of its other components
and of T—it really is a constraint representing the interaction between T and
X prior to the moment when the effect comes into force; thus, for a given X
there may be a single value of T satisfying τ(X, T ) = 0, but there may be none,
and often there will be several—for if T were uniquely determined by X then
the response would be a function of the situation alone and there would be no
treatment to talk of, a possibility that we exclude. On the other hand, except in
artificial cases neither X nor T will be functions of R; and even if (X, T ) can be
written as a function of R there should be no reason for one to interpret (3.1)
as saying that the response causes the situation or the treatment.11
10In a general discussion X, T and R may be thought of as arbitrary sets of numerical,
textual and pictorial elements, but later on we shall think of them mainly as vectors of real
numbers. The range of τ need not be one-dimensional, so the second equation may be a system
of equations relating T and the components of X.
11For instance, if ρ(X, T ) = (X−1)(T −1)+X(X−1)/2+T (T +1)/2 then ρ is one-to-one
in N×N and maps this set onto N, so one might very well consider that R causes (X, T ) rather
than that X and T cause R; but of course that would require us to interpret X, T and R
and their relation with “the moment when the effect comes into force” in a different way. The
possibility of one confusing cause and effect in our two equations, having read the definitions
that presuppose them, is as ‘problematic’ as the possibility of one concluding that the motion
of a marble rolling down an inclined plane is the cause of gravity or of the inclination of the
plane.
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In order to turn these ideas into a ‘causal model’ we only need to specify
or assume the existence of sets X and T of situations and treatments and of
a set S ⊂ X × T containing some elements (X, T ) such that τ(X, T ) = 0 and
which can be used to compute values of R = ρ(X, T ). For, irrespectively of how
apt such model is to represent a particular real-life situation, the fact that we
may try a definite range of values of X and T in (3.1) allows us to consider the
question of whether and to what extent the treatment affects the response—the
question of whether ρ(X, T ) varies with T for some X, and, if the treatment
does have an effect, of quantifying that effect in terms of the possible differences
between responses ρ(X, T1) and ρ(X, T2) to different treatments T1, T2 under
one or more situations X.
And the model applies at least to some concrete problems—even if those
problems may seem artificial or of limited interest. For example, the lifetime
of a set of batteries used in a radio receiver depends on the type or brand of
the batteries and possibly on such factors as elapsed shelf life, temperature and
rate of usage during operation, etc. In principle, by varying the brand of the
batteries of a given type (or the type of batteries of one brand, or both), and
using the radio in such a way as to keep the other factors fixed, one should
be able to determine which brand lasts longer. Such ‘studies’ or ‘experiments’
can take place in everyday life and need not require much planning or care in
order to provide satisfactory answers. Thus, if two sets of batteries being tested
have very different lifetimes then slight differences between the temperature,
rate of usage, elapsed shelf life, etc., experienced during the two periods of
testing will probably not mask the superiority of one set over the other: in the
language of (3.1), if T1 and T2 represent the sets of batteries and X1 and X2 the
‘situations’ during the two periods of testing (satisfying τ(Xi, Ti) = 0, i = 1, 2),
one expects R1 = ρ(X1, T1) ≈ ρ(X, T1) and R2 = ρ(X2, T2) ≈ ρ(X, T2) provided
X1 ≈ X ≈ X2, in which case the comparison between R1 and R2 is a suitable
replacement for the desired but more demanding comparison between ρ(X, T1)
and ρ(X, T2).
12 But the same sort of consideration serves to show that in such
experiments the effect of the factor of interest may be confounded with (or
by) the effects of incidental factors: if ρ(X, T1) ≈ ρ(X, T2) for each X, and if
ρ(X1, T ) and ρ(X2, T ) are very different for each T and X1 6= X2, then the large
difference between R1 and R2 will be a poor substitute of the small differences
between ρ(X1, T1) and ρ(X1, T2) and between ρ(X2, T1) and ρ(X2, T2).
Let us say in connection with our model that confounding occurs or exists, or
that the situationX is a confounder of the treatment, whenever τ is not constant
in X and not constant in T and there exist pairs (X1, T1), (X2, T2) ∈ S such
that X1 6= X2, T1 6= T2 and
τ(Xi, Ti) = 0 and ρ(X1, Ti) 6= ρ(X2, Ti) for i = 1, 2.
While the first condition here implies that the choice of T and the choice of
X are to some extent subordinated to each other, the second implies that the
12In this example, the occurrence of situations and treatments may be represented by a
multivariate table with binary entries indexed by the levels of the factors and treatment, and
τ may consist of a vector of sums of products of indicator functions of the entries of the table.
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possibility of investigating the effect of the treatment by comparing ρ(X, T1)
with ρ(X, T2) for a given X is not guaranteed—because on the one hand X
need not belong both to {X′ : τ(X′, T1) = 0} and {X′ : τ(X′, T2) = 0}, the
intersection of which may be empty, and on the other hand a difference between
ρ(X1, T1) with ρ(X2, T2) may be due to the difference betweenX1 andX2 rather
than to the difference between T1 and T2.
However, as the definition already suggests, even if confounding exists it is
still possible to study the effect of the treatment in situations X for which at
least two different treatments T1 and T2 satisfy τ(X, T1) = τ(X, T2) = 0 by
comparing the responses ρ(X, T1) and ρ(X, T2), or in different situations X1
and X2 which are coupled with different treatments T1 and T2 and which exert
the same effect on the response—that is, ρ(X1, T ) = ρ(X2, T ) for each T—
and therefore permit the comparison of the responses ρ(X1, T1) = ρ(X2, T1)
and ρ(X1, T2) = ρ(X2, T2). Accordingly, when confounding occurs in our model
we shall say that confounding can be removed (or that one can correct for con-
founding, or something similar) provided there exist at least two different points
(X, T1), (X, T2) ∈ S such that τ(X, T1) = τ(X, T2) = 0, or at least two points
(X1, T1), (X2, T2) ∈ S such that X1 6= X2, T1 6= T2, τ(X1, T1) = τ(X2, T2) = 0
and ρ(X1, Ti) = ρ(X2, Ti) for i = 1, 2.
In the first case, removal of confounding is achieved by matching points
(X, T ), (X, T ′) possessing different treatments T, T ′ and such that τ(X, T ) =
τ(X, T ′) = 0 for each one of as many as possible situations X and compar-
ing their responses ρ(X, T ), ρ(X, T ′). In the second case, using the fact that
ρ(X, T ) = ρ(X′, T ) for some pairs (X,X′) of different situations and T in a
certain subset of treatments satisfying τ(X, T ) = τ(X′, T ) = 0, one corrects for
confounding by stratifying or partitioning a subset of X into sets
XX=
{
X′∈X : τ(X′, T )=τ(X, T )=0, ρ(X′, T )=ρ(X, T ) for some T ∈T },
and comparing responses corresponding to various T ∈ T within each XX.13
Example 3.1. Running the risk of being pedantic, we give an example. Take
some functions f :Z→ Z, F,G :Z2→ Z and H :Z3→ Z, some sets A,B ⊂ Z,
and put
τ(x, t) = f(|x1|)1B(x2) + F (x)1Bc(x2)− t,
ρ(x, t) = G(x2, t)1A(x1) +H(x, t)1Ac(x1), x = (x1, x2) ∈ Z2, t ∈ Z.
If x = (x1, x2) and x
′= (x′1, x2) with x1, x
′
1 ∈ A such that x1 6=x′1 andf(|x1|) =
f(|x′1|) (say x′1 = −x1), and x2 ∈ B, then we may have τ(x, t) = τ(x′, t′) =
f(|x1|) − t = 0 for some t but typically ρ(x, t) = G(x2, t) 6=G(x2, t′) = ρ(x′, t′),
so the comparison of the last two quantities reveals the effect of the second argu-
ment on the response. Thus, one can study the effect of treatment by stratifying
13These ideas have been explained (e.g. in the article by Moses and Mosteller in [72])
with a disarming simplicity that makes this formalization appear a little embarrassing. But
some formalization is probably useful, if only because of the periodic revision of ideas about
confounding (e.g. [76]).
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A × B on the second coordinate of the situation, i.e. by comparing ρ(x, t) for
different values of t and x ∈ {x′ = (x′1, x′2) ∈ A×B : f(|x′1|) = f(|x1|)} for each
x1 ∈ A. In order to do this one must ‘know’ that for certain values of the first
coordinate of the situation only the second coordinate influences the response.
It follows from this discussion that the possibility of studying the effect of
treatment on the response depends on the nature of the set S, on the constraint
τ(X, T ) = 0, and on the ‘response function’ ρ.
If τ is constant in T then X and T can be chosen at will, i.e. within the
limits imposed by the constraint on the Xs and by S but independently of each
other. In our example of the radio batteries, the model with constant τ corre-
sponds to the possibility of carrying out an experimental study involving, for
instance, buying batteries of two different brands fresh from the factories at the
appropriate times and testing each brand by playing the radio continuously un-
til the batteries die, at constant volume, in a room with controlled temperature,
humidity, etc.
If on the contrary τ varies with T and X then whether confounding can
be removed and the extent to which it can be removed—the range of Xs for
which τ(X, T1) = τ(X, T2) = 0 for some T1 6= T2—depend on how strong
the constraint τ(X, T ) = 0 is and on how rich S is.14 In the example of the
batteries, this last version of the model may represent an observational study in
which a careless experimenter buys batteries from various shops at unplanned
times, depending on availability and other circumstances, and would not take
particular care in fixing temperature, rate of usage, etc. If the experimenter
carried out many such experiments he might be fortunate enough to have a
few of them in which batteries of different brands happened to have the same
elapsed shelf life (e.g. because by chance the shops replaced their stocks at
the right times) and the rate of usage, temperature, etc., just happened to be
constant or, when they were not, exerted no influence on the life of the batteries.
The model around (3.1) will be generalized to a statistical model of causality
in the next section; most real-life problems—including those of the life of bat-
teries, which is subject to small chance variations already during manufacture—
have to do with some form of randomness, so it is only natural that mathematical
models of causality should be statistical. But before going into the generaliza-
tion let us return for a moment to the general considerations with which we
have started this section.
Once the treatment has come into force, the situation X may change sub-
sequently into a new situation X′, partly as a result of the treatment and
of the response, a possibility that we represent by X′ = κ(X, T, R) for some
function κ; and similarly the treatment and the response may be changed into
T ′ = τ ′(X′,X, T, R) and R′ = ρ′(X′, T ′,X, T, R) by means of some functions τ ′
14For example, let n ∈ N and consider τ(x, t) = x2 + t2 − n2 for x, t ∈ R. If S = N2 then
for each ‘situation’ x there is at most one ‘treatment’ t that can be used to evaluate ρ(x, t),
so confounding cannot be removed. If S = R2, two treatments, namely t± = ±
√
n2 − x2, can
be considered for each situation x ∈ ]−n, n[ and therefore confounding may be removed by
comparing ρ(x,−t) with ρ(x, t) and ρ(−x,−t) with ρ(−x, t); but even in this case the range
of usable (x, t)s is quite restricted compared to S.
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and ρ′. But substitution shows that
R′ = ρ′(κ(X, T, R), τ ′(X′,X, T, R),X, T, R)
= ρ′(κ(X, T, R), τ ′(κ(X, T, R),X, T, R),X, T, R)
=: ρ′′(X, T, R)
= ρ′′(X, T, ρ(X, T ))
=: ρ˜(X, T ),
which is of the same form as the first equation in (3.1) except that the response
is now thought of as being obtained at a later stage—and need not even be of
the same nature as R—and the function ρ˜ effecting it may be different from
the ρ considered first (evidently, the effect of T may be amplified through ρ′, τ ′
and κ, but it may also vanish). This observation shows that it is legitimate to
consider whether and to what extent a treatment has or has had an effect on
a response which is determined at any time following the determination of the
treatment and surrounding situation. And it illustrates the fact, emphasized for
example in [13], that a causal formulation of events based on equations such as
(3.1) “does not imply a notion of ultimate causation” because it “may itself have
a further explanation at some deeper level”—thus the equations R′ = ρ˜(X, T ),
τ(X, T ) = 0 have a deeper explanation in terms of (3.1) together with the
equations defining X′ and T ′, but they themselves can serve to investigate the
effect of the original treatment.
4. A statistical model
The deterministic model around (3.1) has a natural statistical version:
Rn = ρ
(
Vn,Xn, Tn
)
, Tn = τ
(
Un,Xn
)
, n ∈ N, (4.1)
where (Xn)n≥1 is a sequence of random ‘situations’ taking values in X (e.g. in
Rd), (Tn)n≥1 is a sequence of random treatments taking values in T (e.g. in N0),
(Rn)n≥1 is the corresponding sequence of random responses (e.g. taking values
in R), (Un)n≥1 and (Vn)n≥1 are sequences of random variables such that Un and
Vn are both standard uniform conditionally on Xn, all of them defined on our
probability space (Ω,F ,P), and ρ and τ are some functions defined on [0, 1]×X×
T and [0, 1]×X , respectively. Indeed, the first equation in (4.1) is a randomized
version of the first equation in (3.1), and the second picks a treatment at random,
through Un, among those treatments which are compatible with Xn; and if τ is
constant in its second argument then the treatments, though randomly selected,
are not subject to restrictions imposed by the situation. Just like in (3.1), there
is no danger of confusing cause and effect in equations (4.1): Rn is a function of
(Xn, Tn) and represents an event occurring after the determination of the latter;
more precisely, the calculation of Rn(ω) for each ω ∈ Ω is really preceded by
the calculation of Xn(ω) followed by that of Tn(ω) from Xn(ω)—and if there
must be an ‘ultimate cause of things’ it is the drawing of ω.15
15A concern about standard mathematical notation not being able to represent relation-
ships of cause and effect appears to be quite common; see for instance the text leading to
footnote 5 of [47], the second paragraph on p. 291 of [13], or section 2 of [36].
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Remarks. (i) The functions ρ and τ are typically regarded as unknown; the
extent to which they are unknown (whether their expressions are unknown,
whether some parameters of their partially known expressions are unknown)
depends on the real-life problem to which the model is applied, and it is mostly
irrelevant to our general discussion. When X = Rd and T = R, (4.1) includes the
model Rn = β0Tn+β ·Xn+Φ−1(Vn, 0, σ2), where β0 ∈ R, β ∈ Rd and σ2 > 0 and
Φ−1 denotes the inverse of the normal distribution function—i.e.Φ−1(·, µ, σ2) is
the inverse of Φ(x, µ, σ2)=
∫ x
−∞
e
−
1
2
(
y−µ
σ
)2
σ
√
2π
dy. This very particular model is not
a linear regression model unless Un and Vn are independent conditionally on
Xn and the (U1, V1), (U2, V2), . . . are independent conditionally on X1,X2, . . .
Of course, (4.1) is much more general: as seen in section 2, each Vn can be used
to generate a random function; so ρ may, for example, be taken as a function
acting on such a random function and having Xn and Tn as parameters.
(ii) There is nothing special about our choice of the distributions of Un and
Vn: by redefining ρ and τ one may choose other distributions to define the model
(cf. remark (iv) below). But at least in specific examples some distributions must
be chosen, and taking a ‘canonical’ distribution (namely a single continuous
distribution) such as the standard uniform facilitates the statement of definitions
and results. There is even a good psychological reason for using a function such
as Φ−1 in combination with Vn in the example just given: doing so reminds us
and brings home to us that in a real-life problem mathematical ideas need to be
mapped onto empirical objects, and that the mapping requires justification. In
our example of section 3, Vn could represent the vicissitudes of a set of batteries
during manufacture, which should be beyond (though perhaps related to) their
brand or type Tn and beyond the situation Xn surrounding the experiments.
(iii) The fact that one can talk of the distribution of (Xn, Tn) given {Rn=r},
r ∈ R, and the fact that one can construct a random vector (X˜n, T˜n) with the
same distribution as (Xn, Tn) from a random function of Rn—for example, in
the case where X , T ⊂ R, by
X˜n=G
−1
T˜n,Rn
(ξ′n), T˜n=F
−1
Rn
(ξn),
where Fr(t) = P(Tn ≤ t|Rn = r), Gt,r(x) = P(Xn ≤ x|Tn = t, Rn = r) and
ξn, ξ
′
n are independent standard uniforms independent of Rn—do not in any way
invalidate the causal interpretation of (4.1). The (X˜n, T˜n, Rn) thus constructed
has the same distribution as (Xn, Tn, Rn), but these random vectors are quite
different and cannot represent the same relations of cause and effect in a given
problem. Because observed data correspond to random variables evaluated at a
sample point ω, in general they cannot tell us whether they originate by a process
analogous to that used to define (Xn, Tn, Rn)—namely by generating Xn, then
Tn based on Xn, and finally Rn based on Xn and Tn—or by a process analogous
to that used to define (X˜n, T˜n, Rn); typically, they can only tell us whether the
distribution of our random vectors is likely to be correct. Consequently, the basis
and justification for (4.1) are not to be found in observed data—the empirical
analogs of (X˜n(ω), T˜n(ω), Rn(ω))—but in knowledge of the field of application,
part of which may, of course, have a statistical origin or nature.
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(iv) There is no loss of generality in assuming that Un and Vn are standard
uniform conditionally on Xn. To see this, write F (u;x) = P(Un ≤ u|Xn = x)
and G(v;x, u) = P(Vn ≤ v|Un = u,Xn = x), and let ξn and ξ′n be independent
standard uniforms independent of Xn. Then U˜n := F
−1(ξn;Xn) and V˜n,U˜n :=
G−1(ξ′n;Xn, U˜n) have the same joint distribution as Un and Vn, and hence Xn,
R˜n = ρ
(
V˜n,U˜n ,Xn, T˜n
)
and T˜n = τ(U˜n,Xn)
have the same joint distribution as the Xn, Tn and Rn of (4.1). But R˜n and T˜n
can also be written as
R˜n= ρ˜
(
ξ′′n,Xn, T˜n
)
and T˜n= τ˜ (ξn,Xn)
where ξ′′n is the standard uniform random variable obtained by alternating the
digits in the decimal expansions of ξn and ξ
′
n, τ˜ (u,x) = τ
(
F−1(u;x),x
)
and
ρ˜(w,x, t) = ρ
(
G−1(v;x, u),x, t
)
, with w ∈ ]0, 1[ made up by alternating the
digits in the decimal expansions of u and v.
This remark illustrates the fact that our model can be seen as a blueprint
of infinitely many models of cause and effect involving ‘situations’, ‘treatments’
and ‘responses’: if accompanied by appropriate changes in ρ and τ , changes
in the distributions of the random variables may yield vectors with the same
distribution as (Xn, Tn, Rn) but which differ very much from it as functions on
the sample space Ω. This, too, is perfectly natural and does not in any way
invalidate the use of the model to represent relations of cause and effect; for
any blueprint we may adopt (and one must be adopted in any given real-life
problem) will share the essential features of causality with the others, namely
the occurrence of a situation, followed by the occurrence of the treatment as a
result of that situation and of extraneous factors, and the response generated
as a result of the situation, of the treatment, and of further extraneous factors.
Note that in (4.1) the possibility of Un and Vn being dependent conditionally
on Xn is made more explicit by the above representations of T˜n and R˜n, where
U˜n and V˜n,U˜n are dependent if and only if G
−1( · ;x, u) is not constant in u. The
conditional independence of Un and Vn will be seen to play a crucial role in the
study of the treatment effect.
(v) If the τ of (4.1) is constant in the first argument and not constant in the
second then the treatment is fully determined by the situation, the response is
fully determined by the situation, and there is no treatment to talk of. When
using (4.1) as a model for observational data we want to exclude this situation
and implicitly assume that τ is not constant in its first argument if it is not
constant in the second argument; this assumption implies that the distribution
of Tn conditional on Xn is not degenerate and corresponds to Rubin’s notion
of ‘probabilistic assignment’ (p. 38 of [31]). Evidently, τ may be constant in the
second argument, in which case it serves as a model for an experimental study,
and it may be constant in both arguments.
(vi) That Tn = τ
(
Un,Xn
)
is a random version of the constraint in the deter-
ministic model is seen from the fact that selecting (X, T ) from S for the evalua-
tion of the response is equivalent to selecting X and then selecting one of the T s
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for which τ(X, T ) = 0. However, the second equation in (4.1) is not a complete
generalization of the constraint in the deterministic model: the latter is a system
of equations and the former is a single equation; and in (4.1) Tn is the result of
Xn, while in a real-life problem the former could affect some of the components
of the latter. More general models in which part of Xn is a function of Tn and Tn
is a function of the remainder of Xn will be considered in section 5. As will be
seen, for studying the effect of a treatment the more general models can often be
reduced to (4.1). 
The selection of elements (X, T ) satisfying τ(X, T ) = 0 in the deterministic
model has here a counterpart in the random sequence (Xn, Tn)n≥1 of pairs of
situations and treatments, which of course possesses more structure and may
be endowed with such features as independence or dependence and stationarity
or nonstationarity.16
An interesting variant of model (4.1) is obtained by letting Tn be constant
with probability 1, or letting it take a fixed number of values at fixed values of n,
while allowing the Xns to be nondegenerate. If we regard our statistical model
as representing a self-contained ‘world’ or ‘system’ evolving from a random draw
ω, we can think of this option as the external forcing of a fixed treatment, or
of a fixed pattern of treatments, upon the system—which without that external
intervention would have evolved randomly according to its own laws. Thus, we
will see that if a real-life problem can be represented by a model like (4.1) then
it is sometimes useful to consider the associated intervention model
Rn = ρ
(
Vn,Xn, tn
)
, n ∈ N, (4.2)
where the sequences (Xn)n≥1, (Vn)n≥1 have the same distributions as in (4.1)
and (tn)n≥1 is a sequence of numbers in T—which in particular may be set
equal to a constant in order to represent the forcing of the same treatment in
every situation in which the treatment may exert an effect.17
These statistical models bring with them a distinction between observable
and unobservable random variables: in (4.1), the situations, the treatments and
the responses are observable because, already in the deterministic model, they
are regarded as empirical data which can be observed or measured in connection
16If ρ is constant in its first argument, if Un picks Tn at random out of those T satisfying
the second equation in (3.1) withXn in place of X, and if the Xn are randomly drawn from X ,
then our model is essentially the deterministic model, except that the selections of (X, T ) ∈ S
are made in a certain order specified by ω.
17When the tns are all equal, the intervention model corresponds to an application of
Pearl’s ‘do operator’—“which simulates physical interventions by deleting certain functions
[in this case τ ] from the model, replacing them by a constant [...], while keeping the rest of
the model unchanged”—to (4.1); see p. 107 of [48] or pp. 54-57 of [54]. Of course, in many
non-experimental real-life situations the enforcement of a treatment upon a system does affect
other aspects of that system (for instance, forcing an individual to stop smoking may cause
him to increase his consumption of alcohol or foodstuffs, or to recalcitrate in unanticipated
ways; cf. section 8.2 of [13]), but, as we shall see later on, an intervention model, even if purely
hypothetical or unrealizable, may, in principle, serve a good purpose. Note that (4.2) really
defines a family of models, one model for each sequence (tn)n≥1, and that (4.2) could also be
seen as a special case of (4.1) where τ depends only on the index n of the pair (Un,Xn).
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with a cause and effect relationship; the Uns and Vns, on the other hand, are
regarded as unobservable, because they were brought in precisely as ‘factors’
lying beyond the situations and treatments, i.e.beyond what can be observed or
measured. Of course, unobservable random variables are as mathematical and as
‘real’ as observable random variables; the main reason for distinguishing them
is that only observable variables can be used in statistical procedures—such as
versions of the matching and stratification procedures mentioned in section 3,
or procedures to estimate functions such as (x, t) → E[Rn|Xn = x, Tn = t],
which plays an important role in the sequel.
As in section 3, to say that treatment has an effect on the response—or that
there exists a treatment effect—in connection with (4.1) or (4.2) is essentially
to say that the response function ρ is not constant in its third argument. More
precisely, treatment has an effect on the response if, for some n, conditionally
on Xn the function t → ρ(Vn(ω),Xn, t) varies with t with positive probability.
Equivalently, there is a treatment effect if and only if18
L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)∣∣Xn = x) ≡ L(ρ(Vn,x, t)∣∣Xn = x)
is not constant in t for some n and some x such that P(Xn = x) > 0. Evidently,
if L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)) is not constant in t for some n then the treatment has an
effect on the response, but the converse is not true.19
In real-life problems the (Xn, Tn, Rn)s are meant to represent observations on
‘individuals’ (or ‘patients’, ‘units’, etc.) and to serve as models for the responses
of those individuals to treatments under certain conditions. The hypothesis that
the treatment has no effect on the response then means that the response of the
n-th individual is fully determined by the situation and by incidental factors
represented by Vn. On the other hand, it is enough that a single individual’s
response be affected by the treatment in a particular situation for the treatment
to have an effect.
It follows from all this that a study of the treatment effect on the response
amounts to a study of the conditional—or perhaps unconditional—laws of the
random variables ρ(Vn,Xn, t), t ∈ T , the so-called potential outcomes. But these
random variables are unobservable (only ρ(Vn,Xn, Tn) is observable), so it is not
obvious that their laws can be estimated from observed data. In fact, we shall
now see that the possibility of estimating L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)∣∣Xn = x) from data—
i.e. the possibility of studying the effect of treatment on response—corresponds
to the possibility of removing confounding in (4.1); for, as in the deterministic
model, theXns are confounders of treatment because unless one is somehow able
to ‘fix’ them it is generally impossible to know whether differences in response
are due to differences in the situations or to differences in the treatment.
18It is sometimes convenient to refer to the probability distribution A → P(X ∈ A) of
a random variable X as the law of X, which we denote by L(X); similarly, the law of Y
conditional on the event {X = x}, written L(Y |X = x), stands for A→ P(Y ∈ A|X = x).
19The law of ρ(Vn,Xn, t) is interesting both conditionally and unconditionally on Xn: the
conditional law provides complete information about how the treatment varies in direction
and magnitude with the situation, but the unconditional law can be useful for making general
statements; cf. the third and penultimate paragraphs in section 4.4 of [13].
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Ideally, the study of the treatment effect in our statistical model (4.1) would
involve the comparison between the values of ρ
(
Vn,Xn, t
)
for various t ∈ T—the
potential outcomes of the n-th individual. However, at each draw ω we only get
to see the observed response ρ
(
Vn(ω),Xn(ω), t
)
of (4.1) for a single t, namely for
t = Tn(ω); we do not see any of its counterfactuals, that is to say the responses
ρ
(
Vn(ω),Xn(ω), t
)
for t 6= Tn(ω)—if we did, then the differences
ρ
(
Vn(ω),Xn(ω), Tn(ω)
)− ρ(Vn(ω),Xn(ω), t)
for t 6= Tn(ω) would reveal the effect of the treatment (or the lack of it) and solve
our problem. Even in the intervention model (4.2) the most that one is given
to see and is allowed to compare (e.g. when the Xns are discrete) at a single
draw ω are pairs of responses ρ
(
Vm(ω),Xm(ω), tm
)
and ρ
(
Vn(ω),Xn(ω), tn
)
such that Xm(ω) = Xn(ω) = x for some x ∈ X and tm 6= tn, which, because
they generally differ in the first argument of ρ, will, on their own, seldom tell
us whether the differences between them are caused by the treatment or by
variations in Vm and Vn (whose realizations are unobservable). It seems evident,
then, that in order to study the effect of treatment based on a single realization
(Xn(ω), Tn(ω), Rn(ω))n≥1 of (4.1) one has to make do with the comparison of
empirical conditional averages such as
N∑
n=1
1{Xn=x,Tn=t}(ω)ρ
(
Vn(ω),x, t
)
N∑
n=1
1{Xn=x,Tn=t}(ω)
and
N∑
n=1
1{Xn=x,Tn=t′}(ω)ρ
(
Vn(ω),x, t
′)
N∑
n=1
1{Xn=x,Tn=t′}(ω)
for t 6= t′ and various x—and hope that the Vn(ω)s for which Tn(ω) = t are
not essentially different, as far as their role in ρ is concerned, from those for
which Tn(ω) = t
′. However, there is nothing in the conditions introduced so
far that prevents us from having, for instance, Vn(ω) < 1/2 for n such that
1{Xn=x,Tn=t}(ω) = 1 and Vn(ω) ≥ 1/2 for n such that 1{Xn=x,Tn=t′}(ω) = 1,
an occurrence that would confound the workings of t in ρ
(
Vn(ω),x, t
)
and could
produce a difference between the two averages even if ρ were constant in its
third argument. It is therefore necessary to require, for the purpose of studying
the treatment effect in model (4.1), that Vn be independent of Tn conditionally
on Xn, or, what is equivalent, that Un and Vn be independent conditionally on
Xn. This condition, which we shall refer to as unconfoundedness, should make it
possible to remove confounding because each Vn contributing to one average has
the same distribution as each Vn contributing to the other, so that differences
between averages that seem too extreme can be attributed to the fact that t 6= t′
rather than to randomness.
Remarks. (i) Our formulation of unconfoundedness in connection with model
(4.1) can be regarded as a more explicit version of a condition proposed by
Arjas and Parner ([2],[3]). For other arguments and examples showing that the
independence of Un and Vn conditional on Xn is necessary for the removal
of confounding see section 2.1 of [22], where (4.1) under unconfoundedness is
referred to as the ‘basic model’.
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(ii) If Un and Vn are independent given Xn then the set
(
ρ
(
Vn,Xn, t
))
t∈T
of potential outcomes is independent of Tn=τ(Un,Xn) given Xn. In particular,
if T ={0, 1} this means that (R(n)1 , R(n)0 ), where R(n)t ≡R(n)t (Xn) :=ρ
(
Vn,Xn, t
)
,
is independent of Tn given Xn, which is Rubin’s condition of unconfoundedness
(e.g. [63] or p. 38 of [31]). Conversely, if Rubin’s condition holds then we can
define R˜
(n)
t ≡ ρ
(
V˜n,Xn, t
)
:=G−1t,Xn(V˜n) and T˜n ≡ τ(U˜n,Xn) :=F−1Xn(U˜n), where
Gt,x is the distribution function of R
(n)
t given {Xn=x, Tn= t}, Fx that of Tn
given {Xn=x}, and U˜n and V˜n are independent standard uniforms independent
of Xn, to get a ‘probabilistic copy’ (Xn, T˜n, R˜
(n)
0 , R˜
(n)
1 ) of (Xn, Tn, R
(n)
0 , R
(n)
1 )
which follows (4.1) with unconfoundedness. This shows that (4.1) in conjunction
with the conditional independence of Un and Vn is essentially equivalent to the
so-called Neyman-Rubin model—in fact it is a slight generalization of it due to
the more general nature of T , X , etc.
(iii) A short history of the ideas around potential outcomes can be found in
chapter 2 of [31]. Evidently, potential outcomes and counterfactuals are perfectly
well defined from a mathematical point of view, and they are utterly meaningful
in a wide range of real-life situations.20
(iv) If (4.1) holds with unconfoundedness then it can be seen (e.g. p. 114 of
[22]) that the treatment effect can be studied by conditioning on the propensity
score λ(Xn) := (λt(Xn))t∈T , where λt(x) := f
(x)
n (t) = P(Tn = t|Xn = x), in
place of Xn. If T contains just a few elements then λ(Xn) will typically have
a lower dimension than Xn and hence be much easier to stratify or match on;
this is the idea behind the ‘propensity score method’ of Rosenbaum and Rubin
(e.g. [60],[59]), which works provided the propensity score function (λt)t∈T is
known or can be estimated in a consistent way. 
When and to what extent it is possible to study the effect of the treatment by
comparing empirical conditional averages also depends on the properties of those
averages, which in turn depend on properties of the sequence (Xn, Tn, Rn)n≥1
other than unconfoundedness. Thus, although we shall not consider questions of
testing for and estimating a treatment effect (which are treated in [59], [25], [31]
and [22], for example), we must note that when the distribution of (Xn, Tn, Rn)
is independent of n, and hence is the same as that of a generic random vector
(X, T, R) defined on the same probability space, empirical conditional averages
of the form ∑N
n=1 1{Xn=x,Tn=t}f(Rn)∑N
n=1 1{Xn=x,Tn=t}
, (4.3)
where f is some real-valued function, converge under certain conditions and in
a certain sense to
E[f(R)|X = x, T = t] = E[f(Rn)|Xn = x, Tn = t] (4.4)
20From the very prosaic or practical (e.g.“I should have bought alkaline batteries”; see also
p. 89 of [54]) to the more poetic or reflective (e.g.Robert Frost’s poem “The road not taken”);
nevertheless, it appears that some authors find potential outcomes problematic (e.g. [15],[16]).
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as N → ∞ (e.g. with probability 1 if the (Xn, Tn, Rn)s are independent).21
In the sequel we shall often refer to the possibility of estimating expectations
such as these from observed data, by which we imply that the right-hand side
of (4.4) is independent of n and can be consistently estimated by (4.3) with
samples—not necessarily random samples—(X1, T1, R1), ..., (XN , TN , RN ).
In order to confirm that under unconfoundedness the comparison of empirical
conditional averages—those of (4.3) for varying t—provides a way of studying
the effect of treatment, consider (4.4) with f = 1A and varying A, i.e. the law
L(Rn∣∣Xn = x, Tn = t) = L(ρ(Vn,x, t)∣∣Xn = x, Tn = t).
As we have indicated, when based on a single realization of (Xn, Tn, Rn)n≥1 the
study of the treatment effect amounts to the comparison of the conditional laws
L(ρ(Vn,x, t)∣∣Xn = x, Tn = t) and L(ρ(Vn,x, t′)∣∣Xn = x, Tn = t′) (4.5)
for t 6= t′ and varying x. By the conditional independence of Un and Vn,
L(Rn∣∣Xn = x, Tn = t) = L(ρ(Vn,Xn, Tn)∣∣Xn = x, Tn = t)
= L(ρ(Vn,x, t)∣∣Xn = x, τ(Un,x) = t)
= L(ρ(Vn,x, t)∣∣Xn = x)
= L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)∣∣Xn = x)
= L(ρ(Vn,x, t)),
(4.6)
so any difference between the two laws of (4.5) is purely a result of the difference
between t and t′, and it follows that the function t→L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)∣∣Xn=x)—
which we know provides a full description of the causal effect of the treatment
on the response under a situation x—can be estimated from observed data in
the guise of L(Rn∣∣Xn = x, Tn = t).22 From this last law one can compute (and
hence estimate from data) probabilities such as
P
(
ρ(Vn,Xn, t) ≤ r
)
=
∑
x
P
(
ρ(Vn,x, t) ≤ r
∣∣Xn = x)P(Xn = x), (4.7)
which determine the law of the potential responses, and quantities such as∑
x
{
E
(
ρ(Vn,x, t)
∣∣Xn = x)−E(ρ(Vn,x, t′)∣∣Xn = x)}P(Xn = x), (4.8)
the overall mean difference between the responses to treatments t and t′, which
is E
[
ρ(Vn,Xn, t)−ρ(Vn,Xn, t′)
]
—the expected difference between the potential
responses to t and t′ of the same arbitrary individual.23
21This is generally true if the Xns and Tns are discrete, which we assume for simplicity
in most of the paper; if the Xns are not discrete, the indicators 1{Xn=x,Tn=t} in (4.3) are
replaced by 1{Xn∈BN (x),Tn=t}, where BN (x) is a neighbourhood shrinking to x as N →∞.
22Since Un and Vn are standard uniform conditionally on Xn, under unconfoundedness
they are independent and standard uniform unconditionally as well. It follows that under
unconfoundedness the conditioning on {Xn = x} can be removed from L
(
ρ(Vn,x, t)
∣
∣Xn = x
)
and from other expressions involving the law of ρ(Vn,x, t), as done in the last step of (4.6).
23The probabilities (4.7) correspond to those of Pearl’s ‘adjustment formula’ (e.g. section
3.2 of [54]); when treatment is binary and t = 1, t′ = 0, the integrated difference (4.8) between
conditional expectations corresponds to Rubin’s ‘super population average treatment effect’
(e.g. section 6.7 of [31]). For simplicity, when presenting expressions such as these we will often
assume that the Xns and Tns are discrete, but it will be easy to guess from them in each case
what the appropriate expression is when the Xns take values in Rd.
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Two examples will help us summarize the ideas considered so far.
Example 4.1. Simpson’s paradox24
Patients may or may not take a new medicine in order to recover from an illness,
and the indicator Rn of recovery of the n-th patient satisfies
Rn=B
−1(Vn, p(Tn,Xn)), Tn=B−1(Un, q(Xn)), (4.9)
where B is the Bernoulli distribution function (with ‘success rate’ indicated in
the second argument), B−1 its inverse, p and q are functions with values in [0, 1],
Tn is the indicator of treatment (Tn = 1 if the patient takes the medicine),
Xn is the patient’s sex (say Xn = 1 if the patient is a man), and Un, Vn
are independent standard uniforms independent of Xn.
25 It follows from these
definitions that model (4.1) holds with unconfoundedness and that
P (Rn = 1 |Tn = t,Xn = x) = p(t, x), P (Tn = 1 |Xn = x ) = q(x) (4.10)
(t, x ∈ {0, 1}). Suppose that
p(1, x) > p(0, x) (4.11)
for x = 0, 1, i.e. that the medicine makes recovery more likely for both men and
women; is it possible that
P (Rn = 1 |Tn = 1) ≤ P (Rn = 1 |Tn = 0) , (4.12)
i.e. that a patient randomly drawn from the population of patients governed by
(4.9) will be more likely to recover by not taking the medicine? It is possible—
and that is the paradox.
Indeed,
P (Rn = 1 |Tn = 1) =
∑
x=0,1
P(Rn=1,Tn=1,Xn=x)
P(Tn=1)
=
∑
x=0,1
p(1,x)q(x)P(Xn=x)
P(Tn=1)
,
P (Rn = 1 |Tn = 0) =
∑
x=0,1
p(0,x){1−q(x)}P(Xn=x)
P(Tn=0)
,
and we can show that p(t, x) and q(x) may be chosen so as to yield (4.12).
Suppose first that
p(1, 1) > p(0, 1) > p(1, 0) > p(0, 0), (4.13)
24Due to E.H.Simpson [68]; cf. pp. 1–3 of [54].
25Evidently, in a real-life application one does not need to assume or commit to a particular
definition of the random variables which serve as a model for the empirical data—though some
model must be assumed, even if only implicitly, since except in trivial situations empirical
data alone are meaningless for purposes of inference (cf. remark (iv) on p. 18). Since the
most complicated notion we are concerned with is that of a sequence of random variables, any
definition of the random variables which is consistent with the postulated class of distributions
may be admitted and will serve as a more or less convenient ‘photographic negative’ of those
distributions, as illustrated by the interpretation of confounding to be given shortly in the
present example.
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so that, although the medicine favours recovery in both men and women, recov-
ery is more likely in untreated men than in treated women. The middle inequality
implies
p(0, 1)− p(1, 0) > 0,
and it is obvious that
p(1, 1)− p(0, 1) > −{p(1, 0)− p(0, 0)} .
The second of these last two inequalities is equivalent to
p(1, 1)− p(0, 0) > p(0, 1)− p(1, 0),
which by the first can be written as
θ :=
p(1, 1)− p(0, 0)
p(0, 1)− p(1, 0) > 1. (4.14)
Suppose too that q(0) = β and q(1) = 1− β for some β ∈ ]0, 1[ such that
β
1− β ≥ θ; (4.15)
since θ > 1, this implies β > 1/2, so women are more likely to take the medicine
than men are.
Finally, suppose P (Tn=1) = 1/2: this would be the case if, for example, a
target population were formed by recruiting the same number of treated and
untreated individuals from a population of interest and if individuals were then
randomly sampled from that target population. (More generally, one may take
q(0)=β0 and q(1)=β1 for certain β0 > β1, which no longer implies P (Tn=1)=
1/2 but makes the calculations somewhat more complicated.)
Since by the choice of q
P (Tn = 1) =
∑
x=0,1
P (Tn = 1 |Xn = x)P (Xn = x) =
∑
x=0,1
q(x)P (Xn = x)
= βP (Xn = 0) + (1− β) {1−P (Xn = 0)},
the last assumption entails (by β>1/2) P(Xn=0)=1/2. But then P(Xn=x)=
P(Tn= t) for all t, x and
P (Rn = 1 |Tn = 1)−P (Rn = 1 |Tn = 0) =∑
x=0,1
[
p(1, x)q(x) − p(0, x){1− q(x)}] =
[
p(1, 0)β − p(0, 0)(1− β)] + [p(1, 1)(1− β)− p(0, 1)β] =[
p(1, 0)− p(0, 1)]β + [p(1, 1)− p(0, 0)](1− β) =[
p(1, 1)− p(0, 0)](1 − β)− [p(0, 1)− p(1, 0)]β,
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which yields (4.12) because by (4.14) and (4.15)
[
p(1, 1)− p(0, 0)] ≤ [p(0, 1)− p(1, 0)] β
1− β .
What is happening? From (4.9) it is clear that the treatment has a positive
effect on the response, because by (4.11) p(t, x) increases with t for fixed x
and B−1(v, p) increases with p for fixed v, so that ρ(v, x, t) := B−1
(
v, p(t, x)
)
increases with t for fixed (v, x); and treatment has an effect despite the fact
that the Tn in ρ(Vn,Xn, Tn) is not ‘manipulable’ but a random function of
(Xn, Un). However, if we consider treated patients, i.e. condition on {Tn = 1},
the equation Tn=B
−1(Un; q(Xn)) constrains the patient to be a woman—forces
Xn to be 0—more frequently than not, because q(0) > q(1). Consequently, more
frequently than not we have
p(Tn,Xn) = p(1, 0) and Rn=B
−1(Vn; p(1, 0)),
so more frequently than not the recovery rate of a treated patient is the third
smallest in the ranking determined by (4.13). It follows that when q(0)≫q(1),
the chance of the treated patient being a man is small and the recovery rate will
be little more than p(1, 0). Conversely, if we consider untreated patients then
more frequently than not Xn = 1,
p(Tn,Xn) = p(0, 1) and Rn=B
−1(Vn; p(0, 1)),
more frequently than not the recovery rate of an untreated patient is the third
largest in the ranking determined by (4.13), and when q(0)≫q(1) the probability
of the untreated patient being a man is high and the recovery rate will be little
less than p(0, 1).
This confounding of the treatment effect by sex, which manages to counterfeit
a negative effect, can be expressed more concisely: Although p(t, x) ↑ in t for
fixed x, we also have p(t, x) ↑ in x for fixed t and q(x) ↓ in x, so if we look
for a ‘large’ Tn in the hope of finding a ‘large’ Rn = B
−1(Vn; p(Tn,Xn)) the
constraint Tn =B
−1(Un; q(Xn)) gives us a ‘small’ Xn, which in turn yields a
‘small’ Rn.
Of course, if we know that (4.9) holds for some known or unknown B, p and
q—i.e. if we know that (4.1) holds with unconfoundedness—and if we have a
random sample from it then we can ‘correct for’ sex and estimate the causal
effect of treatment on the response, which is entirely embodied by the first
equation in (4.10). Incidentally, with the above choices of the basic parameters,
the overall or unconditional treatment effect (cf. (4.7) and footnote 19),
P
(
B−1
(
Vn, p(t,Xn)
)
= 1
)
=
∑
x
P (Rn = 1 |Tn = t,Xn = x )P(Xn = x)
=
p(t, 0) + p(t, 1)
2
,
is an increasing function of t (by (4.11)); evidently, this need not be the case if
the effect of the treatment is negative for one sex and positive for the other. 
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Example 4.2. A continuous version of Simpson’s paradox26
The logarithm of the body mass index of an individual randomly drawn from a
certain population, Rn, is related to a standardized measure of the intensity of
his physical training, Tn, and to the logarithm of his age, Xn, by
Rn = ρ(Vn,Xn, Tn) := αXn − βTn +Φ−1
(
Vn, 0, σ
2
1
)
,
Tn = τ(Xn, Tn) := µ+
σ3√
σ22+2γ
2σ23
(Xn − γµ) + Φ−1
(
Un, 0, σ
2
3
)
,
Xn = Φ
−1 (ξn, γµ, σ22 + 2γ2σ23),
(4.16)
where α, β, γ, µ, σ1, σ2, σ3 > 0, Φ(·,m, s2) is the normal distribution function
with mean m and variance s2, Φ−1(·,m, s2) is its inverse, and ξn, Un and Vn
are independent standard uniform random variables.
These specifications—which constitute another example of model (4.1) under
unconfoundedness—imply that Xn, Tn and Rn are jointly normally distributed
with
EXn = γµ, ETn = µ, ERn = (αγ − β)µ,
Var(Xn) = σ
2
2 + 2γ
2σ23 , Var(Tn) = 2σ
2
3 ,
Cov(Xn, Tn) = σ3
√
σ22 + 2γ
2σ23 ,
Var(Rn) = α
2Var(Xn) + β
2Var(Tn)− 2αβCov(Xn, Tn) + σ21 ,
(4.17)
etc., and that the law of Rn conditional on (Xn, Tn) = (x, t) is
L(R|T = t,Xn = x) ≡ N (αx − βt, σ21), (4.18)
i.e. normal with mean αx− βt and variance σ21 .
It is clear from the first equation in (4.16) that (4.18) characterizes completely
the joint effect of age and physical training on body mass, and that at any
given age body mass tends to decrease with physical training. Thus, physical
training—which may be thought of as potentially manipulable in reality, even
though according to (4.16), the present model of reality, it is not—tends to
reduce body mass at all ages. However, because by the second equation in (4.16)
physical training tends to increase with age in the population in question, it can
be seen that, if α is sufficiently bigger than β, body mass will appear to increase
rather than decrease with physical training when regarded as a function of this
variable alone—as when data on (Tn, Rn) are used to ‘regress’ body mass index
on physical training without ‘correcting for’ age.
In order to exhibit the paradox explicitly we need to find P(Rn>r|Tn = t)
and show that for some choices of α and β this is an increasing function of t for
each r. To this end we first note that (Xn, Tn, Rn) retains its distribution if the
26A variant of this example is sketched on pp. 3–4 of [54].
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last two equations in (4.16) are replaced by27
Xn = γµ+
√
σ22+2γ
2σ23
2σ3
(Tn − µ) + Φ−1
(
Un, 0,
σ22+2γ
2σ23
2
)
,
Tn = Φ
−1 (ξn, µ, 2σ23) . (4.19)
Then
L(Rn|Tn = t) = L
(
αXn − βt+Φ−1
(
Vn, 0, σ
2
1
) |Tn = t) =
L
(
α
{
γµ+
√
σ22+2γ
2σ23
2σ3
(t− µ)+Φ−1
(
Un, 0,
σ22+2γ
2σ23
2
)}
−βt+Φ−1(Vn, 0, σ21)
)
=
N
(
µα
{
γ−
√
σ22+2γ
2σ23
2σ3
}
+
{
α
√
σ22+2γ
2σ23
2σ3
−β
}
t, σ21 +
α2{σ22+2γ2σ23}
2
)
,
so the paradox arises if and only if α
√
σ22+2γ
2σ23
2σ3
> β.
Of course, (4.16) is rather unrealistic as a model for body mass as a function of
physical training and age; for instance, diet influences and is influenced by body
mass and physical training, so even if its functional expressions were correct the
Vn of the first equation would depend on the Un of the second through diet.
28

Let us look again at the intervention model (4.2) and reconsider its relation
with model (4.1). It is evident that unconfoundedness has no role to play in the
intervention model proper, since L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)∣∣Xn = x) can be estimated—
hence the treatment effect investigated—from data following (4.2).29 In an ob-
servational study the data follow a model like (4.1), not like (4.2); yet, under
unconfoundedness, estimates of L(Rn∣∣Xn=x, Tn= t) obtained from such data
are also estimates of L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)∣∣Xn=x), these laws being one and the same
by (4.6). Thus, data following the observational model under unconfoundedness
provide us with estimates of the intervention model, hence with the means of
predicting the results of interventions, i.e.predicting the consequences of forcing
a particular treatment t upon an individual under a given situation, as opposed
to letting the individual choose the treatment Tn.
30
27To get the first of these, one writes (Xn − γµ) = c(Tn −µ) + sZn, where Zn is standard
normal and independent of Tn, multiplies boths sides by Tn−µ and takes expectations to get
Cov(Tn,Xn) = cVar(Tn), takes the variance on both sides to get Var(Xn) = c2Var(Tn)+ s2,
solves these equations for c and s2, and finally substitutes Cov(Tn,Xn), Var(Tn) and Var(Xn)
in the solutions by their expressions given in (4.17). It is important to realize that we are
not abandoning (4.16) as a model in favour of (4.19); the latter representation is just one
‘photographic negative’ of the distribution of (Xn, Tn, Rn) and is used merely as a convenient
method of finding a conditional distribution (incidentally, a conditional distribution has to do
with known information rather than with an antecedent).
28For a somewhat more general example illustrating the sort of bias caused by failing to
condition on a subset of confounders see section 5 of [22].
29Again, we may write L(ρ(Vn,x, t)
)
in place of L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)
∣
∣Xn=x
)
(cf. footnote 22).
30The observation that the results of interventions can, in principle, be predicted from
observed data under unconfoundedness seems to be due to Pearl (cf. pp. 55-7, 101-3 of [54]); it
indicates the relation between determining a treatment effect by ‘correcting for confounding’
and determining the effect of an intervention.
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In a given real-life problem one must have a clear idea about the reality that
each of the two models is supposed to represent. While model (4.1) corresponds
to the passive observation of situations, of the determination of the treatments
and of the responses that follow (as if an observer locked out of ‘the system’ were
able to witness some of the consequences of the draw ω ‘causing everything’ but
unable to interfere with it), the intervention model corresponds to the forcing
of fixed, nonrandom treatments upon situations (experimental or observational)
and the observation of the ensuing results (as if the observer were able to pre-
vent ω from dictating the treatments, and possibly the situations, but not from
dictating the responses). Accordingly, a statistical analysis founded on the first
model normally refers to what happened—to the influence that the treatment
had in the past—whereas an analysis founded on the second normally refers
to what may happen—to the possible influence that the treatment may have in
the future. Yet, when used in a real-life problem in which both points of view
are possible—say a study of a population whose individuals are free to choose
their treatment at one stage but at a second stage may be assigned a particular
treatment—the models have something in common: even if it is clear that in the
past the treatment has had a certain effect in a certain direction, it does not
follow that a reversal of treatment at the time would have been possible, just
as it does not follow that a prescription of treatment in the future will have the
desired effect.
Remark. This commonality appears to have been overlooked by some authors
(e.g. section 1.2 of [16]). Model (4.1)—which when τ is equal to a constant is a
special case of (4.2)—is consistent with the two points of view (‘what happened’
and ‘what may happen’), and in a general discussion of causality we need not
exclude any of them. The two points of view may indeed be used in the same
real-life problem: first in connection with an observational study and then in
connection with an intervention guided by the conclusions of the observational
study—though in the latter the ρ and the distribution of the Xns may have
changed (cf. second point of footnote 17). In the discussion around equation
(6) of [13] (which corresponds to our equation (4.7)), the law of ρ(Vn,Xn, t)—
and consequently (at least as far as realistic applications are concerned) the
very concept of causal effect—is presented as if it were irremediably tied to
interventions and the conditions for their success in real-life problems. But if in
a given study this law is unbiasedly and accurately estimated from a sample, and
if it appears very likely that it varies with t, then the treatment very probably
had a causal effect on the response for the population underlying the sample
(in the sense of ρ(Vn,Xn, t) being a nonconstant function of t for a substantial
number of individuals). That one may or may not have convinced the individuals
of that population to opt for a particular value of the treatment instead of
the treatments they chose at the time, that one may or may not convince the
individuals of that population to opt for a particular value of the treatment in the
future, can be meaningful questions in a given real-life problem, but neither the
definition of causal effect nor identity (4.6) are subordinated to them—indeed,
the latter are theoretical notions, the former empirical). 
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Our next example illustrates these points.
Example 4.3. Lord’s paradox31
As part of a programme to encourage his employees to live more healthily, at
the beginning of the year the director of a company inaugurates a new canteen
offering a rich variety of healthy dishes (salads, vegetable soups, grilled fish,
etc.). Although the old canteen, which already had a substantial selection of
healthy dishes on offer, undergoes some refurbishment and keeps its old faithful
selection of unhealthy dishes (fat smoked sausages, fried meat and fish, chips,
etc.), it is hoped that, helped by New Year resolutions, the gastronomical, social
and architectural attractions of the new canteen will gradually win over most
of the employees and eventually render the old canteen superfluous.
For managerial reasons, after a trial-period of two weeks employees are en-
couraged to opt for one of the two canteens during the rest of the year.
In order to investigate the possible beneficial effects of the opening of the
new canteen, measurements of body mass index are taken on a large random
sample of employees at the beginning of the year. At the end of the year body
mass is measured again on the same employees, who are also asked which of the
two canteens had their preference during the year.
The company’s statistician called in to analyze the data happens to know
that the logarithm of body mass index of the n-th employee at the end of the
year, Rn, the logarithm of his body mass at the beginning of the year, Xn, and
the canteen preferred by him, Tn (equal to 1 if it is the new one, equal to 2
otherwise), obey the following model rather closely:
Rn =µTn + ̺(Xn − µTn) + Φ−1
(
Vn, 0, (1− ̺2)σ2
)
,
Tn =1 +B
−1(Un, q(Xn)),
Xn=B
−1(ξ1,n, p)Φ−1(ξ2,n, µ1, σ2)+[1−B−1(ξ1,n, p)]Φ−1(ξ2,n, µ2, σ2),
(4.20)
where
q(x) =
(1− p)φ(x, µ2, σ2)
p φ(x, µ1, σ2) + (1− p)φ(x, µ2, σ2) ,
σ > 0, p, ̺ ∈ ]0, 1[, µ1 and µ2 are parameters, µ1 < µ2, φ(·,m, s2) denotes the
normal density function of mean m and variance s2, ξ1,n, ξ2,n, Un and Vn are
standard uniform random variables, and B and Φ are as in examples 4.1 and
4.2 respectively. From (4.20) one can conclude that Xn and Tn are positively
correlated: employees with a large body mass index at the beginning of the year
are more likely to opt for the old canteen. But the model provides more, namely
information about the relations of cause and effect between the variables.
After examining the data, the statistician realizes that the distribution of
body mass does not seem to have changed among those who frequented the old
canteen nor among those who frequented the new canteen, and, moreover, that
the distribution of the gain in the logarithms of body mass, Rn−Xn, seems to be
31Due to F.M.Lord [43]; for other interpretations see [53] and section 1.9 of [31].
Ferreira/Causality: Viewpoint of Classical Statistics 31
the same in the two groups and to have mean 0. These observations correspond
to the identities32
L(Rn|Tn = t) = N (µt, σ2) = L(Xn|Tn = t), L(Rn) = L(Xn), (4.21)
ERn = pµ1+(1− p)µ2 = EXn, VarRn = σ2+p(1− p)(µ1 − µ2)2 = VarXn
and
L(Rn −Xn|Tn = t) = L(Rn −Xn) = N
(
0, 2(1− ̺)σ2), (4.22)
which follow from (4.20), and they suggest that the opening of the new canteen
has had no effect in any of the two groups. On hearing the statistician present
this conclusion, the director is sceptical: after all, he certainly lost some weight
thanks to the healthy diet of the new canteen, and one of his assistants who had
about the same height and weight as he at the beginning of the year and kept
to the old canteen even grew slightly fatter. So he decides to consult a second
statistician. After discussing things with the first statistician and accepting that
model (4.20) provides a correct description of reality, the second statistician
agrees that it is almost certainly true that the distribution of body mass in the
whole population of employees has not changed throughout the year, neither
among healthy eaters nor among unhealthy eaters, but observes that
L(Rn|Tn = t,Xn = x) = L
(
µt + ̺(x− µt) + Φ−1
(
Vn, 0, (1− ̺2)σ2
))
(4.23)
= N (̺x+ (1 − ̺)µt, (1− ̺2)σ2),
and that (based on the parameter estimates) it is almost certain that µ2 > µ1.
This, he adds, is a strong indication that if a randomly sampled employee has a
logarithm of body mass of x and opts for the healthy diet then after a year he
will tend to have a logarithm of body mass of about −(1− ̺)(x− µ1), whereas
if he keeps to the old canteen his body mass will be around −(1 − ̺)(x − µ2);
since the difference between these,
E(Rn|Tn = 1,Xn = x)−E(Rn|Tn = 2,Xn = x) = (1− ̺)(µ1 − µ2), (4.24)
is almost certainly negative, there is, concludes the second statistician, a strong
indication that adopting the healthy diet tends to lower one’s body mass.
The director is relieved, but after a moment’s thought directs a puzzled look
at the first statistician. Well, says the first statistician, it is evident that no one
has kept exactly his initial body mass, that some healthy eaters lost weight and
some unhealthy eaters put on weight, but it is also true that some healthy eaters
put on weight and some unhealthy eaters lost weight. Clearly, he goes on, it is
almost certain that the choice of canteen has an effect on body mass, because
we know that if employee n started with a logarithm of body mass x and opted
for canteen t then his logarithm of body mass at the end of the year is given by
ρ(Vn, x, t) := (1− ̺)µt + ̺x+Φ−1
(
Vn, 0, (1− ̺2)σ2
)
,
32Note that the densities of Xn and Tn satisfy fXn (x) = pφ(x, µ1, σ
2)+(1−p)φ(x, µ2, σ2),
fTn|Xn=x(t) = {1 − q(x)}δt,1 + q(x)δt,2, fTn (t) = pδt,1 + (1 − p)δt,2 and fXn|Tn=t(x) =
φ(x, µt, σ2). By N (µ, σ2) we mean the normal law of mean µ and variance σ2.
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and that this random variable, which depends on t and x only in the first and
second terms, almost certainly increases with t for fixed x; so, everything else
(namely the Vns) being statistically equal of two employees with the same body
mass, the one opting for the healthy diet will, a year later, tend to have a lower
body mass than the one keeping to the unhealthy diet—which is what (4.24)
indicates. It follows that if we had been able to foist t = 1 into the ‘response
function’ of every employee without affecting its other aspects (embodied by
Vn) we should have noticed a decrease in the body mass of the population.
That this is not the case is explained by the fact that each individual was left
to choose the canteen at will; actually, he says pointing to (4.21), the equality
of the distributions of the initial and final body mass (both the same mixture
of normal distributions) and the correlation between body mass and canteen
reflect the fact that most people have kept to the diet they followed before the
opening of the new canteen, even if they changed restaurant—after all, the old
canteen already served healthy dishes in the past, and it is evident from the
knowledge contained in model (4.20) that the healthy eaters today are, for the
most part, the healthy eaters of the past.
The second statistician and the director agree with this explanation and the
latter realizes that a general reduction of body mass among his employees may
require more drastic measures.33 
As far as validity is concerned, there is a very substantial difference between
using model (4.1) with unconfoundedness in an observational study and using
the intervention model (4.2) in an experimental study.34 Since it is generally
impossible to check the independence of unobservable variables, it is generally
impossible to check the validity of inferences on L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)∣∣Xn = x) from
observed data, so if unconfoundedness is assumed in a particular real-life, non-
experimental problem then it has to be justified by means of evidence derived
from the relevant fields of knowledge—rather than from the data to which model
(4.1) is being applied. That this is quite difficult to do, however, can be judged
by our simple example of section 3: In a ‘homemade’ but nevertheless well-
33There has been some discussion about whether the analysis of the first statistician—
based on estimating and interpreting the laws in (4.21) and (4.22)—is correct, whether it is
the analysis of the second statistician—based on (4.23) and (4.24)—that is correct, whether
both analyses are correct or both are incorrect; see [65] and [20] and the literature cited
there. Lord clearly assumes that the model used by the statisticians is the correct one, and,
judging from his qualitative description, the paradox does not seem to rely on a particular
specification of the assumed and true models (accordingly, our choice of distributions and
functional relationships in (4.20) is not essential, though it is convenient); rather, it arises
from the supposed conflict between the interpretations underlying the two different questions
considered by the statisticians—whether the population as a whole has changed and whether
the population as a whole could have changed (or could change in the future). Despite this,
the paradox is sometimes confused with, and confused by, questions related to the correctness
of the model assumed for the data and to the bias of a certain estimation method when the
assumed model is incorrect. The consideration of a ‘treatment’ which is not readily conceived
of as manipulable, such as ‘sex’, as in Lord’s own version, or ‘ability’, as in [20], can add to
the confusion by making the causal interpretation of the second statistician look strange.
34Questions of validity of the intervention model in an observational study have just been
discussed, and they have been mentioned in footnote 17.
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planned study on the lives of two types of batteries, in which the situation (time
of purchase, rate of usage, temperature, etc.) would be kept almost constant
throughout the tests, in order to be able to justify unconfoundedness one would
have to know, in particular, that the elapsed shelf life of each set of batteries
was representative of its type—which might not be the case since certain types
might be sold only in certain shops and different shops might differ with respect
to storing conditions, turnover and size of stock, etc. In the typically more
difficult observational studies carried out in medicine, biology, sociology and
economics, it has to be more difficult to argue that the main factors affecting
the determination of the treatment (the Uns and Xns) and the main factors
affecting the response (the Vns and Xns) have only the factors specified by the
situation (the Xns) in common.
35 It is not surprising, therefore, that according
to Freedman, who wrote so many lucid reviews of such studies (see [24],[25]),
the number of successful attempts at establishing causality in observational
studies is “at best quite limited”, and that the much-needed justifications for
the assumptions of causal models are rare and generally unconvincing.
According to Pearl and other authors,36 the problem of justifying a model
like (4.1) with unconfoundedness should be tackled by laying bare the relations
of cause and effect between the confounding variables and the treatment and
response variables, namely by proposing a detailed causal model involving all
the variables thought to be relevant to the real-life problem in hand and founded
principally on subject-matter knowledge (as opposed to statistical knowledge)—
a model containing (4.1) and whose correctness can be checked, in part, with
observed data. It is to this type of model and to the questions they pose that
we now turn.
5. Levels of causality; more detailed models
We begin by introducing some terminology37 which qualifies the assumptions in-
volved in a causal model and the degree to which those assumptions are thought
to hold in a real-life problem. We speak of zero-level causality when a model
like (4.1) is assumed without unconfoundedness, so that conclusions based on
samples of the (Xn, Tn, Rn)s may say something about the association between
the treatment and the response but not necessarily about the causal effect of
the former on the latter (since at least some confounding subsists). It seems
that observational studies are mostly carried out at the zero-level, even if they
do not explicitly invoke model (4.1) or do not discuss the extent of confounding,
and even if they vary with respect to the statistical methods used.
In first-level causality one assumes a model like (4.1) with unconfoundedness—
perhaps in a less explicit form, such as Rubin’s, discussed in remark (ii), p.22—
35The assumption of unconfoundedness as formulated here ought to make clear what needs
to be checked or argued for in a given application; as suggested by Pearl (e.g. p. 129 of [48],
p. 126 of [54]), Rubin’s formulation of unconfoundedness, mentioned in remark (ii) on p. 22,
appears to be less helpful in this respect.
36See for instance pp. 708-9 of [46], pp. 129-130 of [48], or p. 5 of [49].
37Proposed by Cox and Wermuth [13].
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and knows or believes that the model corresponds sufficiently well to the real-
life problem. In particular, one has identified most of the factors influencing
both treatment and response—the confounders in Xn—and in principle can
collect data on them in order to apply methods of stratification and match-
ing to test for or estimate the causal effect of the treatment. Indeed, we have
seen that under unconfoundedness the effect of the treatment on the response
in model (4.1), which is completely characterized by L(ρ(Vn,Xn, t)∣∣Xn = x)
for varying (t,x) ∈ T × X , can be estimated from observed data in the guise
of L(Rn∣∣Xn = x, Tn = t).38 However, as suggested above, not many studies
are carried out at the first-level, and few present a thorough argumentation to
justify unconfoundedness based on a list of variables identified as confounders.
Identifying which variables must be conditioned upon in order to make the
assumption of unconfoundedness tenable is recognized by many (see for example
section 3.7 of [31], pp. 76–7 of [59]) as a difficult task, demanding substantial
extra-statistical knowledge about the real-life problem in hand. As a general
rule, researchers such as Rosenbaum and Rubin recommend that “all the rel-
evant covariates, that is, all the variables that may be associated with both
outcomes and assignment to treatment” be considered as possible confounders,
and say that “there is little or no reason to avoid adjustment for a true covari-
ate, a variable describing subjects before treatment” ([31],[59]). Pearl and others
(e.g. [67],[49]), on the other hand, have pointed out that in certain situations
conditioning on some variables may create rather than remove confounding,39 so
that in order to justify conditioning on a particular set of variables one generally
needs to postulate (and defend, based on extra-statistical knowledge) a detailed
causal model describing the relationships between the various components of
the situation, the treatment and the response—not just the model we have con-
sidered in section 4 of the cause and effect relationship between treatment and
response given a situation.
We speak of second-level causality whenever such a detailed causal model of
the situation, treatment and response is assumed or can be justified in a real-life
problem. Since, as noted at the end of section 3, a given problem may admit
various levels of causality, second-level causality may be based on several models
of varying complexity (which of course should be consistent with each other),
and it may be reduced to first-level causality.
As an example of the ‘second-level model’ we have in mind let us take

X1 = ϕ1(U1), X2 = ϕ2(U2),
X3 = ϕ3(U3, X1, X2),
X4 = ϕ4(U4, X1), X5 = ϕ5(U5, X2),
T = τ(U,X3, X4), X6 = ϕ6(U6, T ),
R = ρ(V,X3, X5, X6),
(5.1)
38It is perhaps worth pointing out that the notion of casual effect, as embodied by the
conditional laws of ρ(Vn,Xn, t), can always be entertained in a real-life problem to which (4.1)
is applied; unconfoundedness, which allows those laws to be estimated from data, may very
well be plausible in such a problem, but in an observational study it will often be difficult to
identify and measure all the components of Xn for which unconfoundedness holds.
39See pp. 118-20 of [22] for an example of general character illustrating this phenomenon.
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where U , V , U1, . . . , U6 are independent standard uniforms, to be thought of
as unobservable, purely random ‘errors’, and τ , ρ, ϕ1, . . . , ϕ6 are real-valued
functions.40 The schematic representation of this set of equations in figure 1—
a ‘causal graph’—omits the essential information about the unobservable, so-
called exogenous, random variables, but provides a more digestible summary of
the essential aspects of it, namely of which variables ‘influence’ which. We shall
use standard or self-explanatory terminology when referring to such graphs:
the variables X1, X2, . . . , T, R correspond to nodes of the graph; the graph is
directed because its edges are arrows; X1 → X4 → T → X6 → R is a directed
path leading X1 to R, and we say that X1 leads to R; X1 → X4 → T ← X3 → R
is a path (not a directed one); T is a descendant of X1, and a direct descendant
of X4 (and of X3), and X1 and X4 are ancestors of T (and of X6 and R);
T ← X4 is a subpath of the path T ← X4 ← X1; and so on. Note that a causal
graph is acyclic: no two nodes point arrows to each other, and, more generally, a
directed path from a node cannot lead back to the node (a future event cannot
influence a past event). Actually, whenever we talk of a path we really mean a
simple path: in it, a node appears only once (so even among undirected paths
we never consider closed ones—those that begin and end in the same node).
Remark. We do not regard the graph of figure 1 as a model: the model is the
mapping that assigns a set or vector of numbers to each ω ∈ Ω, and the figure
is a summary of this mapping which can serve as a tool to analyse it in some
respects. While in a general discussion one may consider figure 1 in connection
with (5.1), in a more specific example one may wish, for example, that τ be
constant in the second argument, in which case the arrow from X3 to T may be
misleading. 
X1 X2
X4 X3 X5
T X6 R
Fig 1. Graph of the model at the second-level of causality defined by (5.1).
Model (5.1) represents second-level causality because it consists of more than
just the two equations of (4.1); but it is not the only such model since the
model without the equation X6 = ϕ6(U6, T ) and with X6 replaced by ϕ6(U6, T )
in the definition of R—a graph of which is obtained by deleting the node X6
from figure 1 and linking T to R by a single arrow—is simpler but still of
second-level causality. Finally, if some of the functions and variables representing
‘intermediate relations’ are substituted into the functions they actuate, one may
40This model is used as an example in [48], pp.113-4, and in [54], p.64. In real-life problems,
different variables in a set of equations like (5.1) may represent measurements of the same
quantity made at different times, the more recent one being a function of the earlier one.
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reduce the model to a first-level model: For instance, from (5.1) follow
R = ρ(V,X3, X5, X6) = ρ
(
V,X3, ϕ5(U5, X2), ϕ6(U6, T )
)
=: ρ˜
(
V˜ ,X, T
)
,
T = τ(U,X3, X4) = τ
(
U,X3, ϕ4(U4, X1)
)
=: τ˜
(
U˜ ,X
)
,
where X = (X1, X2, X3) and U˜ and V˜ are standard uniforms obtained from
(U4, U) and (U5, U6, V ), respectively, independent and independent of X, so the
conditions of the basic model (4.1) are satisfied with unconfoundedness and41
L(R∣∣X = x, T = t)=L(ρ˜(V˜ ,x, t)∣∣X = x, τ˜(U˜ ,x) = t)=L(ρ˜(V˜ ,x, t)). (5.2)
Despite the difficulty of setting up a convincing second-level model in a real-
life problem, it seems evident that any earnest effort in that direction can only
help in thinking about and defending the assumption of unconfoundedness in a
corresponding first-level model—and in opening it to scrutiny and criticism.42
The study of such a second-level model can also render a statistical analysis more
efficient if it is found that unconfoundedness holds by conditioning on a smaller
or more easily available subset of variables: thus, essentially the same method
of reduction just used with X = (X1, X2, X3) shows that both X = (X1, X3)
and X = (X2, X3) guarantee unconfoundedness, but (5.2) will often be easier to
estimate with any of the last two vectors than with the first.43 Besides, it seems
that the possibility mentioned above that conditioning on certain variables may
create rather than remove confounding, although considered by some to be
mostly theoretical (e.g. [64]), cannot be ruled out. For instance, if we try to
reduce model (5.1) to first-level causality by conditioning on X := X3 alone,
writing
R = ρ(V,X3, X5, X6) = ρ
(
V,X3, ϕ5(U5, X2), ϕ6(U6, T )
)
=: ρˇ
(
Vˇ ,X, T
)
,
T = τ(U,X3, X4) = τ
(
U,X3, ϕ4(U4, X1)
)
=: τˇ
(
Uˇ ,X
)
,
we find that Uˇ and Vˇ are no longer conditionally independent because Uˇ involves
(U4, U,X1), Vˇ involves (U5, U6, V,X2), and Uˇ and Vˇ are ‘entangled’ by X1
41U˜ and V˜ are independent and independent of X because the event {X = x} is equal
to
{(
ϕ1(U1), ϕ2(U2), ϕ3
(
U3, ϕ1(U1), ϕ2(U2)
))
= x
}
and hence involves (U1, U2, U3), while U˜
involves (U4, U) and V˜ involves (U5, U6, V ). In particular, the conditional distribution of V˜
given {X = x} is independent of x, whence the last equality in 5.2 (cf. footnote 22). As we
shall see below this reduction to a first-level model is not the only one possible. Note that V˜
may, for example, be defined by arranging the digits in the decimal expansions of V , U5, U6
alternately, so that ρ˜ involves first the ‘unfolding’ of a sequence in three sequences of digits.
42Pearl has been explaining this for years (see the references in footnote 36); for a dif-
ferent opinion see [30] and p. 22 of [31]. It must be admitted, however, that if in relatively
simple problems, such as (for instance) those considered in [58], setting up and justifying a
second-level model is possible, in many observational studies of the type considered in [59]
and [31] it may simply be impossible. In fields such as Economics and Sociology, identifying
and estimating causal effects seems to be particularly difficult; see the valuable analyses of
Freedman in the later chapters of [24] and in chapter 5 of [25].
43Take for instance X = (X2,X3): L(R|T = t,X = x) = L
(
ρ(V, x3, ϕ5(U5, x2), ϕ6(U6, t))
∣
∣
τ(U, x3, ϕ4(U4,X1)) = t,X = (x2, x3)
)
= L(ρ(V, x3, ϕ5(U5, x2), ϕ6(U6, t))
)
.
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and X2 through the conditioning event {X = x} = {ϕ3
(
U3, X1, X2
)
= x}, so
unconfoundedness fails if X3 is the only confounder to be corrected for in (5.1);
and it must be possible to contrive a mildly realistic problem which is compatible
with (5.1) or with a similar model.
Although a model at the second-level of causality ought to be based princi-
pally on extra-statistical knowledge, it has been pointed out by Pearl and others
(e.g. section 2.5 of [54]) that such a model implies the conditional independence
of certain variables and hence can be checked, in part, by means of data on
those variables. Thus, in model (5.1) X3 and X4 are independent conditionally
on X1 because
L(X4∣∣X1 = x1, X3 = x3) = L(ϕ4(U4, x1)∣∣X1 = x1, ϕ3(U3, x1, X2) = x3)
= L(ϕ4(U4, x1))
does not depend on x3, so if data are available on X1, X3 and X4 a test of
independence provides a test of the model; similarly, the independence of X3
and X5 conditionally on X2, the independence of X1 and X6 conditionally on T ,
etc., are implications of the model that can be used to criticize it. On the other
hand, as in other questions of goodness-of-fit, unless the sample size is very large
the non-rejection of conditional independence does not imply the approximate
correctness of the portion of the model being tested.44
These considerations might tempt one to conclude that it is possible to infer
the ‘causal structure’ underlying a certain phenomenon and the statistical data
pertaining to it from the data alone (i.e. without substantial knowledge about
the phenomenon proper), even if only in an asymptotic sense. That this is not
the case can be seen from the model R = ρ(V,X, T ), T = τ(U,X), X = ϕ(W ),
say, with X , T and R taking values in N, which is essentially model (4.1) and
may be said to represent the simplest of all causal structures containing the
possibility of confounding. As pointed out in remark (iii) on p. 17, given a large
random sample of vectors (Xi, Ti, Ri) with the same distribution as (X,T,R),
it is impossible, without the knowledge of the order by which the variables are
generated in reality, to find out whether the (Xi, Ti, Ri)s are determined in the
same fashion as (X,T,R) or rather by
Xi = H
−1(Wi;Ri, Ti), Ti = G−1(Ui;Ri), Ri = F−1(Vi),
(in notation analogous to that of remark (iii) on p. 17). Even in special cases,
as when ρ is constant in the third argument and hence there is no treatment
effect, testing for the independence of T and R conditional on X will not help us
discover the model behind the data because both sets of equations lead to the
distribution of (X,T,R). The situation does not improve if one ignores that the
44Since a realistic model should typically have many portions to be tested there will be
several and often many tests to perform and assess; a multiple testing correction may then
be necessary in order to control the number of incorrect rejections. If many tests are carried
out then one thing to check is whether the histogram (or the probability plot) of the p-values
(which typically are ‘weakly dependent’) looks compatible with a uniform distribution, or with
an appropriate null distribution.
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confounderX plays a role in the generation of T and R and does not collect data
on it; for then, as exemplified by Simpson’s paradox, it is not even possible, in
general, to find out whether the effect of T on R—in the event that the former is
known to precede the latter (part of subject matter knowledge, not to be taken
for granted in general)—is positive or negative.45
In the next subsection we shall have more to say about the identification of
subsets of variables which allow the reduction of a second-level model to a first-
level model—sets of confounders such as {X1, X3}, {X2, X3} or {X1, X2, X3} in
the case of model (5.1). After that we shall consider other, more involved causal
effects pertaining to a model at the second-level of causality.
5.1. Choice of variables on which to condition: Pearl’s criterion
Let us think of a generic model at the second-level of causality involving a
number of random variables X1, X2, . . . , T, R, such that T and R are functions
of some of the Xjs, none of the Xjs is a function of (T,R) and R is a function of
T , and consider the problem of finding a set X of Xjs in the model which allows
the estimation of the effect of T on R by conditioning upon it—a set which
provides the means of reducing the model to a first-level model. There exists at
least one set with the required property, namely the union X=X1 ∪X2 of the
set X1 of Xjs that affect T with the set X2 of Xjs that affect R (and which by
our definitions are not affected by T ); for then R = ρ(V,X2, T ), T = τ(U,X1),
X does not involve T , and so we have, with x = (x1,x2),
L(R|T = t,X = x) = L(ρ(V,x2, t)∣∣τ(U,x1) = t,X = x) = L(ρ(V,x2, t)) (5.3)
by the independence of U , V and the exogenous variables involved in X, and
the last term here characterizes the causal effect of T on R completely and can
be estimated from observed data in the guise of the first term. The point is that
there may be a smaller, or in some sense more convenient, X.46
In what follows, denote by X a set with the required property, or a candidate
for such a set. Let Xˇ be the set of variables not in X that affect the treatment
as arguments of τ and Xˆ the set of variables not in X that affect the response
as arguments of ρ. Figure 2 sketches a graph of the model with the sets X, Xˇ
and Xˆ, and with the double, dashed arrows indicating that some nodes Xi∈X,
Xˇj ∈ Xˇ and Xˆk ∈ Xˆ may be functions of each other—so that we may have, for
instance, Xi = ϕi(Ui, Xˇj), Xˇj = ϕˇj(Uˇj , Xˆk), which in a detailed representation
of the graph would correspond to the path Xi ← Xˇj ← Xˆk.47
45Freedman’s article on pp. 243-54 of [25] is interesting in this connection.
46In the complementary notes at the end of this subsection we consider situations in which
some of the Xjs are functions of T . Note that if some of the Xjs are functions of T and are
also involved in R then we can write them explicitly in terms of T and other variables in
order to achieve a ‘reduced’ expression for R that satisfies our requirements. For instance, in
model (5.1) the response can be written as R = ρ
(
V,X3, X5, ϕ6(U6, T )
) ≡ ρ˜(V˜,X3,X5, T
)
so
to exclude X6 from X2.
47As always, the Uis, Uˇjs and Uˆks are independent standard uniform random variables.
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Xˇ X Xˆ
T R
Fig 2. Graphical representation of a second-level model to which Pearl’s criterion applies.
Since τ and ρ generally have common arguments, Xˇ and Xˆ are typically not
disjoint, but by definition none of their elements is to be conditioned upon and
hence X ∩ Xˆ = X ∩ Xˇ = ∅. Since not all variables need to be involved in τ
and ρ, X ∪ Xˇ ∪ Xˆ need not contain all the Xjs in the model; thus figure 2 may
correspond to a somewhat incomplete representation of the model.
To help fixing ideas, consider conditioning on X= {X2, X3} in model (5.1)
without the equation defining X6 and with R= ρ
(
V,X3, X5, ϕ6(U6, T )
)
. Since
T = τ(U,X3, X4), we may take Xˇ= {X4} and Xˆ= {X5}. But because we can
also write T = τ
(
U,X3, ϕ4(U4, X1)
)
, we may take Xˇ = {X1} and Xˆ = {X5}
instead; and because we can also write R = ρ
(
V,X3, ϕ5(U5, X2), ϕ(U6, T )
)
we
may take Xˇ={X1} and Xˆ=∅ instead.
If X is to allow the estimation of the effect of T on R we must have48
L(R|T = t,X = x) = L(ρ(V, Xˆ,x, t)∣∣τ(U, Xˇ,x) = t,X = x)
(5.4)
= L(ρ(V, Xˆ,x, t)∣∣X = x).
But the second equality holds if and only if Xˇ and Xˆ are independent condi-
tionally on X. Indeed, if this condition holds then τ(U, Xˇ,x)= t can be dropped
from the second term in (5.4); but if it fails then the treatment may, due to the
constraint τ(U, Xˇ,x)= t, exert an effect on the response through Xˆ—not only
through the last argument of ρ. This already characterizes the desired sets X,
but it does not yet provide a direct, workable means of identifying them.
For the second equality in (5.4) to fail there must be at least two variables
Xˇ ∈ Xˇ and Xˆ ∈ Xˆ which are dependent given X. In the graph of a second-level
model there is always a path (not necessarily a directed one) between nodes,
certainly if they are dependent. Thus the dependence between Xˇ and Xˆ implies
that there is a path between them, a path which also links T and R (because
Xˇ points an arrow to T and Xˆ points one to R) and which represents a chain
of random equations involving Xˇ and Xˆ (hence also T and R) and other nodes.
Note that if the equation Xi = ϕi(Ui, Xˇj) is used to define a second-level model then that
same model cannot be defined with an equation Xˇj = ϕj(Ui,Xi) for some ϕj (in terms of
the graph this means that each node may point an arrow to a node or have an arrow pointed
to it but no two nodes can point arrows to each other), although the first equation can in
principle be inverted, globally or locally, to give Xˇj as a function ϕ
−1
i of Xi and Ui; consider
for instance the model X1 = U1, X2 = U2X1 (cf. footnote 15 and the text leading to it).
48Although X∩ Xˆ = ∅, in general we are not allowed to drop the conditioning on {X = x}
from the last term of (5.4) because X and Xˆ may be dependent.
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As an example, and in order to introduce some notation used below, let us
consider the path
T ← Xˇ ← N1 → N2 ← N3 → N4 ← N5 → Xˆ → R (5.5)
with N1, N2, . . . standing for generic nodes (not necessarily belonging to X, Xˇ
or Xˆ). This path represents a chain of equations of the type
T = τ(U, Xˇ, . . .), Xˇ = ϕˇ(Uˇ , N1, . . .), N2 = ψ2(W2, N1, N3, . . .),
N4 = ψ4(W4, N3, N5, . . .), Xˆ = ϕˆ(Uˆ , N5, . . .), R = ρ(V, Xˆ, . . . , T ),
where U, Uˇ,W2, ..., V are independent standard uniforms, ϕˇ, ϕˆ, ψ2, . . . are certain
functions, and the ellipsis after a list of arguments indicates the possible presence
of other variables not in (5.5).
The following appears to be the most general criterion for deciding which
variables to include in X in order to secure the conditional independence of Xˇ
and Xˆ and hence the second identity in (5.4):49
X is such that for each path P linking T to R with an arrow pointing at T
and an arrow pointing at R one (hence only one) of these conditions holds:
(i) There is a node X∈X in P pointing an arrow to another node in P , so P
contains a subpath of type N ′ → X → N ′′ or of type N ′ ← X → N ′′;
(ii) No node of X in P points an arrow to another node in P , and P contains
a subpath of the form N ′ → N ← N ′′ where neither N nor any of its
descendants is in X (hence P contains no nodes of X).
Before attempting to prove the effectiveness of the criterion let us illustrate its
application to the model of figure 1 without the nodeX6: The path T ← X3 → R
does not permit (ii), so (i) must hold and hence X3 must be included in X.
But if (i) is to hold with the path
T ← X4 ← X1 → X3 ← X2 → X5 → R
another node must be added to X (for otherwise X3, the single node in it, would
point no arrows in that path), and this may be X1, X2, X4 or X5. Thus, if X
consists of X3 and at least one of these four nodes then it satisfies the criterion.
Now letX satisfy the criterion and suppose Xˇ ∈ Xˇ and Xˆ ∈ Xˆ are dependent
givenX (if no such variables exist or if one of Xˇ and Xˆ is empty there is nothing
to prove). We note first for later reference that conditionally on {T = t,X = x}
we have
t = τ(U, Xˇ1, Xˇ,x), R = ρ(V, Xˆ1, Xˆ,x, t), (5.6)
where Xˇ1 = Xˇ \ {Xˇ}, Xˆ1 = Xˆ \ {Xˆ}, so
L(R|T = t,X = x) = L(ρ(V, Xˆ1, Xˆ,x, t)∣∣τ(U, Xˇ1, Xˇ,x) = t,X = x). (5.7)
49It is due to Pearl; see pp.17–8, 79–81 of [47], pp.106, 114 of [48], and the earlier references
provided in these sources. We have not been satisfied with any proof of this result, but have
not yet studied the more recent proof in [55]. A computer program is almost a necessity if one
is to apply the criterion to large models; for flexible software see [73].
Ferreira/Causality: Viewpoint of Classical Statistics 41
Conditionally on X = x ≡ (x1, x2, . . .) we have
Xˇ = f(Wˇ , Wˇ1, Wˇ2, . . . , Wˇp, xj1 . . . , xjp′ ) (5.8)
and
Xˆ = g(Wˆ , Wˆ1, Wˆ2, . . . , Wˆq, xk1 . . . , xkq′ ) (5.9)
for some functions f and g, some sets of standard uniforms {Wˇ1, . . . , Wˇp} and
{Wˆ1, . . . , Wˆq}, and certain coordinates xj1 . . . , xjp′ , xk1 . . . , xkq′ of x. This is
evident from the fact that each node can be written as a composition of real-
valued functions of uniform random variables. The conditional dependence of
Xˇ ∈ Xˇ and Xˆ ∈ Xˆ holds if and only if the constraint X = x implies the
existence of at least one constraint between some Wˇj and some Wˆk, unless a
constraint of the form Wˇj = Wˆk already holds unconditionally.
Suppose first that there exists a constraint determined by the single equation
Ψj,k(Wˇj , Wˆk, . . .) = 0, (5.10)
where the ellipsis indicates a possible list of arguments consisting of standard
uniforms and of xis (this includes the possibility that Wˇj = Wˆk). Then, writing
Nˇj for the unique node generated by Wˇj and Nˆk for the unique node generated
by Wˆk, we have
Nˇj = ψˇj(Wˇj , Wˆk, . . .) or Nˆk = ψˆk(Wˆk, Wˇj , . . .), (5.11)
or else
Ni = ψi(Wi, Wˇj , Wˆk, . . .) (5.12)
for some node Ni. While (5.11) implies that Nˇj is a function of Nˆk or Nˆk is a
function of Nˇj , (5.12) implies that Ni is a function of both Nˇj and Nˆk.
In the first case it follows that there is a directed path leading from Nˆk to Xˇ
(via Nˇj) and a directed path leading from Nˆk to Xˆ, or a directed path leading
from Nˇj to Xˆ (via Nˆk) and a directed path leading from Nˇj to Xˇ . Thus there
is a path linking Xˆ to Xˇ which includes no subpath of the type contemplated
in condition (ii); such a path must then satisfy condition (i) and hence contain
a node Xi ∈ X leading to Xˆ or to Xˇ (or to both when Xi = Nˇj or Xi = Nˆk).
In the second case there is a path linking Xˇ to Xˆ which consists of a directed
subpath leading from Nˇj to Xˇ, a directed subpath leading from Nˆk to Xˆ, and
the subpath Nˇj → Ni ← Nˆk. If this path contains a node Xi ∈ X different
from Ni then it is essentially a path with the same properties as the path
obtained in the first case, the only difference being that it leads to one and only
one of Xˇ and Xˆ. If not, then it is a path contemplated in condition (ii) and
therefore neither Ni nor any of its descendants are in X; but since Wˇj and Wˆk
are independent random variables unless the conditioning on X forces Ni or any
of its descendants to take a numerical value, say Ni = xi = ψi(Wi, Wˇj , Wˆk, . . .),
this possibility invalidates (5.12) as the constraint on Wˇj and Wˆk. Thus in the
second case too the path linking Xˇ to Xˆ satisfies condition (i).
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In the path in question let Xi ∈ X lead to Xˇ. The conditioning on X implies
Xi = xi, and substitution of this equation in (5.8) shows that the first equation
of (5.6) can be updated to
t = τ(U, Xˇ1, τ1(xi, . . .),x) (5.13)
for some function τ1. Similarly, if Xi ∈ X leads to Xˆ substitution in (5.9) shows
that the second equation of (5.6) can be updated to
R = ρ(V, Xˆ1, ρ1(xi, . . .),x, t) (5.14)
for some function ρ1. Whatever the case (and both cases can occur under (5.11)),
a numerical value takes the place of a random variable from Xˇ or Xˆ in (5.6).
Now suppose that no two uniforms Wˇj or Wˆk among those appearing in
(5.8) and (5.9), respectively, can be found for which (5.10) holds. Then there
is a chain of equations involving one Wˇj from (5.8), one Wˆk from (5.9) and
uniforms Wi1 , . . . ,Wip (possibly but not necessarily from (5.8) and (5.9)), say
Ψj,i1(Wˇj ,Wi1 , . . .) = 0, Ψi1,i2(Wi1 ,Wi2 , . . .) = 0, . . . ,
(5.15)
Ψip−1,ip(Wip−1 ,Wip , . . .) = 0, Ψip,k(Wip , Wˆk, . . .) = 0,
where each Ψi,i′ may involve other uniforms not in (5.8)–(5.9) and some com-
ponents of x (as indicated by the ellipsis) but not a uniform from (5.8) together
with a uniform from (5.9) (for otherwise (5.10) would hold). Since the uniforms
involved here are all independent, in order for Wˇj and Wˆk to be conditionally
dependent at least two uniforms Wi and Wi′ among Wˇj ,Wi1 , . . . ,Wip , Wˆk and
any of the other uniforms involved in (5.15) but not in (5.8)–(5.9) must be
involved in the generation of some node Mi,i′ = ϕi,i′ (Ui,i′ , Ni, Ni′ . . .) that is
in X or is a function of some node in X via the nodes Ni = ψi(Wi, . . .) and
Ni′ = ψi′(Wi′ , . . .) that they generate; and while one—say Ni—is involved in
the generation of Xˇ but not of Xˆ the other—say Ni′—is involved in the gener-
ation of Xˆ but not of Xˇ (since otherwise Ni would be a function of Wi′ or Ni′ a
function of Wi, contrary to the assumption that (5.10) fails). This means that
(5.15) implies the existence of a path between Xˇ to Xˆ consisting of a subpath
Ni → Mi,i′ ← Ni′ , a path leading from Ni to Xˇ, and a path leading from Ni′
to Xˆ. If one of the nodes of the path leading from Ni to Xˇ or one of the nodes
of the path leading from Ni′ to Xˆ contains a node of X (or both contain a node
of X) the first argument shows that one of the equations (or both) in (5.6) can
be updated to (5.13) or (5.14). If this is not the case then the path cannot fulfill
condition (i); but then it cannot fulfill condition (ii) either because Mi,i′ is in
X or is a descendant of a node in X, so we have a contradiction.
What we have shown is that, whenever there are two random variables Xˇ ∈ Xˇ
and Xˆ ∈ Xˆ which are dependent givenX, the first, the second or both equations
in (5.6) may be reduced to (5.13), (5.14), or to these two equations combined.
Since the reduction can be carried out with Xˇ1 and Xˆ1 in place of Xˇ and Xˆ and
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then repeated, we eventually conclude after m+n steps that L(R|T = t,X = x)
has the form
L
(
ρ
(
V, Xˆn, ρn(x1, . . . , xn, . . .),x, t
) ∣∣∣∣τ
(
U, Xˇm, τm(x1, . . . , xm, . . .),x
)
= t,
X = x
)
,
for some (possibly empty) sets Xˇm and Xˆn containing no further condition-
ally dependent variables. From this last expression we can drop the constraint
determined by τ to get
L(R|T = t,X = x) = L(ρ(V, Xˆn, ρn(x1, . . . , xn, . . .),x, t)∣∣X = x);
comparing this with the last terms in (5.3) and (5.4) we see that the conditioning
on X permits the substitution of some of the components of x into some of the
arguments of the response function ρ.50
Remark. The rightmost term of (5.3) is the most basic characterization of the
effect of treatment on response, since the only random element involved in it is
the exogenous variable V . In general, as we have seen, the treatment effect may
be characterized by conditioning on a set X that is a proper subset of the set of
arguments of ρ, so the last term in (5.4) may differ from the last term in (5.3).
For example, in model (5.1) without the equation defining X6 and with R=
ρ
(
V,X3, X5, ϕ6(U6, T )
)
, we have X1 = {X3, X4} and X2 = {X3, X5}, and if we
take X = X1 ∪X2 = {X3, X4, X5} in (5.3) then L(R|T = t,X = (x3, x4, x5)) =
L(ρ(V, x3, x5, ϕ6(U6, t))), which may be seen as the most basic characterization
of the effect of treatment on response.
If in the same model we takeX={X1, X3} in (5.4), then Xˇ={X4}, Xˆ={X5}
and the effect of treatment on response is characterized by
L(R∣∣T = t,X = (x1, x3)) = L(ρ(V, x3, X5, ϕ6(U6, t))∣∣ϕ3(U3, x1, X5) = x3).
If instead we take X={X2, X3} we obtain
L(R∣∣T = t,X = (x2, x3)) = L(ρ(V, x3, ϕ5(U5, x2), ϕ6(U6, t)));
if we take X={X3, X4},
L(R∣∣T = t,X=(x3, x4))=L
(
ρ(V, x3, X5, ϕ6(U6, t))
∣∣∣∣ϕ3(U3, X1, X2)=x3,ϕ4(U4, X1)=x4
)
,
and if we take X={X3, X5},
L(R∣∣T = t,X = (x3, x5)) = L(ρ(V, x3, x5, ϕ6(U6, t))).
Of these characterizations of treatment effect only the first and last coin-
cide. This variety of effects reflects the fact that a model at the second-level
of causality incorporates different levels of detail and generally admits different
reductions to first-level causality (cf. the last paragraph of section 3 and the
definition of second-level causality at the beginning of the present section). 
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X1 X2
X8 X4 X3 X5
T X6 R
X7 X9
Fig 3. Graph of a second-level model to which Pearl’s criterion does not apply directly.
Complements
(A) With certain modifications the criterion can be applied to models in which
some of the Xjs are functions of T . As an example, consider the enlarged version
of model (5.1) represented in figure 3 and to which the criterion does not apply:
X6, X7, X8 and X9 are functions of T .
Suppose we include X7 and X8 in X. Then in
L(R|T = t,X = x) = L(ρ(V, Xˆ,x, t)∣∣τ(U, Xˇ,x) = t,X = x) (5.16)
the conditioning event implies
T = τ(U,X3, X4) = t, X7 = ϕ7(U7, t, x8) = x7, X8 = ϕ8(U8, X1, X4, t) = x8.
The equality in the middle can be dropped from the right-hand side of (5.16)
because it involves only an exogenous random variable (which is independent
of all the other exogenous variables). Depending on which other variables are
included in X, the first equality may or may not be dropped; but if it is, then
the third equality may subsist and, because it too depends on t, may affect the
response, ρ(V,X3, X5, ϕ6(U6, t), ϕ9(U9, X3, t)), as a function of t in the guise of
X3 or X5.
Indeed, if we include X3 and X4 in X the conditioning event in (5.16) implies
τ(U, x3, x4)= t, ϕ8(U8, X1, x4, t)=x8, ϕ3(U3, X1, X2)=x3, ϕ4(U4, X1)=x4;
of these equalities, the first vanishes from the conditioning event in (5.16), but
by the second and the third t may exert an effect on
ρ(V, x3, ϕ5(U5, X2), ϕ6(U6, t), ϕ9(U9, x3, t))
also through X2 (since X1 and X2 are entangled by the third equality and X1 is
provided information on t by the second). Thus, while the criterion shows that
model (5.1)—and indeed the model represented by the graph of figure 3 without
X8—may be reduced to first level causality by conditioning on {X3, X4}, in the
present model the addition of X8 to {X3, X4} prevents such a reduction.
50Cf. footnote 43 and the direct verifications in appendix A of [22].
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To see how the criterion can deal with this situation, note that if part of
X, say X′ ≡ X′(T ), is a function of T , and the rest, say X′′, is not, then the
conditioning event in (5.16) can be written as
τ∗t (U, Xˇ,x) :=
(
τ(U, Xˇ,x′,x′′),X′(t)
)
= (t,x′) =: t∗, X′′ = x′′,
which is analogous to (5.16) with a pseudo-treatment τ∗t in place τ ; in order to
determine which other variables can be included in X′′ when X′(T ) is included
in X ≡ (X′,X′′), one can then apply the criterion to the graph that results from
deleting the nodes of X′ from the original graph, replacing τ and X′ by τ∗t , and
directing all the arrows pointing to τ or X′ in the original graph to τ∗t .
X1 X2
X4 X3 X5
T ∗t X6 R
X9
Fig 4. Modified version of the graph of figure 3 to which Pearl’s criterion may be applied to
determine which variables in addition to X7 and X8 must be conditioned upon in order to
allow the estimation of the effect of T on R.
In our example, thanks to the possibility of deleting ϕ7(U7, t, x8) = x7 right
away, the inclusion of X′ = (X7, X8) in X ≡ (X′,X′′) leads to a conditioning
event that includes
τ∗t (U,X1, X3, X4,x) :=
(
τ(U,X3, X4), ϕ8(U8, X1, X4, t)
)
=(t, x8) =: t
∗, X′′=x′′,
and to the graph shown in figure 4, to which Pearl’s criterion may be applied:
The path T ∗t ← X3 → R does not permit (ii), so (i) must hold and hence X3
must be included in X. If (i) is to hold with the path
T ∗t ← X4 ← X1 → X3 ← X2 → X5 → R
then at least one of X1, X2, X4 or X5 must be included in X. But X4 alone
cannot deal with the path T ∗t ← X1 → X3 ← X2 → X5 → R, so we conclude
that if at least one of X1, X2 and X5 joins X3, X7 and X8 in X then the effect
of T on R can be estimated from observed data.
Thus, for each subset X′ of X that is a function of T , one can use Pearl’s
criterion to determine the subsetsX′′ ofX that are not functions of T and which
permit the estimation of the effect of T on R by conditioning on (X′,X′′).
(B) The situation may be different when the nodes that are functions of T are
involved in the definition of R, as is the case with X6 and X9 in the model of
figure 3, and one considers including them in X.
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Suppose we intend to condition on X6, i.e. to include this variable in X. Then
under the conditioning event in (5.16) we have
R = ρ(V,X3, X5, x6, ϕ9(U9, X3, t)), τ(U,X3, X4)= t, ϕ6(U6, t)=x6,
and we can apply the criterion to the graph obtained from that of figure 3 by
deleting X6, replacing T by
T ∗t := τ
∗
t (U,X3, X4) =
(
τ(U,X3, X4), ϕ6(U6, t)
)
,
and linking T ∗t directly to R. The conclusion is that including X3 and at least
one of X1, X2, X4 and X5 in addition to X6 in X allows us to estimate the
effect of T on R—or at least some of the effect of T on R. The problem is that
by conditioning on {X1, X3, X5, X6}, for example, the effect is characterized by
L(ρ(V, x3, x5, x6, ϕ9(U9, x3, t))) = L(ρ(V, x3, x5, X6, ϕ9(U9, x3, t))∣∣X6 = x6),
while by conditioning on {X1, X3, X5} the effect is characterized by
L(ρ(V, x3, x5, ϕ6(U6, t), ϕ9(U9, x3, t))),
and there is quite a difference between these two: while the second law may
be said to apply to the whole population and describes the effect of treatment
through two arguments of ρ, the first applies to a subpopulation in which part
of the treatment effect is, so to speak, overruled by a fixed value of X6, and
whether one rather than the other is relevant depends on the problem in hand.
A more extreme situation is met with if one includes both X6 and X9 in X.
Under the conditioning event in (5.16) we then have
R=ρ(V,X3, X5, x6, x9), τ(U,X3, X4)= t, ϕ6(U6, t)=x6, ϕ9(U9, X3, t)=x9,
and if T is to exert any effect on R it is through a conditioning event consisting
of the second and last of these equations. In the modified graph with T , X6
and X9 replaced by T
∗
t =
(
τ(U,X3, X4), ϕ9(U9, X3, t)
)
, only T ∗t , X3 and X5
point arrows at R, and we can apply the criterion to conclude that including
X3 and one of X1, X2, X4 and X5 to X, in addition to X6 and X9, allows us
to remove from (5.16) all the conditioning events that involve t. But, whatever
the choice we make, the law that is obtained no longer involves t, which seems
rather odd if we think—as we have been doing—of the treatment effect in terms
of the role played by an argument of a random function. Thus, if we condition
on {X1, X3, X6, X9}, for example, the effect is characterized by
L(ρ(V, x3, ϕ5(U5, X2), x6, x9)∣∣ϕ3(U3, x1, X2) = x3),
while if we condition on {X1, X3, X5, X6, X9} it is characterized by
L(ρ(V, x3, x5, x6, x9)),
and not only are these different as they are constant in t.
In conclusion, although Pearl’s criterion can be applied to models in which
some of theXjs are functions of T , in models for which the response is a function
of such Xjs it may lead to characterizations of causal effects in which the role
of T is partly or completely overruled by other variables.
Ferreira/Causality: Viewpoint of Classical Statistics 47
5.2. More complicated causal effects
In some problems one needs to consider the effect on a response of two or more
treatments associated with a sequence of situations; such problems presuppose a
second-level model, and, because of the natural connection between the different
treatments and situations, the specification and estimation of the joint effect of
treatments cannot be reduced to applying the methods described in section 4
with a single ‘multiple treatment’ and a single ‘multiple situation’. An example
of general character will make clear what the difficulties and possibilities are.51
Consider the model 

T = τ(U,X),
R = ρ(V,X, T ),
X′ = ξ(W,X, T, R),
T ′ = τ ′(U ′,X′, T, R),
R′ = ρ′(V ′,X′, T ′, T ),
(5.17)
where conditionally onX (hence also unconditionally) the unobservable random
variables U , U ′, V , V ′, W are independent and standard uniform and τ , τ ′, ξ, ρ
and ρ′ are some functions. This is a statistical version of the deterministic model
considered at the end of section 3 and is intended to represent the application
of two treatments, T and T ′, at two different moments in time and under two
situations, X and X′, and the relationship of these variables with each other
and with the two corresponding responses, R and R′: As indicated by the graph
of figure 5, under an initial situation X a first treatment T is chosen and both
situation and treatment influence the first response R; after some time, under a
new situation X′ determined by the ‘past variables’ (X, T, R), a new treatment
T ′ is chosen, based on the most recent situation X′, on the first response R and
on the initial treatment T , and a final response R′ is brought about by the new
situation and the two treatments.52
X
T R X′
T ′ R′
Fig 5. Graph of the second-level causal model (5.17).
Just as in the case of the deterministic version of (5.17), one may consider
the problem of determining the effect of the initial treatment T on the final
51Examples of this kind seem to have been considered first by Robins in [56].
52An equation like X = ϕ(ξ), where ϕ is some function and ξ is a standard uniform
independent of (U, U ′, V, V ′,W ), could be added to (5.17), but is unnecessary. Evidently, the
first two equations in (5.17), and the subgraph of nodes {X, T,R} in figure 5, correspond to
model (4.1) with unconfoundedness.
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response R′: Successive substitutions yield
R′ = ρ′
(
V ′,X′, T ′, T
)
= ρ′
(
V ′, ξ[W,X, T, R], τ ′[U ′,X′, T, R], T
)
= ρ′
(
V ′, ξ
[
W,X, T, ρ{V,X, T }], τ ′[U ′,X′, T, ρ{V,X, T }], T )
= ρ′
(
V ′, ξ
[
W,X, T, ρ{V,X, T }], τ ′[U ′, ξ[W,X, T, R], T, ρ{V,X, T }], T )
=: ρ′′
(
V ′′,X, T
)
,
where V ′′ is a standard uniform random variable defined in terms of U ′, V , V ′
andW ; and since these variables are independent of U conditionally onX we see
that model (4.1) with R′ in place of R holds with unconfoundedness for a generic
individual with data (X, T, R′) and the effect of T on R′ can be investigated by
the method of section 4. Similarly, one may consider determining the effect of the
second treatment T ′ on R′ by conditioning on (X′, T ) (or on (X′, T, R)), since
by the independence of U ′, V and V ′ the variables R′ = ρ′
(
V ′,X′, T ′, T
)
and
T ′ = τ ′(U ′,X′, T, R) = τ ′(U ′,X′, T, ρ{V,X, T }) are independent given (X′, T )
(and given (X′, T, R)); this, too, falls in the class of problems considered so far.
Investigating the joint effect of T and T ′ on the final response R′ presents a
different problem: In essence, it concerns the question of whether and how the
law of the potential response
ρ′
(
V ′, ξ
[
W,X, t, ρ{V,X, t}], t′, t) (5.18)
varies with (t, t′) ∈ T ×T ′, and the question of whether that law can be estimated
from observed data, which need not be obvious because the potential response is
unobservable.53 As posed, the question is incomplete because the law in question
could, for example, be considered conditionally on {X = x} for varying x,
but also unconditionally. We shall study the unconditional law of (5.18), which
describes the effect of (T, T ′) on R′ in a general sense, and in the end mention
the conditional law.
X˜
t R˜ X˜′
t′ R˜′
Fig 6. ‘Intervention version’ of the graph of figure (5); dashed-line arrows represent equations
occurring in (5.17) but not in (5.19).
Note first that the potential outcome (5.18) can be seen as the result of forcing
treatments T and T ′ to take the particular values t and t′, discarding the first
53We may note that in this example the range of T ′ and the range of X′, denoted here by
T ′ and X ′, need not be the same as T and X , respectively.
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and penultimate equations in (5.17), and leaving (X, V,W, V ′) untouched, a
procedure described by the ‘intervention model’54

R˜ = ρ(V˜ , X˜, t),
X˜′ = ξ(W˜ , X˜, t, R˜),
R˜′ = ρ′(V˜ ′, X˜′, t′, t),
(5.19)
where (X˜, V˜, W˜, V˜ ′) has the same distribution as (X,V,W, V ′); it is represented
in relation to the original model by the graph in figure 6.
Of course, the laws of (X, R,X′, R′) and (X˜, R˜, X˜′, R˜′) are generally different,
but if in addition to (5.19) we introduce T˜ = τ(U˜, X˜) and T˜ ′= τ ′(U˜ ′, X˜′, T˜ , R˜),
with (U˜, U˜ ′) independent of (X˜, V˜ , W˜ , V˜ ′) and with the same distribution as
(U,U ′), then
P
[
(X˜, R˜, X˜′, R˜′)∈A, (T˜ , T˜ ′)=(t, t′)] = P[(X, R,X′, R′)∈A, (T, T ′)=(t, t′)].
Using this observation and the independence of U˜ , U˜ ′, V˜ , V˜ ′, W˜ and X˜, and
assuming, in order to simplify the calculations, that the first response is discrete,
we see that
P
(
R˜′ ≤ r′) = ∑
r,x,x′
P
(
R˜′ ≤ r′, R˜ = r, X˜ = x, X˜′ = x′)
=
∑
r,x,x′
P
(
ρ′(V˜ ′,x′, t′, t) ≤ r′, R˜ = r, X˜ = x, X˜′ = x′)
=
∑
r,x,x′
P
(
ρ′(V˜ ′,x′, t′, t) ≤ r′, ρ(V˜,x, t) = r, X˜ = x,
ξ(W˜,x, t, ρ(V˜,x, t)) = x′
)
=
∑
r,x,x′
P
( ρ′(V˜ ′,x′,t′,t)≤r′, ρ(V˜,x,t)=r, X˜=x,
ξ(W˜,x,t,ρ(V˜,x,t))=x′, τ(U˜,x)=t, τ ′(U˜ ′,x′,t,r)=t′
)
P
(
τ(U˜,x) = t, τ ′(U˜ ′,x′, t, r) = t′
)
=
∑
r,x,x′
P
(
R˜′ ≤ r′, R˜ = r, X˜ = x, X˜′= x′, T˜ = t, T˜ ′ = t′)
P
(
τ(U˜,x) = t, τ ′(U˜ ′,x′, t, r) = t′
)
=
∑
r,x,x′
P
(
R˜′ ≤ r′∣∣R˜ = r, X˜ = x, X˜′= x′, T˜ = t, T˜ ′ = t′)
ϕ(x,x′, r, t, t′)
=
∑
r,x,x′
P
(
R′ ≤ r′∣∣R = r,X = x,X′= x′, T = t, T ′ = t′)
ϕ(x,x′, r, t, t′)
,
where we wrote
1
ϕ(x,x′, r, t, t′)
=
P
(
R˜ = r, X˜ = x, X˜′ = x′, T˜ = t, T˜ ′ = t′
)
P
(
τ(U˜ ,x) = t, τ ′(U˜ ′,x′, t, r) = t′
)
= P
(
R˜ = r, X˜ = x, X˜′ = x′
)
.
54It is really a family of models indexed by (t, t′), but there is no harm in ignoring this
in our notation. Again, this intervention model can be seen as the result of an application of
Pearl’s ‘do operator’ (cf. footnote 17).
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This sequence of identities results from an attempt to turn the probabilities
P
(
R˜′ ≤ r′, R˜ = r, X˜ = x, X˜′ = x′), which pertain to (5.19), into a product of
probabilities pertaining to (5.17). It is carried out by ‘completing’ the events
pertaining to (5.19) by the events {τ(U˜ ,x) = t}, {τ ′(U˜ ′,x′, t, r) = t′}, through
multiplication and division by P
(
τ(U˜ ,x) = t
)
and P
(
τ ′(U˜ ′,x′, t, r) = t′
)
. The
procedure may also be seen as an attempt to reconstruct the graph in figure 5
by adding arrows to the graph in figure 6. It will be illustrated several times in
section 6.
Applying essentially the same procedure to P
(
R˜=r, X˜=x, X˜′=x′
)
, we have
1
ϕ(x,x′, r, t, t′)
=
P
(
R˜ = r, X˜ = x, X˜′ = x′, T˜ = t
)
P
(
τ(U˜ ,x) = t
)
=
P
( ρ(V˜,x,t)=r, X˜=x,
ξ(W˜,x,t,ρ(V˜,x,t))=x′, τ(U˜,x)=t
)
P
(
τ(U˜,x) = t
)
=
P
(
R = r,X = x, X′ = x′, T = t
)
P
(
τ(U,x) = t
)
= P
(
X′ = x′
∣∣∣∣X = x, T = t,R = r
)
P
(
X = x, T = t, R = r
)
P
(
τ(U,x) = t
)
= P
(
X′ = x′
∣∣∣∣X = x, T = t,R = r
)
P
(
R = r
∣∣∣∣X = x,T = t
)
×
P
(
X = x, T = t
)
P
(
τ(U,x) = t
)
= P
(
X′ = x′
∣∣∣∣X = x, T = t,R = r
)
P
(
R = r
∣∣∣∣X = x,T = t
)
P
(
X = x
)
.
Putting the two results together we get
P
(
R˜′ ≤ r′) = ∑
r,x,x′
P
(
R′ ≤ r′∣∣X = x, T = t, R = r,X′ = x′, T ′ = t′)×
P
(
X′ = x′
∣∣X = x, T = t, R = r)× (5.20)
P
(
R = r
∣∣X = x, T = t)P(X = x).
In particular, (5.20) shows that the law of the potential outcome (5.18)—the
law of the response R˜′=ρ′(V˜ ′, X˜′, t′, t) of the intervention model (5.19)—can be
estimated from data on (X,X′, T, T ′, R,R′). It also shows that the joint effect
of T and T ′ on the final response R′ compounds the effect of T on the first
response R conditionally on the first situation X, the effect of (X, T, R) on the
new situation X′, and the effect of T ′ on R′ conditionally on (X, T, R,X′).55
55Equation (5.20) is a special case of a result due to Robins; see pp.696–7 of [57], pp.102–3
of [47], and the references cited in the sources. The general result involves further iterations of
the procedure, illustrated by (5.17), of defining a new situation, a new treatment and a new
response based on earlier situations, treatments and responses; the corresponding identity can
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This example illustrates two aspects of the analysis of a second-level model:
the specification of the causal effect—which often amounts to choosing one
among several meaningful measures of causal effect, like the unconditional law
of (5.18)—and the investigation of whether the causal effect can be expressed in
terms of quantities that can be estimated from observed data—a question that
need not have a positive nor obvious answer.
Regarding the interpretation and potential usefulness of a result like (5.20),
we may note that if the distribution of a potential outcome such as (5.18) can
indeed be estimated from observed data and, based on a large sample, is found
to depend on the values of the treatment variables with high probability, then
it is probable that a substantial number of individuals underlying the sample
had responses which were nonconstant functions of the treatments. If this is the
case, then whether one may or may not have convinced those individuals to opt
for certain values of the treatments instead of those they chose at the time and
whether one may or may not convince the same or similar individuals to opt for
certain values of the treatments in the future are legitimate questions, but they
do not diminish the evidence for an effect of the treatments.56
In the case of our example, knowing that
(t, t′)→ ρ′(V ′, ξ[W,X, t, ρ{V,X, t}], t′, t)
is nonconstant with positive probability implies that
P
{
ρ′
(
V ′, ξ
[
W,X, t, ρ{V,X, t}], t′, t) ∈ A |X = x}
depends on (t, t′) for some x and A. In a real-life problem this information could
be used as a basis for prescribing or recommending particular values of treatment
to individuals of a given population. In fact, one may guess from (5.20) (and
verify by a slight modification of its derivation) that this last probability equals∑
r,x′
P
(
R′ ∈ A∣∣X = x, T = t, R = r,X′ = x′, T ′ = t′)×
P
(
X′ = x′
∣∣X = x, T = t, R = r)P(R = r∣∣X = x, T = t);
since this too can be estimated from observed data, it could provide information
about the most favourable directions in which to move t and t′ in situations x,
and hence guide a future intervention on the population in question. Although
in many cases the probabilities estimated from past data do not apply to future
data, in some real-life problems the directions of the effects do, and sometimes
it may be enough to get these right.
be guessed from the proof of the special case above. We may note that the potential outcome
(5.18) and T ′ = τ ′(U ′,X′, T, R) are independent conditionally on the random variables T =
τ(U,X), X, R = ρ(V,X, T ) and X′ = ξ(W,X, T,R) which precede them; this corresponds to
assumption (1) in [57].
56A similar observation has been made in the remark on p. 29, in connection with the
simpler problem of the effect of a single treatment.
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6. Specification and identification of causal effects: some examples
Our purpose in this section is to study a number of ‘causal problems’ that have
been considered (as examples, mostly) in the literature, and to solve them by
elementary probability arguments. It will be seen that the calculations involved
are typically of the sort used in the derivation of (5.20). Such calculations have
been formalized by Pearl into a ‘calculus of intervention’ designed to facilitate
the derivation of similar results in connection with arbitrary second-level models
and help develop computer algorithms for deriving results about large models.57
Appendix A presents an attempt at understanding Pearl’s calculus, but we shall
make no use of it here; the method used in our first example may be compared
with the methods used by Pearl on pp. 81–82 and pp. 86–88 of [47].
6.1. Smoking and the genotype theory
Pearl (pp. 83–84 of [47]) considers the model

X = ϕ0(U0),
Y = ϕ1(X,U1),
Z = ϕ2(Y, U2),
W = ϕ3(X,Z,U3),
(6.1)
where U0, U1, U2, U3 are independent standard uniforms,W , Y , Z are regarded
as observable, X and the Uis as unobservable, and the ϕis as unknown real-
valued functions. The model, summarized by figure 7, is intended to describe
the combined effects on the development of lung cancer of smoking and of a
putative genotype that is not only carcinogenic but also predisposes people to
smoke; the random variables pertain to an individual randomly drawn from some
population, X stands for the individual’s genotype, Y for his level of smoking
and Z for the concentration of tar deposits in his lungs, both determined at
some point in time, and W for the indicator of whether the individual develops
lung cancer at a later stage.
X
Y Z W
Fig 7. Graph of model (6.1).
The question of interest is whether the effect of smoking on the development
of lung cancer (the effect of Y on W ) can be estimated despite the confounder
of that effect (X) being unobservable; the answer is that it can, thanks to the
knowledge about the concentration of tar in the lungs (Z), a more immediate
57See section 3.4 of [47] and pp. 677-8, 686-7 of [45].
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cause of cancer. This model is probably not very realistic, but the question
behind it is not trivial and could be of interest in similar problems.58
Model (6.1) implies
W = ϕ3 (X,ϕ2(Y, U2), U3) , Y = ϕ1(X,U1), (6.2)
which is of type (4.1) with unconfoundedness: the ‘treatment’ Y is a function
of X , the response W is a function of the treatment Y and of X , the latter con-
founds the effect of Y on R, but since U1 and U2 are independent (conditionally
on X as well as unconditionally) the treatment effect is fully characterized by
L(W |X = x, Y = y) and may be quantified through functionals of it, such as
py(w) :=
∑
x
P(W = w|X = x, Y = y)P(X = x). (6.3)
This can be estimated from data on (W,X, Y ), but our assumption is that only
data on (W,Y, Z) are available. In order to show that one can write py(w) in
terms of probabilities pertaining to W , Y and Z, we first put
mz(w) :=
∑
x
P(W = w|X = x, Z = z)P(X = x)
=
∑
x
P[ϕ3(x, z, U3)=w|ϕ0(U0)=x, ϕ2(ϕ1(x, U1), U2)=z]P(X=x)
=
∑
x
P(ϕ3(x, z, U3) = w)P(X = x),
where in the last equality we make use of the independence of the Uis, and
ly(w) :=
∑
z
mz(w)P(Z = z|Y = y),
and then note that
py(w) =
∑
x
P [ϕ3(x, ϕ2(y, U2), U3)=w |ϕ0(U0)=x, ϕ1(x, U1)=y ]P(X=x)
=
∑
x
P [ϕ3(x, ϕ2(y, U2), U3) = w]P(X = x)
=
∑
x,z
P [ϕ3(x, ϕ2(y, U2), U3) = w,ϕ2(y, U2) = z]P(X = x)
=
∑
z
P [ϕ2(y, U2) = z]
∑
x
P [ϕ3(x, z, U3) = w]P(X = x)
58See Freedman’s critique of the model on pp. 272-3 of [25]. In Freedman’s opinion, the
‘perverse theory’ about smoking and lung cancer, according to which it is the genotype rather
than smoking that causes cancer, is refuted by carefully designed population studies, not by
statistical analyses of detailed models such as (6.1). As far as we know, Freedman (pp. 267–9
of [25]) was the first to prove Pearl’s result by means of standard probability arguments; our
approach is less general because it assumes the variables to be discrete, but we make an explicit
connection between the quantity to be estimated from data on (W,Y,Z) and the treatment
effect—comparing the proofs is easy since we follow Freedman’s notation rather than Pearl’s.
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=
∑
z
P [ϕ2(y, U2) = z]mz(w) =
∑
z
P(Z = z|Y = y)mz(w)
= ly(w),
the penultimate step following from
P(Z = z|Y = y) = P[ϕ2(y, U2) = z|ϕ1(ϕ0(U0), U1) = y] = P(ϕ2(y, U2) = z).
Thus the result will be proved if we prove that mz(w) can be written in terms
of probabilities pertaining to W , Y and Z.
By the independence of X , U1, U2 and U3, we have
P(W = w|Y = y, Z = z) = P [ϕ3(X, z, U3) = w,ϕ1(X,U1) = y, ϕ2(y, U2) = z]
P(Y = y, Z = z)
=
∑
x
P
(
ϕ3(x,z,U3)=w,ϕ1(x,U1)=y,
ϕ2(y,U2)=z,X=x
)
P(ϕ1(X,U1) = y, ϕ2(y, U2) = z)
=
∑
x
P(ϕ3(x, z, U3) = w)P
(
ϕ1(x,U1)=y,ϕ2(y,U2)=z,
X=x
)
P(ϕ1(X,U1) = y)P(ϕ2(y, U2) = z)
=
∑
x
P(ϕ3(x, z, U3) = w)P
(
ϕ1(X,U1)=y,
X=x
)
P(ϕ1(X,U1) = y)
=
∑
x
P(ϕ3(x, z, U3) = w)P(X = x|Y = y)
(incidentally, the last couple of steps show that X and Z are independent given
Y ). Since
P(ϕ3(x, z, U3) = w) = P(W = w|Z = z,X = x)
(an observation already used in connection with the definition of mz(w)), the
preceding identity is equivalent to
P(W = w|Y = y, Z = z) =
∑
x
P(W = w|Z = z,X = x)P(X = x|Y = y).
Finally, integrating both sides here with respect to the distribution of Y we get∑
y′
P(W =w|Y =y′, Z=z)P(Y =y′) =
∑
x
P(W =w|Z=z,X=x)P(X=x)
= mz(w),
and the first term involves only probabilities pertaining to W , Y and Z.
In conclusion, the effect of Y on W in the form of (6.3) can be estimated
from data on (W,Y, Z) because
py(w) =
∑
y′,z
P(W =w|Y =y′, Z=z)P(Y =y′)P(Z=z|Y =y) = ly(w).
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This result has been obtained by identifying the effect of smoking on cancer
through the reduced model (6.2) and using the information of the full model
(6.1) to derive an alternative expression—that of ly(w)—for a measure of that
effect—namely py(w). It is worth noting, however, that ly(w) has its own causal
interpretation within the full causal mechanism: Under (6.1), mz(1) quantifies
the effect of a concentration z of deposited tar on the development of lung cancer
irrespectively of genotype, since, for example, mz(1)−mz′(1) is equal to∑
x
{P(W = 1|X = x, Z = z)−P(W = 1|X = x, Z = z′)}P(X = x),
the expected difference between the ‘risk’ of cancer at different concentrations
z and z′ of deposited tar for an individual/genotype randomly drawn from
the population. The differences mz(1) −mz′(1) are meaningful because under
model (6.1) the development of lung cancer is purely a function of genotype
and tar accumulation and of other, ‘exogenous factors’ embodied by U3. On the
other hand, tar deposits occur only through smoking (in particular they are not
affected by genotype), so P(Z = z|Y = y) is a proper measure of the effect
of smoking on tar accumulation. Thus ly(1) quantifies the effect of smoking on
cancer by averaging the risk of cancer due to tar accumulation with respect to
the distribution of the tar accumulation that results from smoking at level y.
6.2. Eelworms, fumigants and crop yields
Pearl (pp. 66–68 of [47]) considers the model

A = ϕ0(ξ0), B = ϕ1(A, ξ1),
U = ϕ2(A, ξ2),
X = ϕ3(A, ξ3),
V = ϕ4(U,X, ξ4),
W = ϕ5(B, V, ξ5),
Y = ϕ6(X,V,W, ξ6),
(6.4)
where the ξis are independent, U , V , W , X and Y are regarded as observable,
all the other variables (including A and B) as unobservable, and the ϕis are
regarded as unknown. This is intended to represent the effects of the population
density of eelworms, the application of fumigants, and the predation of eelworms
by birds and other animals, on the crop yield of oats, as indicated in figure
8. The amount of fumigants applied, X , is decided by the farmer based on
intuition, past experience and last year’s impressions, all of which constitute
some unmeasurable and hence unobservable set of quantities A. Some parts of
A at least have an effect on the estimate of the eelworm population obtained just
before fumigation, U , and on the predatory activity on eelworms, represented by
B, which, being difficult to quantify, is regarded as unobservable. The eelworm
population is estimated again as V some time after fumigation, and then again
later in the season, when the effect of the fumigant is lost, as W . While V is
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affected by X , the only systematic effects on W are due to V and to B. Finally,
the yield of oats, Y , is influenced by X , V and W .59
A
U B
X V W
Y
Fig 8. Graph of model (6.4).
The question of interest is similar to that of subsection 6.1: can one estimate
the effect of X on Y—the effect of fumigation on crop yield—from observed
data on (U, V,W,X, Y ) (hence without making use of data on (A,B)), and, if
so, how?60
Note that (6.4) implies
Y = ϕ6(X,V,W, ξ6) = ϕ6 [X,ϕ4(U,X, ξ4), ϕ5(B, V,X, ξ5), ξ6]
= ϕ6 [X,ϕ4 {ϕ2(A, ξ2), X, ξ4} , ϕ5 {ϕ1(A, ξ1), V,X, ξ5} , ξ6] = · · ·
=: ρ(X,A, ξ),
say, the third argument of ρ being occupied by ξ = (ξj)j 6=3. Together with
X = ϕ3(A, ξ3) this yields a model of type (4.1) with unconfoundedness; the
effect of X on Y is characterized by L(Y |A = a,X = x) and may be quantified
through functionals of it, such as
µx(y) :=
∑
a
P(Y = y|A = a,X = x)P(A = a). (6.5)
Because data on A are not observable, it is not clear that something like this
can be estimated; we shall prove that it can through manipulations of the kind
used in our previous example.
By the independence of the ξis,
P
(
ϕ6(x, v, w, ξ6) = y
∣∣∣∣X = x,W = w,V = v,A = a
)
= P(ϕ6(x, v, w, ξ6) = y)
and
P(ϕ6(x, v, w, ξ6) = y |X = x,W = w, V = v ) = P(ϕ6(x, v, w, ξ6) = y),
59But not by B, which, as Freedman notes on pp. 273-4 of [25], is one of the reasons why
the model is not completely realistic.
60The answer is provided on p.67 of [47], but we have found no proof of it in the literature.
Freedman (p. 270 of [25]) certainly solved the problem but provides only an indication of how
to proceed. We follow Freedman’s notation rather than Pearl’s.
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so
P
(
Y = y
∣∣∣∣X = x,W = w,V = v,A = a
)
= P(Y = y|X = x,W = w, V = v).
Using this equality we get
P(Y = y|X = x,A = a) =
∑
v,w
P(Y = y,W = w, V = v|X = x,A = a)
=
∑
v,w
P
(
Y = y
∣∣∣X=x,W=w,V=v,A=a )P(X=x,W=w,V=v,A=a )
P(X = x,A = a)
=
∑
v,w
P
(
Y =y
∣∣∣∣X=x,W =w,V =v
)P(X=x,W=w,
V=v,A=a
)
P(X=x,A=a)
.
Writing Ψ(a, v, w, x) for the second term of the summand on the right we thus
have the identity
P(Y = y|X = x,A = a) =
∑
v,w
P
(
Y =y
∣∣∣∣X=x,W =w,V =v
)
Ψ1(a, v, w, x), (6.6)
and we have to show that Ψ1(a, v, w, x)P(A = a) can be estimated from observed
data (the first term of the summand can).
Note that Ψ1(a, v, w, x) = P(W = w, V = v|X = x,A = a); since this is
formally analogous to the probability P(Y = y|X = x,A = a) we have started
with, we may try and reapply the procedure just used: We have
Ψ1(a, v, w, x) =
∑
u
P(W =w, V =v, U=u|X=x,A=a)
=
∑
u
P
(
W =w
∣∣∣∣X = x, V = v,U = u,A = a
)
P
(
V = v
∣∣∣∣X=x, U=u,A=a
)
×P(U=u |X=x,A=a )
and, using as always the independence of the ξis,
P(U=u |X=x,A=a ) = P(ϕ2(a, ξ2) = u),
P(V = v |X=x, U=u,A=a ) = P(V = v |X=x, U =u),
P(W =w |X = x, V = v, U = u,A = a ) = P(ϕ5{ϕ1(a, ξ1), v, ξ5}=w).
Thus
Ψ1(a, v, w, x) =
∑
u
P
(
V = v
∣∣∣∣X=x,U=u
)
P
(
ϕ5{ϕ1(a, ξ1), v, ξ5}=w
ϕ2(a, ξ2) = u
)
=
∑
u
P
(
V = v
∣∣∣∣X=x,U=u
)P(ϕ5{ϕ1(a,ξ1),v,ξ5}=w,
U=u,A=a
)
P(A = a)
.
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To see how much progress we have made, let us multiply both sides of (6.6) by
P(A = a) and sum over a; using the last equality we get (see (6.5))
µx(y) =
∑
u,v,w
P
(
Y =y
∣∣∣∣X=x,W =w,V =v
)
P
(
V = v
∣∣∣∣X=x,U=u
)∑
a
Ψ2(a, u, v, w),
where
Ψ2(a, u, v, w) = P(ϕ5{ϕ1(a, ξ1), v, ξ5}=w,U = u,A = a).
The last probability here is the remaining problematic term. In it, the vari-
able ϕ5{ϕ1(a, ξ1), v, ξ5} could almost be replaced by W , were it not for the
absence of the event {V = v}. We cannot slip {ϕ4(u,X, ξ4) = v} into our prob-
abilities because X = ϕ3(A, ξ3) depends on A; but the event {ϕ4(u, x′, ξ4) =
v, ϕ3(a, ξ3) = x
′} is allowed to appear there:
Ψ2(a, u, v, w) =
∑
x′
P(ϕ5{ϕ1(a, ξ1), v, ξ5}=w,ϕ3(a, ξ3)=x′, U=u,A=a)
=
∑
x′
P
(
ϕ5{ϕ1(a,ξ1),v,ξ5}=w,ϕ4(u,x′,ξ4)=v,ϕ3(a,ξ3)=x′,
U=u,A=a
)
P(ϕ4(u, x′, ξ4) = v)
=
∑
x′
P
(
ϕ5{ϕ1(A,ξ1),V,ξ5}=w,ϕ4(U,x′,ξ4)=v,ϕ3(A,ξ3)=x′,
U=u,A=a
)
P(ϕ4(u, x′, ξ4) = v)
=
∑
x′
P(X = x′,W = w, V = v, U = u,A = a)
P(ϕ4(u, x′, ξ4) = v)
.
Summing over a rids us of probabilities pertaining to A and leads us to
µx(y) =
∑
u,v,w
P
(
Y =y
∣∣∣∣X=x,W =w,V =v
)
P
(
V = v
∣∣∣∣X=x,U=u
)
Ψ3(u, v, w),
where
Ψ3(u, v, w) =
∑
x′
P(W =w |X=x′, V =v, U=u) P(X=x
′, V =v, U=u)
P(ϕ4(u, x′, ξ4) = v)
.
Finally,
P(X=x′, V =v, U=u)
P(ϕ4(u, x′, ξ4) = v)
=
P(ϕ4(u, x
′, ξ4)=v, ϕ3(A, ξ3)=x′, ϕ2(A, ξ2)=u)
P(ϕ4(u, x′, ξ4) = v)
.
= P(ϕ3(A, ξ3)=x
′, ϕ2(A, ξ2)=u)
= P(X=x′, U=u),
so
µx(y) =
∑
u,v,w
P
(
Y =y
∣∣∣∣X=x,W =w,V =v
)
P
(
V = v
∣∣∣∣X=x,U=u
)
×
∑
x′
P(W =w |X=x′, V =v, U=u )P(X=x′, U=u),
and this indeed can be estimated from data on (U, V,W,X, Y ).
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6.3. Direct effect of initial treatment in a two-stage treatment plan
Cox and Wermuth (section 2.3 of [79]) consider the model

Y1 = λY2 + αY4 + δU + ǫ1,
Y2 = νY3 + ǫ2,
Y3 = θY4 + γU + ǫ3,
Y4 = ǫ4, U = ǫ5,
(6.7)
where the ǫis are independent variables with zero means, the Yis are regarded
as observable, U as unobservable, and α, γ, δ, λ, ν, θ as unknown numbers. This
is a special case of a model used by Pearl in [52] to comment on the work of
Cox and Wermuth: 

Y1 = ϕ1(Y2, Y4, U, ǫ1),
Y2 = ϕ2(Y3, ǫ2),
Y3 = ϕ3(Y4, U, ǫ3),
Y4 = ϕ4(ǫ4), U = ϕ5(ǫ5),
(6.8)
where the ϕis are regarded as unknown real-valued functions. The two models,
summarized by figure 9, are versions of a model considered earlier by Robins
and Wasserman in [58]. They represent the situation of a two-stage treatment
plan in which patients of unknown ‘health status’ U undergo a first treatment
Y4 and then a second treatment Y2 dictated in part by the outcome Y3 of an
examination carried out some time after the first treatment; the final outcome
Y1, measured some time after the second treatment, is influenced by the first as
well as by the second treatment, and also by health status.
U Y3 Y4
Y2
Y1
Fig 9. Graph of models (6.7) and (6.8).
Using the second and third equations in the first equation of (6.7), we see
that by ‘regressing’ Y1 on Y4 one can estimate the effect of the initial treatment
Y4 on the final outcome Y1, namely the parameter α+ λνθ, in a consistent and
unbiased way.61 Cox and Wermuth, however, were interested in the estimation
of the direct effect of the first treatment. It seems clear enough that Y4 affects
Y1 directly as well as indirectly through its influence on Y3 and Y2, that one may
want to quantify one effect rather than the other, and that in (6.7) the direct
61 On the other hand, regressing Y1 on (Y2, Y4) yields a biased estimate of the first equation
of (6.7), because U—which, being unobservable, is forced to contribute to the error term—is
correlated with Y2. This phenomenon is well-known from regression analysis (e.g.[24], question
14, pp.56, 251) and finds a general explanation in terms of model (4.1): if ϕ1 is identified with
ρ and Y2 with T , unconfoundedness fails unless one can correct for the confounder U .
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effect should be α. But if the first three equations are Y1 = αY2Y4 + δU + ǫ1,
Y2 = Y3 + ǫ2 and Y3 = Y4 + γU + ǫ3, for example, then the situation may
not be so clear. It is useful, therefore, to define the direct effect of Y4 on Y1 in
connection with the more general model (6.8).
One of way of doing this is by integrating L(Y1|U =u, Y2= y2, Y4= y4) with
respect to the distribution of (U, Y2) and considering the result as a function of
y4. If we write
62
µt :=
∑
u,y1,y2
y1P(Y1 = y1|U = u, Y2 = y2, Y4 = t)P(U = u, Y2 = y2) (6.9)
then µt′ − µt for t′ 6= t quantifies the difference between the outcomes of two
randomly chosen patients who happened to have the same health status and
to have received the same second treatment but to have had different initial
treatments. If in (6.7) we regard U as observable, the first equation constitutes
a linear regression model of Y1 on (U, Y2, Y4) (because this random vector is
independent of ǫ1), so E[Y1|U = u, Y2 = y2, Y4 = y4] = λy2 + αy4 + δu and
µt′ − µt = α(t′ − t), and this definition of direct effect can be identified with
α. The definition applies more generally to model (6.8), of course, but then a
quantity such as µt′ − µt need not be reducible to a single parameter.
Another way of defining the direct effect of Y4 on Y1 is to imagine that the
second treatment Y2 can be fixed at some value y2, rather than being determined
by the result Y3 of the examination, without consequences for the way in which
the other variables are generated. This situation, which need not be less realistic
than the situation behind the models (6.7)–(6.8) (it is probably just as realistic
if neither patients nor doctors have expectations about, or wish to influence,
the second treatment), corresponds to the intervention model obtained from
(6.8) by deleting the second equation and replacing the occurrences of Y2 in the
remaining equations by a numerical value y2:

Yˆ1 = ϕ1
(
y2, Yˆ4, Uˆ , ǫˆ1
)
,
Yˆ3 = ϕ3
(
Yˆ4, Uˆ , ǫˆ3
)
,
Yˆ4 = ϕ4(ǫˆ4), Uˆ = ϕ5(ǫˆ5).
(6.10)
Under this model, the effect of Yˆ4 on Yˆ1 corresponds to a direct effect of Y4 on
Y1 in (6.8) in the sense that the influence that Y4 would have had on Y1 through
Y2 has been cancelled by the replacement of Y2 by a numerical value and the
removal of the equation defining Y2; and it is of course fully determined by
p
(y2)
t (y) :=
∑
u
P(Yˆ1 = y|Uˆ = u, Yˆ4 = t)P(Uˆ = u) = P(Yˆ1 = y|Yˆ4 = t) (6.11)
(the expression on the right follows from the independence of Uˆ and Yˆ4).
Let us write
ν
(y2)
t :=
∑
y
y p
(y2)
t (y); (6.12)
62We assume that the ǫis are discrete random variables with mean zero, but the discussion
extends in obvious ways to general random variables.
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then νt′ − νt for t′ 6= t quantifies the difference between the outcomes of two
randomly chosen patients who received the same fixed second treatment y2, and
who—as it happens—may or may not have had the same health status, but had
different initial treatments. If in the analogous intervention version of (6.7) we
regard Uˆ as observable, the first equation constitutes a linear regression of Yˆ1
on (Uˆ , Yˆ4) (with y2 contributing to the intercept), so E[Yˆ1|Uˆ = u, Yˆ4 = y4] =
λy2 + αy4 + δu and ν
(y2)
t′ − ν(y2)t = α(t′ − t), and this definition too can be
identified with α.
Which definition of direct effect is of interest depends on the real-life problem
in hand. The second definition is probably more useful in the analysis of clinical
studies because the substitution of a numerical value for Y2 in (6.7)–(6.8) does
not constrain Y3 in any way (since the second equation vanishes as well) whereas
the probabilities involved in (6.9) do imply a constraint on Y3 and consequently
a constraint on Y4, which constraints may not have operational meaning. That
in the case of the ‘linear system’ (6.7) the two definitions coincide may be
of some interest, but it should not cause us to ignore the essential difference
between them—nor perhaps the need for defining ‘direct effect’ in operational
terms rather than in terms of a parameter in a specific functional relationship.63
Now Cox and Wermuth (pp. 21-22 of [79]) show that, despite the absence of
data on U , the parameter α—the direct effect of the first treatment on the final
outcome according to any of our two definitions—can be estimated indirectly by
fitting a number of regression models implied by (6.7) to observable data. In his
comment on their work, Pearl shows (p.2 of [52]) that the direct effect according
to the second definition can be estimated from the observable data even under
the more general model (6.8); in other words, (6.11)—hence (6.12), from which
α is retrieved under (6.7)—can be written in terms of probabilities pertaining
to Y1, Y2, Y3 and Y4 (in contrast, (6.9) does not, in general, seem to admit
an alternative form free from probabilities pertaining to U).64 We are going to
prove Pearl’s result and then consider another situation—slightly different from
the one behind the definition of direct effect—where the idea of an intervention
model may be meaningful and perhaps practically useful.65
As noted on p. 2 of [52], the result applies slightly more generally to model
(6.8) with the second equation replaced by Y2 = ϕ2(Y3, Y4, ǫ2), which allows the
initial treatment to influence the second treatment and may be represented by
63The definition and study of causal effects in situations where a response is influenced by
a variable in a direct way but also in an indirect way through another variable are sometimes
referred to as ‘mediation analysis’; see subsection 6.4 below, and also section 3.7 of [54], where
our second definition of direct effect is used in an essentially different problem.
64As noted on p.2 of [52], Pearl’s result “extends the linear analysis” of Cox and Wermuth.
This is certainly the case when the definition of interest is the second. It is also the case when
the definition of interest is the first and, for example, (6.7) has its first equation replaced by
Y1 = ϕ1(Y2, U, ǫ1)+αY4 for some ϕ1; for under this model too both definitions of direct effect
amount essentially to α and the result applies in the same way to the estimation of α.
65Cox and Wermuth seem to have suggested, in the works cited in [52], that definitions of
effects based on ‘interventions’ (presumably on potential outcomes, such as the Yˆ1 involved in
the second definition) generally have no bearing on real-life situations; the comments in [52]
are Pearl’s response to such a suggestion. We have not been able to understand exactly what
Cox and Wermuth mean in the texts quoted by Pearl.
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figure 9 with an additional arrow from Y4 to Y2; it states that
p
(y2)
t (y) =
∑
y3
P(Y1 = y|Y2 = y2, Y3 = y3, Y4 = t)P(Y3 = y3|Y4 = t) (6.13)
and implies that the direct effect of the first treatment Y4 on the final outcome
Y1 according to the second definition can be estimated from the observable data.
The proof is based on two observations: First,
P
(
ϕ3
(
y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ3
)
= y3
∣∣∣Yˆ4 = y4) = P (ϕ3(y4, U, ǫ3) = y3 |Y4 = y4 ),
because the last three equations of each of (6.8) and (6.10) impose the same
distribution on (U, Y3, Y4) and (Uˆ , Yˆ3, Yˆ4). Secondly,
P
(
ϕ1
(
y2, y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ1
)
= y1
∣∣∣ϕ3(y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ3) = y3, Yˆ4 = y4) =
P
(
ϕ1
(
y2, y4, U, ǫ1
)
= y1
∣∣ϕ3(y4, U, ǫ3) = y3, Y4 = y4 ) =
P
(
ϕ1
(
y2, y4, U, ǫ1
)
= y1
∣∣ϕ2(y3, y4, ǫ2) = y2, ϕ3(y4, U, ǫ3) = y3, Y4 = y4 ) =
P
(
ϕ1
(
y2, Y4, U, ǫ1
)
= y1
∣∣ϕ2(Y3, Y4, ǫ2) = y2, ϕ3(Y4, U, ǫ3) = y3, Y4 = y4 ) =
P (Y1 = y1 |Y2 = y2, Y3 = y3, Y4 = y4 ),
because (U, ǫ1, ǫ3, ǫ4) and (Uˆ , ǫˆ1, ǫˆ3, ǫˆ4) have the same distribution and ǫ1 and
ǫ2 are independent.
Using these identities and recalling the second identity in (6.11), we see that
p(y2)y4 (y1) = P(Yˆ1 = y1|Yˆ4 = y4) =
∑
y3
P(Yˆ1 = y, Yˆ3 = y3|Yˆ4 = y4) =
∑
y3
P
(
ϕ1
(
y2, y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ1
)
= y1, ϕ3
(
y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ3
)
= y3
∣∣∣Yˆ4 = y4) =
∑
y3
P
(
ϕ1
(
y2,y4,Uˆ,ǫˆ1
)
=y1,
ϕ3
(
y4,Uˆ,ǫˆ3
)
=y3,Yˆ4=y4
)
P
(
ϕ3
(
y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ3
)
=y3, Yˆ4=y4
) P
(
ϕ3
(
y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ3
)
=y3, Yˆ4=y4
)
P
(
Yˆ4 = y4
) =
∑
y3
P
(
ϕ1
(
y2, y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ1
)
=y1
∣∣∣∣∣ϕ3
(
y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ3
)
=y3,
Yˆ4=y4
)
P(ϕ3
(
y4, Uˆ , ǫˆ3
)
=y3|Yˆ4=y4) =
∑
y3
P(Y1 = y1|Y2 = y2, Y3 = y3, Y4 = y4)P(Y3 = y3|Y4 = y4),
which is the right-hand side of (6.13) with (t, y) = (y4, y1).
The following example, vaguely inspired by diseases such as Lyme but rather
academic, is intended to show how simple distributional identities such as these
can in principle be useful for making predictions or drawing conclusions about
real or imagined ‘interventions’.
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Among individuals bitten by ticks that may carry a disease, some go to the
doctor because they fear being infected (e.g. on the grounds of information they
have about the disease or because of symptoms). The disease can be treated with
antibiotics of two kinds: one is very effective but has undesirable side effects; the
other is weaker, has few side effects, but is effective only at an early stage of the
disease. The disease is difficult to diagnose, and diagnosis is based on a laborious
and not infallible test. The only consensus among doctors about the treatment
of a potentially infected individual coming for a first visit is that the test should
be offered to him only after some time and provided certain symptoms persist or
develop, and that if tested positive he should probably (thus: not certainly) be
treated with the effective antibiotic and if not tested or tested negative should
probably not be treated at all. Some doctors choose to treat the patient with
the weak antibiotic on the first visit, but this is frowned upon by some of their
colleagues who think that the risk of someone being infected is very small,
that the symptoms reported by the patients are consistent with many other
diseases, and that if a patient is really infected then the weak antibiotic will
probably not help much anyway; consequently, whether a patient is assigned to
the weak antibiotic or is asked to wait until he gets the chance of taking the
test is dictated by the doctor rather than by the patient’s health condition—
implying that the assignment to the weak antibiotic is randomized. Eventually,
a patient, depending on his infection status and general health condition and
on the course of treatments he underwent, is declared free of the disease or
else becomes chronically ill with it, the second possibility tending to occur if
antibiotics are prescribed too late.
If we represent the largely unknown health condition (including its disease
status) of a patient by U ′, the prescription of the weak antibiotic by Y ′4 (equal
to 1 if prescribed, equal to 0 otherwise), the result of the test by Y ′3 (equal to 1
if the test is positive and to 0 if the test is negative or is not even offered), the
prescription of the effective antibiotic by Y ′2 , and the patient’s outcome by Y
′
1
(which can be thought of as binary, with 1 indicating chronically ill, or else as a
number representing ‘level of disability’, ‘survival time’, or something similar),
we may describe this situation by the model

Y ′1 = ϕ1(Y
′
2 , Y
′
4 , U
′, ǫ′1),
Y ′2 = ϕ2(Y
′
3 , Y
′
4 , ǫ
′
2),
Y ′3 = ϕ3(Y
′
4 , U
′, ǫ′3),
Y ′4 = ϕ4(ǫ
′
4), U
′ = ϕ5(ǫ′5).
(6.14)
This is equivalent to (6.8) except for the appearance of Y ′4 in the second equation,
motivated by the influence that having or not having been treated with the first
antibiotic may have on the prescription of the second antibiotic.
Suppose that years of practice reveal that a substantial number of patients (of
whom some have undergone antibiotic treatment of one or both kinds and some
have not) become chronically ill, and that even some of the patients who tested
positive did not, for some reason, undergo antibiotic treatment. An intervention
aimed at reducing the number of chronically ill patients might consist of putting
every patient who tests positive on the effective antibiotic; and within such an
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intervention one could ask whether or not treating all patients initially with the
weak antibiotic would have a further beneficial effect.
In obvious notation, we may describe the intervention by the model66

Yˇ1 = ϕ1
(
Yˇ2, Yˇ4, Uˇ , ǫˇ1
)
,
Yˇ2 = Yˇ3 + (1− Yˇ3)ϕ2
(
Yˇ3, Yˇ4, ǫˇ2
)
,
Yˇ3 = ϕ3
(
Yˇ4, Uˇ , ǫˇ3
)
,
Yˇ4 = ϕ4(ǫˇ4), Uˇ = ϕ5(ǫˇ5).
(6.15)
If for instance Yˇ1 indicates whether the patient becomes chronically ill or not,
then the question of interest is whether
E(Yˇ1|Yˇ4 = 1) < E(Yˇ1|Yˇ4 = 0). (6.16)
If the probabilities P(Yˇ1 = y1|Yˇ4 = y4), which pertain to the intervention, can
be estimated with data on (Y ′1 , Y
′
2 , Y
′
3 , Y
′
4) obtained from the earlier clinical
practice, one may try to check (6.16) and consequently propose rules for an
early prescription of the weak antibiotic.
That the probabilities in question can be estimated from data follows from67
P(Yˇ1=y1|Yˇ4=y4)=P(Yˇ1=y1, Yˇ3=0|Yˇ4=y4) +P(Yˇ1=y1, Yˇ3=1|Yˇ4=y4)=∑
y2=0,1
P
[
ϕ1
(
Yˇ2, y4, Uˇ , ǫˇ1
)
=y1, Yˇ2=y2, Yˇ3=0
∣∣Yˇ4=y4 ]+
P
[
ϕ1
(
1, y4, Uˇ , ǫˇ1
)
=y1, Yˇ3=1
∣∣Yˇ4=y4 ]=∑
y2=0,1
P
[
ϕ1
(
y2, y4, Uˇ , ǫˇ1
)
=y1, ϕ2
(
0, y4, ǫˇ2
)
=y2, ϕ3
(
y4, Uˇ , ǫˇ3
)
=0
∣∣Yˇ4=y4 ]+
P
[
ϕ1
(
1, y4, Uˇ , ǫˇ1
)
=y1, ϕ3
(
y4, Uˇ , ǫˇ3
)
=1, Yˇ4=y4
]
P(Yˇ4=y4)
=
∑
y2=0,1
P [ϕ1(y2, y4, U
′, ǫ′1)=y1, ϕ2(0, y4, ǫ
′
2)=y2, ϕ3(y4, U
′, ǫ′3)=0 |Y ′4=y4 ] +
P
(
ϕ1(1,y4,U
′,ǫ′1)=y1,ϕ2(1,y4,ǫ
′
2)=1,
ϕ3(y4,U ′,ǫ′3)=1,Y
′
4=y4
)
P(ϕ3(y4, U
′, ǫ′3)=1)
P(ϕ2(1, y4, ǫ′2)=1, ϕ3(y4, U ′, ǫ
′
3)=1, Y
′
4=y4)
=
∑
y2=0,1
P [Y ′1=y1, Y
′
2=y2, Y
′
3=0 |Y ′4=y4 ]+
P [Y ′1=y1 |Y ′2 =1, Y ′3=1, Y ′4=y4 ]P(Y ′3 =1|Y ′4=y4)=
P(Y ′1=y1, Y
′
3=0 |Y ′4 =y4) +P(Y ′1=y1|Y ′2=1, Y ′3=1, Y ′4=y4)P(Y ′3=1|Y ′4=y4).
66This is an ‘intervention model’ in a more general sense than the one considered so far—
which is of replacing certain random variables in a system by numerical values and deleting
the equations defining those variables—but it contains nothing essentially new.
67 The same result would be obtained if in (6.15) we deleted the penultimate equation and
replaced Yˇ4 by y4 in the other equations, which would yield an equivalent intervention model.
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Evidently, the conclusions of this type of analysis would be quite ‘volatile’:
If an intervention guided by them were really carried out (rather than simply
imagined for the purpose of producing and assessing predictions—e.g. checking
(6.16)), the population of patients and the population of doctors would probably
change considerably following the release of the news of the intervention and of
the apparent need for it, and then the probabilities computed from past data
would end up not applying in reality. But the most important thing in this case
should be to get (6.16) (or a similar inequality) right, and that would perhaps
dispense with correct estimates of ‘post-intervention’ probabilities.
6.4. Sex discrimination in hiring
In order to study the effect of sex discrimination on the hiring of applicants for
a certain job one may consider the model

H = ϕ1(B,Q, S, ǫ1),
Q = ϕ2(B,S, ǫ2),
B = ϕ3(S, ǫ3),
S = ϕ4(ǫ4),
(6.17)
where H is a binary variable indicating whether a given applicant is hired or
not, Q constitutes a summary of the applicant’s qualifications, B a summary
of the applicant’s ‘social and economic background’, and S is the applicant’s
sex (equal to 1 if it is male, 0 if female), and as usual the ǫis are unobserved,
independent standard uniforms and the ϕis are some unknown functions. A
modicum of realism would perhaps require us to consider applicants of a certain
age group applying for a first job and to include in B the background provided
to the applicant by the family up to a certain age, and to take one such model
for each type of job, type of company or institution, etc.; our purpose again is
simply to illustrate some basic ideas and calculations.
B S
Q
H
Fig 10. Graph of model (6.17).
In essence, (6.17) is the model considered by Pearl, Glymour and Jewel on
pp.75–78 and 114–116 of [54]. As indicated by figure 10, sex can help determine
the fate of the applicant in a direct way but also in an indirect way through the
applicant’s qualifications and background, reflecting the possibility of men and
women having different inclinations for certain subjects or kinds of education;
one may say that the effect of S on H is ‘mediated’ by Q.68
68See footone 63.
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In a real or imagined intervention designed to assess the direct effect of sex on
the applicant’s success or to predict the result of anti-discriminatory measures,
one may contemplate the situation where the hiring committee is not provided
with any clue about the applicant’s sex, or else may be given a false, fixed or
randomized sex. This situation could be represented by the model

H ′s = ϕ1(B
′
s, Q
′
s, σs, ǫ
′
1,s),
Q′s = ϕ2(B
′
s, s, ǫ
′
2,s),
B′s = ϕ3(s, ǫ
′
3,s),
(6.18)
where the variables are completely analogous to those of (6.17) except for σs,
which is independent of the ǫ′i,ss and stands for the assumption made by the
hiring committee about the applicant’s sex, and for the indexing by s (to be set
to 0 or 1), intended to concentrate the analysis on females or on males.69
The interest of such a study lies in comparing P(H ′s = h|B′s = b,Q′s = q), or
a functional of it, with P(H =h|B= b,Q= q, S= s), or with the corresponding
functional. When a large set of data on (B,H,Q, S) is available but no data
have ever been collected on (B′s, H
′
s, Q
′
s), the statistical question is whether the
first probability can be estimated indirectly through estimates of the second
probability.
In essence, the answer is affirmative: using the independence of σs, ǫ
′
1,s, ǫ
′
2,s
and ǫ′3,s, we see that
P(H ′s = h|B′s = b,Q′s = q) = P
(
ϕ1(B
′
s, Q
′
s, σs, ǫ
′
1,s) = h
∣∣∣∣∣ ϕ3(s, ǫ
′
3,s) = b,
ϕ2(B′s, s, ǫ′2,s) = q
)
= P
(
ϕ1(b, q, σs, ǫ
′
1,s) = h
∣∣∣∣∣ ϕ3(s, ǫ
′
3,s) = b,
ϕ2(b, s, ǫ′2,s) = q
)
= P
(
ϕ1(b, q, σs, ǫ
′
1,s) = h
)
=
∑
s′
P(ϕ1(b, q, σs, ǫ1,s) = h, σs = s
′)
=
∑
s′
P
(
ϕ1(b,q,σs,ǫ1,s)=h, S=s
′,
ϕ3(s′,ǫ3,s)=b,ϕ2(b,s′,ǫ2,s)=q
)
P(σs = s
′)
P(ϕ3(s′, ǫ3,s) = b, ϕ2(b, s′, ǫ2,s) = q, S = s′)
=
∑
s′
P(H = h|B = b,Q = q, S = s′)P(σs = s′),
so the remaining question is whether P(σs = 0) is known or can be estimated
or posited.
If the committee is unaware of the intervention and is given a randomized σs
then P(σs = 0) is certainly known. Otherwise, σs cannot be fully controlled and
its distribution will be unknown, but it may still be estimated in a small pilot
69Because S is exogenous, one might include its analog S′ in (6.18) and obtain equivalent
results in the analysis that follows by conditioning on the event {S′ = s}; cf. footnote 67.
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intervention, or by simulation—e.g.by submitting to the committee a number of
pseudo-applications mimicked from past applications and eliciting the commit-
tee’s assumption about the putative applicant’s sex. Positing values ofP(σs = 0)
is always possible, of course, and it may be useful for certain purposes.
For example, one might ask what happens if only women apply for jobs when
the committee always assumes that the applicant is a man, i.e. what happens
if s=0 when σ0 = σ1 = 1. Averaged over background and qualifications in the
population of women, the chance of women getting hired in that situation is∑
b,q
P(H ′0 = h|B′0 = b,Q′0 = q)P(B = b,Q = q|S = 0).
This can be contrasted with∑
b,q
P(H ′1 = h|B′1 = b,Q′1 = q)P(B = b,Q = q|S = 1),
which is the average chance of men getting hired in the same situation. In terms
of expectations, the difference between these two measures is∑
b,q
E(H ′0|B′0 = b,Q′0 = q)P(B = b,Q = q|S = 0)−
E(H ′1|B′1 = b,Q′1 = q)P(B = b,Q = q|S = 1) =∑
b,q
E(H |B=b,Q=q, S=1){P(B=b,Q=q|S=0)−P(B=b,Q=q|S=1)},
by the identity derived above with P(σ0=1)=P(σ1=1)=1 (which incidentally
shows that in this particular situation P(H ′s = h|B′s = b,Q′s = q) is independent
of s, as intuition suggests). This last quantity can be estimated from data on
(B,H,Q, S), and, despite being based on a very unlikely ‘intervention’, could
perhaps serve as an indicator of sex discrimination.70
6.5. Case-control studies
Let us consider model (4.1) with unconfoundedness, with the Rns and Tns binary
and the Xns as well as the (Un, Vv)s independent and identically distributed, so
that the vectors (Xn, Tn, Rn) too are independent and identically distributed,
and think of Rn as an individual’s status of a certain disease (equal to 1 if
the individual is diseased), of Tn as the individual’s indicator of exposure to
an agent suspected of causing the disease (equal to 1 if the individual has been
exposed), and ofXn as a set of background characteristics (age, sex, occupation,
etc.) which may influence the individual’s exposure and disease statuses. For
simplicity we assume that the Xns are discrete, so that the (Xn, Tn, Rn)s too
are discrete. As usual, we write (X, T, R) for a random vector with the same
distribution as the (Xn, Tn, Rn)s.
70Cf. p. 115 of [54], where it (or, more precisely, a slight variant of it) is referred to as the
‘natural indirect effect’ of sex on hiring ‘mediated by’ qualification and background.
Ferreira/Causality: Viewpoint of Classical Statistics 68
In situations where the disease is rare it may be necessary to collect a very
large random sample of individuals in order to obtain enough cases—i.e.diseased
individuals—to provide evidence for the supposed effect of the exposure on the
disease. Instead of collecting a random sample one may then think of obtaining
a substantial number of cases from readily accessible subpopulations—typically
patients in hospitals that treat the disease—and comparing them in terms of
frequency of exposure with a more general subpopulation which, due to the
rarity of the disease, will consist mostly of nondiseased individuals. The intuition
behind this proposal is that if the background characteristics of the cases are
very similar to those of the nondiseased individuals and if the exposure indeed
contributes to the disease then a greater rate of exposure must be found among
the cases than among the nondiseased. But for it to work it is evident that great
care is needed to ensure that the subpopulation of cases and the more general
subpopulation are comparable enough with respect to everything except for
frequency of disease and possibly frequency of exposure.
In a case-control study one tries to make the subpopulations comparable by
matching each case with a ‘control’, namely an individual from a more general
population who has the same or practically the same background characteristics
as the case. In the language of our model this type of study can be described
as follows: First, conditionally on {R1, R2, . . .}, a sequence of cases is obtained
by selecting random indices I1 < I2 < · · · from {n : Rn = 1} independently of
all the other variables, and a sample of N cases is obtained from the indices in
CN = {I1, I2, . . . , IN} by setting
(X′2n−1, T
′
2n−1, R
′
2n−1) ≡ (X′2n−1, T ′2n−1, 1) := (XIn , TIn , 1)
for n = 1, 2, . . . , N . Then, conditionally on {(X1, R1), (X2, R2), . . .}, for each
x ∈ X a sequence of random indices J1(x) < J2(x) < · · · is selected from
{n : Xn = x} \ CN independently of all the other variables and a corresponding
sample of cases is obtained as
(X′2n, T
′
2n, R
′
2n) := (X
′
2n−1, TJn(X′2n−1), RJn(X′2n−1)),
n = 1, 2, . . .N .71
The set (X′1, T
′
1, R
′
1), (X
′
2, T
′
2, R
′
2), . . . , (X
′
2N , T
′
2N , R
′
2N ) so defined represents
the data that can be observed in the study. It is no random sample since in it
a case is always followed by its control, but more important is the fact that its
elements do not have the same distribution as the (Xn, Tn, Rn)s (which are only
incompletely and selectively observed), so it is not obvious that a case-control
study can help us investigate the effect of the exposure on the disease. To show
that it can, note first that, thanks to the way in which the sets {I1, I2, · · · , IN}
71Note that, thanks to the conditioning on the (Xn, Rn)s, the Jn(x)s may be chosen in
such a way that R′2n = 0 for all n, but also in such a way that Jn(x) > In for all n = 1, 2, . . . , N
and all x, so that R′2n = 1 too may occur. While in the former case no diseased individuals
are found among the controls, in the latter the number of diseased and exposed individuals
with background characteristics x among the controls may very well follow the probabilities
P(T = t, R = r|X = x).
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and {J1(x), J2(x), · · · } are generated, the data from the cases and the data from
the controls, respectively, allow us to estimate the probabilities
px := P (T = 1|R = 1,X = x) and qx := P (T = 1|R = 0,X = x), (6.19)
at least for the x ∈ X assumed by the observed X′ns.
Of course, these probabilities are not our object of interest: we know that
under our model the effect of the exposure on the disease is fully characterized
by the probabilities P (R = 1|T = t,X = x) as functions of t, that is by
P (R = 1|T = 1,X = x) and P (R = 1|T = 0,X = x), (6.20)
or by some measure of discrepancy between them. But these probabilities can
hardly be estimated from the data collected in a case-control study because in
the set of cases the number of diseased individuals is fixed and the set of controls,
which may have had its source of diseased individuals even more depleted by
the preceding sampling of cases, will rarely have a diseased individual to show.
Surprisingly, there is a measure of discrepancy between the probabilities in
(6.20) which can be expressed in terms of those in (6.19), and hence estimated
from the data collected in a case-control study: the odds ratio, or, more precisely,
the odds ratio conditional on {X = x}, defined by
e(x) =
O(R = 1|T = 1,X = x)
O(R = 1|T = 0,X = x) , (6.21)
where
O(R = 1|T = t,X = x) = P (R = 1|T = t,X = x)
1− P (R = 1|T = t,X = x) ,
the odds of an individual with characteristics x being diseased given that he was
exposed to treatment t, is an increasing function of P (R = 1|T = t,X = x). If
the exposure does not cause the disease, O(R = 1|T = t,X = x) is constant in t
and hence e(x)=1; otherwise, P (R = 1|T = 1,X = x)>P (R = 1|T = 0,X = x)
and hence e(x) > 1. Since, as is easy to verify,
e(x) =
O(T = 1|R = 1,X = x)
O(T = 1|R = 0,X = x) =
px(1− qx)
qx(1− px) , (6.22)
e(x) also compares the odds of an individual having been exposed given that he
is diseased with the odds of an individual having being exposed given that he is
not diseased. Thus, although it is (6.21) that characterizes the causal effect of
the exposure on the disease, (6.22) shows that the effect can be estimated from
estimates of the probabilities (6.19).72
If we integrate e(x) with respect to P (X ≤ x|R = 1) we get an overall measure
of the effect of exposure on disease which in principle can be estimated from
the observed data, namely E[e(X)|R = 1], where the conditioning on {R = 1}
reflects the fact that, by virtue of the sampling scheme, all the values of the Xns
that actually turn up arise conditionally on Rn = 1.
72The significance of the odds ratio in case-control studies was first noticed by Cornfield
[11]. There exist various types of case-control studies; in particular, several controls may be
matched to each case (see, for example, pp. 7, 83–86 of [59], where case-control studies are
called case-referent studies).
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6.6. Determination of a causal effect with an instrumental variable
In situations where unconfoundedness does not hold in the basic model (4.1)
the study of a causal effect in the full sense of the word is usually ruled out, but
sometimes it is still possible to estimate a sort of causal effect. Angrist, Imbens
and Rubin [1] consider a special situation where the use of an ‘instrumental
variable’ permits the estimation of the causal effect in a subpopulation of the
population of interest.73
The model studied in [1] is
R = ρ(ε, T ), T = τ(δ, I), (6.23)
where the functions ρ and τ are regarded as unknown, T and I are observable
binary random variables, (δ, ε) is an unobservable random vector with arbitrary
distribution, I and (δ, ε) are independent but δ and ε are dependent. The model
arises in the study of the effect of a treatment, T , on a response, R, with the
help of a third variable, I, called an instrument, which is not of direct interest
and affects R only through T .
In the real-life problem treated in [1] the question of interest is whether
serving in the military in times of war has detrimental effects on the health
of individuals; R stands for the health outcome of a generic individual, I for
the individual’s ‘draft status’—whether he was called to serve or not—and T
for his indicator of military service—whether he actually served or not. During
the periods covered by the data, recruitment had been determined by a lottery,
‘low’ lottery numbers leading to drafting. Individuals who were called to serve
may or may not have avoided joining the army, so the data on an individual
might be (I, T ) = (1, 0) or (I, T ) = (1, 1), and individuals who were not called
may have volunteered and joined the military, so (I, T ) = (0, 1) too might be
observed. Although in principle an individual might refuse to join in if recruited
and decide to join in if not recruited, his δ being such that 1 = τ(δ, 0) and
0 = τ(δ, 1), this possibility seems remote; accordingly, it is assumed in [1], and
will be assumed here as well, that τ is monotonic in its second argument, i.e.that
τ(δ, 0) ≤ τ(δ, 1) for all δ.74
In order to study the effect of the treatment on the response—to study how
varying t changes the law of ρ(ε, t)—one might think of estimating
L(R|T = t) = L(ρ(ε, t)|τ(δ, I) = t)
or
L(R|T = t, I = i) = L(ρ(ε, t)|τ(δ, i) = t, I = i),
73I thank my colleague Albert Wong for bringing the work of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin
to my attention.
74The study in [1], which had been preceded by other studies addressing similar questions
by means of simpler statistical methods, is perhaps one of the best and more carefully argued
observational studies involving notions of causality, but it is a little disquieting that some of
our best minds should busy themselves with such things as trying to establish that war has
harmful effects on the health of those likely to participate in it. Other real-life problems in
which the method of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin is potentially useful are described in [66].
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or functionals of them, from data on (I, T,R). However, the dependence between
δ and ε shows that the conditioning on {τ(δ, I) = t} or on {τ(δ, i) = t, I = i}
implies that changes in t cause changes in ρ(ε, t) also through the first argument
of ρ, so neither of these probability laws (and indeed no other probability law)
describes the effect of the treatment on the response.
Surprisingly, the presence of the ‘instrument’ I in the second equation of
(6.23) makes it possible to describe the effect of T on R in some, albeit incom-
plete, sense.75 Indeed, Angrist, Imbens and Rubin show that the parameter
θ :=
E(R|I = 1)−E(R|I = 0)
E(T |I = 1)−E(T |I = 0) , (6.24)
which is defined whenever I and T are correlated, and which can be estimated
from data on (I, T,R) by replacing expected values by sample averages, is a
measure of the causal effect of T on R.
To see this, note that by the independence of I and δ and the monotonicity
of τ , which implies
τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0) 6= 0 ⇔ τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0) = 1 ⇔ τ(δ, 1) = 1 ∧ τ(δ, 0) = 0,
the denominator of θ is
E(T |I = 1)−E(T |I = 0) = E[τ(δ, 1)|I = 1]−E[τ(δ, 0)|I = 0]
= E[τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0)]
= P[τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0) = 1].
By the independence of I and (δ, ε) and by
ρ (ε, τ(δ, 1))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, 0)) 6= 0 ⇒ τ(δ, 1) > τ(δ, 0),
the numerator is
E(R|I = 1)−E(R|I = 0) = E[ρ (ε, τ(δ, 1)) |I = 1]−E[ρ (ε, τ(δ, 0)) |I = 0]
= E[ρ (ε, τ(δ, 1))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, 0))]
= E[{ρ (ε, 1)− ρ (ε, 0)}1{τ(δ,1)−τ(δ,0)=1}].
Thus
θ =
E[{ρ (ε, 1)− ρ (ε, 0)}1{τ(δ,1)−τ(δ,0)=1}]
P[τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0) = 1]
(6.25)
= E [ρ (ε, 1)− ρ (ε, 0) |τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0) = 1 ]
is the average effect of treatment on response in the subpopulation of individuals
for whom τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0) = 1.76
75The role of I is quite different from that of the vector of potential confounders in model
(4.1). In fact, one may include such a vector X in both equations of (6.23) and carry out a
stratified version of the analysis that follows conditionally on {X = x}.
76In [1], where I is really a suggestion of treatment rather than the treatment T = τ(δ, I),
such individuals are called ‘compliers’: they get treatment only if treatment is suggested to
them.
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Although it is impossible to identify the subpopulation of individuals to which
the causal effect represented by θ applies (τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0) being unobservable),
evidence that θ 6= 0 does provide evidence for a treatment effect.
If T is discrete rather than binary, similar arguments show that
θ =
E[{ρ (ε, τ(δ, 1))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, 0))}1{τ(δ,1)>τ(δ,0)}]
E[{τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0)}1{τ(δ,1)>τ(δ,0)}]
=
E [ρ (ε, τ(δ, 1))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, 0)) |τ(δ, 1) > τ(δ, 0) ]
E [τ(δ, 1)− τ(δ, 0) |τ(δ, 1) > τ(δ, 0) ] .
This, too, is a measure of the effect of the treatment on the response in the
subpopulation of individuals for whom τ(δ, 1) > τ(δ, 0); it is more difficult to
interpret than the first version because one cannot estimate the denominator,
but, again, evidence that θ 6= 0 provides evidence for a treatment effect.
This analysis can be extended to model (6.23) in the case where I and T are
discrete random variables with I taking the numerical values i0 < i1 < i2 <
· · · and τ such that τ(δ, i0) ≤ τ(δ, ik) for k ≥ 1. For simplicity, assume that
P[τ(δ, ik)>τ(δ, i0)]>0 for all k and consider the parameters
θk :=
E(R|I = ik)−E(R|I = i0)
E(T |I = ik)−E(T |I = i0) =
E[ρ (ε, τ(δ, ik))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, i0))]
E[τ(δ, ik)− τ(δ, i0)] ,
which can be estimated from data on (I, T,R). By the same arguments used
earlier with θ, the denominator of θk is
E[{τ(δ, ik)− τ(δ, i0)}1{τ(δ,ik)>τ(δ,i0)}]
and its numerator
E[{ρ (ε, τ(δ, ik))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, i0))} 1{τ(δ,ik)>τ(δ,i0)}],
so
θk =
E [ρ (ε, τ(δ, ik))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, i0)) |τ(δ, ik) > τ(δ, i0) ]
E [τ(δ, ik)− τ(δ, i0) |τ(δ, ik) > τ(δ, i0) ]
is a measure of the effect of the treatment on the response in the subpopulation
of individuals for whom τ(δ, ik) > τ(δ, i0).
The numbers
pk :=
P(I = ik) {E(T |I = ik)−E(T |I = i0)}∑
l≥1P(I = il) {E(T |I = il)−E(T |I = i0)}
define a probability distribution on N which can be estimated from data on I
and T , so we can define an overall measure of treatment effect by
Θ :=
∑
k≥1 θkpk.
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Since the denominator in the expression of pk is∑
l≥1
P(I = il)E[τ(δ, il)− τ(δ, i0)] =
∑
l≥1
E[{τ(δ, I) − τ(δ, i0)}1{I=il}]
= E[{τ(δ, I)− τ(δ, i0)} 1{I>i0}]
= E[{τ(δ, I)− τ(δ, i0)} 1{I>i0,τ(δ,I)>τ(δ,i0)}]
= E[{τ(δ, I)− τ(δ, i0)} 1{τ(δ,I)>τ(δ,i0)}],
we have
Θ =
∑
k≥1P(I = ik) {E(R|I = ik)−E(R|I = i0)}
E[{τ(δ, I)− τ(δ, i0)} 1{τ(δ,I)>τ(δ,i0)}].
=
∑
k≥1P(I = ik)E[ρ (ε, τ(δ, ik))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, i0))]
E[{τ(δ, I)− τ(δ, i0)} 1{τ(δ,I)>τ(δ,i0)}]
=
∑
k≥1 E[{ρ (ε, τ(δ, I))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, i0))} 1{I=ik,τ(δ,I)>τ(δ,i0)}]
E[{τ(δ, I)− τ(δ, i0)}1{τ(δ,I)>τ(δ,i0)}]
=
E[{ρ (ε, τ(δ, I))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, i0))}1{τ(δ,I)>τ(δ,i0)}]
E[{τ(δ, I)− τ(δ, i0)}1{τ(δ,I)>τ(δ,i0)}]
=
E[ρ (ε, τ(δ, I))− ρ (ε, τ(δ, i0)) | τ(δ, I) > τ(δ, i0)]
E[τ(δ, I)− τ(δ, i0) | τ(δ, I) > τ(δ, i0)] .
Thus Θ, which can be estimated from data on (I, T,R), is a measure of the
effect of treatment on response in the subpopulation of individuals for whom
τ(δ, I) > τ(δ, i0). When T is binary it simplifies to a conditional expectation
and compares to (6.25).
The idea of using ‘instrumental variables’ for estimating a causal effect seems
to have originated in applications of linear regression in which the assumption
of exogeneity—the independence between the error term and the explanatory
variables—is doubtful (as may be the case when the data are known to follow
a regression model quite closely but only data on a subset of the explanatory
variables are available for estimating the model). In some of these applications
the method of “instrumental-variable regression” or “two-stage least-squares”,
which, as the method of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin, involves an instrument
which is correlated with the explanatory variables, is used in place of least-
squares to estimate the coefficient of the treatment effect. We shall conclude by
explaining this method in the case of simple linear regression and by connecting
it with the method of Angrist, Imbens and Rubin; for the more general, but
necessarily less clear, case of a regression model containing other explanatory
variables besides the treatment variable, see Freedman’s exposition on pp.181–4
and 197–8 of [24].77
77Our purpose is to clarify the relationship between two apparently unrelated approaches;
the assumptions required by the version of (6.23) conditional on a set of covariates are more
likely to be met in a real-life problem than those required by the more general model considered
in [24].
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Let the observed data (I, T,R) on a generic individual satisfy the following
special case of model (6.23):
R = α+ β T + ε, T = τ(δ, I). (6.26)
Since ε and T are dependent (because δ and ε are dependent and the second
equation constrains T by δ), the least-squares estimates of α and β are biased.78
However, a consistent estimate of β (the parameter of interest when studying
the treatment effect) can be obtained under certain conditions.
Let I, T, R, ε and δ, stand for column vectors containing the elements of
a random sample (I1, T1, R1, ε1, δ1), (I2, T2, R2, ε2, δ2),...,(In, Tn, Rn, εn, δn), of
vectors with the same distribution as (I, T,R, ε, δ), and 1 for a column vector
of 1s, so that
R = 1α+Tβ + ε. (6.27)
Assume that I¯, the average of I, is zero; if this is not the case we can always
subtract it from I. Multiplying both sides of (6.27) on the left by IT we get
ITR = ITTβ + ITε. (6.28)
Since on the one hand
1
n
ITT =
1
n
∑n
j=1
(Ij − I¯)(Tj − T¯) = cov(I,T)
and
1
n
ITR =
1
n
∑n
j=1
(Ij − I¯)(Rj − R¯) = cov(I,R),
and on the other hand, by the independence of I and ε, n−1ITε → 0 (say in
probability) as n→∞, we have from (6.28) that
1
n
ITR− 1
n
ITTβ = cov(I,R)− cov(I,T)β → 0.
But by the assumption that I and T are correlated, cov(I,T) converges to some
constant 6= 0, so cov(I,R)/cov(I,T)→ β. In other words,
βˇ :=
cov(I,R)
cov(I,T)
is a consistent estimator of β.
Evidently, βˇ is not the least-squares estimate; in fact, it is easy to check that
when the Ijs and Tjs are binary βˇ coincides with the estimator of θ mentioned
after (6.24). But it is clear that when the Ijs and Tjs are binary and the mono-
tonicity of τ holds the assumption of a linear relationship between response and
treatment is not at all needed for the estimation of the treatment effect.
The appellation “two-stage least-squares” comes from the fact that βˇ can be
obtained in an alternative way by two applications of least-squares estimation
78See footnote 61.
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in regression models. First, one pretends that I, T and δ satisfy the linear
regression model
T = τ(δ, I) = a+ b I + δ,
where a and b are unknown parameters.79 Applied to our random sample this
takes the form
T = 1a+ Ib+ δ
and yields the usual least-squares estimators aˆ and bˆ, the latter being
bˆ =
cov(I,T)
var(I)
.
Secondly, one plugs in the ‘fitted values’, or ‘predicted values’, Tˆ = 1aˆ+ Iˆ bˆ into
(6.27) to get
R = (α+ aˆ β)1 + I bˆ β + ε. (6.29)
This is not a linear regression model because ε and (I, aˆ, bˆ) are dependent (for
instance, bˆ is a function of T, which depends on δ, and ε and δ are dependent);
however, we can, just as we have done above to get βˇ, multiply both sides of
(6.29) on the left by IT and solve the resulting equation to get an estimator for
β, namely
β˜ :=
cov(Ibˆ,R)
cov(Ibˆ, Ibˆ)
=
1
bˆ
cov(I,R)
var(I)
=
cov(I,R)
cov(I,T)
,
which is none other than βˇ.
A more transparent and concise version of this approach is possible when
T = a+ bI + δ holds in place of the second equation of (6.23); substitution of T
in R = α+ Tβ + ε gives
R = α+ a β + I b β + δ β + ε β =: A+ I B + E
for a generic individual with data (I, R,E) and E = δ β + ε β. This equation is
a linear regression model proper (I being independent of (δ, ε) and hence of E),
so we have two linear models, one regressing T on I and the other R on I, which
give consistent estimates of b and B = b β, and hence a consistent estimate of
B/b = β which is easily verified to coincide with βˇ (cf. pp. 85–6 of [54]).
79What could fail here is not the assumption of exogeneity (since I and δ are independent)
but the postulated form of τ .
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Appendix A: Pearl’s calculus of intervention
As suggested by N. Singpurwalla (see [69] and the ensuing exchange with Pearl),
for example, Pearl’s calculus of intervention ought to admit a formulation based
entirely on notation and results of elementary probability theory (of the kind
used throughout our work). We believe this to be the case, and in this section
provide an interpretation and proofs of the first two of Pearl’s calculus rules;
the third rule is beyond our grasp.
We speak of an interpretation because we are not sure that the rules stated
here correspond to Pearl’s; see pp. 85–86 of [47] for the statements of the rules
and [45] for proofs—the only ones we have seen and which we are unable to
understand. As far as we see—and if we exclude the efforts by R. Tucci in [75],
which we are equally unable to understand—no additional elucidation of the
calculus and no alternative proofs of its rules have been given by other authors,
nor by Pearl (not even in [51]), since their publication in [45]; but the three rules
have been widely cited and reproduced almost verbatim from this last source.
Consider a second-level modelM consisting of four disjoint sets of variables—
also called ‘nodes’ in connection with the graph representing the relationships
between them—W, X, Y and Z. RegardingW, X, Y and Z as random vectors,
such a model is defined by a system of equations of the form

W = ϕ1(U1,W,X,Y,Z),
X = ϕ2(U2,W,X,Y,Z),
Y = ϕ3(U3,W,X,Y,Z),
Z = ϕ4(U4,W,X,Y,Z),
(A.1)
where the Uis are independent vectors of independent uniforms and the ϕis are
vector-valued functions. In such a system, a variable appearing on the left-hand
side of an equality is understood not to enter as a variable in the corresponding
coordinate of the function on the right. For instance, ifWj is the j-th coordinate
of W then Wj plays no active role in the j-th coordinate function of ϕ1. More
generally, a variable defined as a function of another variable cannot in turn be
involved in its definition. Thus the first line in (A.1) could be something like

W1 = − logU1,1,
W2 = 1/(1 + U1,2),
W3 = a1 exp (a2U2,1 + a3W2X2 + a4W1Y6Z2) ,
W4 = b1 sin (U2,2W1W3) + b2 log
(
Z21 + b3W2e
Y3
)
,
with U1,1, U1,2 coordinates of U1, U2,1, U2,2 coordinates of U2,W1,W2,W3,W4 ∈
W,X2 ∈ X, etc.; and in this caseX2 could not be a function of (W3,W4) because
W3 is a function of X2 and W4 a function of W3.
In order to formulate Pearl’s rules we need to distinguish between exogenous
variables—i.e. those that are functions of uniforms alone, such as W1 and W2
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in the example just given—from the non-exogenous ones, so we write (A.1) as

W1 = ϕ1(U1), W2 = φ1(V1,W,X,Y,Z),
X1 = ϕ2(U2), X2 = φ2(V2,W,X,Y,Z),
Y1 = ϕ3(U3), Y2 = φ3(V3,W,X,Y,Z),
Z1 = ϕ4(U4), Z2 = φ4(V4,W,X,Y,Z),
(A.2)
with the Uis and Vis independent vectors of independent uniforms, the ϕis and
φis vector-valued functions, W = (W1,W2), X = (X1,X2), etc.
Pearl’s rules are identities, valid under conditions to be stated below, between
certain conditional probability functions pertaining to two intervention models
derived fromM: a modelM′
x
corresponding to a numerical vector x = (x1,x2)
in the range of X and defined by

W′1 = ϕ1(U1), W
′
2,x = φ1(V1,W
′
x
,x1,x2,Y
′
x
,Z′
x
),
Y′1 = ϕ3(U3), Y
′
2,x = φ3(V3,W
′
x,x1,x2,Y
′
x,Z
′
x),
Z′1 = ϕ4(U4), Z
′
2,x = φ4(V4,W
′
x
,x1,x2,Y
′
x
,Z′
x
),
(A.3)
where we write W′x = (W
′
1,W
′
2,x), Y
′
x = (Y
′
1,Y
′
2,x) and Z
′
x = (Z
′
1,Z
′
2,x); and
a model M′′
x,z corresponding to numerical vectors x = (x1,x2) and z in the
ranges of X and Z, and defined by{
W′′1 = ϕ1(U1), W
′′
2,x,z = φ1(V1,W
′′
x,z,x1,x2,Y
′′
x,z, z),
Y′′1 = ϕ3(U3), Y
′′
2,x,z = φ3(V3,W
′′
x,z,x1,x2,Y
′′
x,z, z),
(A.4)
where W′′
x,z = (W
′′
1 ,W
′′
2,x,z) and Y
′′
x,z = (Y
′′
1 ,Y
′′
2,x,z).
Note thatM′x is obtained fromM by removing all the equations that define
nodes of X and replacing the nodes of X in all the remaining equations by
elements of a numerical vector x, and M′′
x,z is obtained from M by removing
all the equations that define nodes of X and Z and replacing the nodes of X
and Z in all the remaining equations by elements of numerical vectors x and z.
A.1. Rule 1
The first identity is
P (y|xˆ, z, w) := P(Y′x = y|Z′x = z,W′x = w)
(A.5)
= P(Y′x = y|W′x = w) =: P (y|xˆ, w),
where the right- and leftmost terms indicate, in Pearl’s notation, conditional
probabilities pertaining to the intervention model M′x (the identity proper is
the middle equality) and w, y, z, like the x and z that determineM′
x
andM′′
x,z,
denote numerical vectors.80
80In Pearl’s notation a symbol such as xˆ serves to indicate the model from which the
probabilities are to be computed (in this caseM′x, which is determined by x); sometimes xˆ is
replaced by do(x), where the do stands for the operation that transforms a second-level model
into an intervention version of it.
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It is valid under the following condition:
C1. Let the equation X′1 = ϕ2(U2) be added to M′x; then
P (Y′x = y |W′x = w,X′1 = x1,Z′x = z ) = P (Y′x = y |W′x = w,X′1 = x1 )
for all (w, y, z) in the range of (W′
x
,Y′
x
,Z′
x
).
Rule 1 follows in three steps from the exogeneity of X′1, from C1 and again
from the exogeneity of X′1:
P(Y′
x
= y|Z′
x
= z,W′
x
= w) =
P(Z′
x
= z,Y′
x
= y,W′
x
= w)P(X′1 = x1)
P(Z′
x
= z,W′
x
= w)P(X′1 = x1)
=
P(Z′x = z,Y
′
x = y,X
′
1 = x1,W
′
x = w)
P(Z′
x
= z,X1 = x1,W′x = w)
= P(Y′x = y|Z′x = z,X′1 = x1,W′x = w)
= P(Y′x = y|X′1 = x1,W′x = w)
= P(Y′
x
= y|W′
x
= w).
A.2. Rule 2
The second identity is
P (y|xˆ, zˆ, w) := P(Y′′x,z = y|W′′x,z = w) (A.6)= P(Y′
x
= y|Z′
x
= z,W′
x
= w) =: P (y|xˆ, z, w),
in notation similar to that of (A.5).
It is valid under the following condition:
C2. Let the equations X′′1 = ϕ2(U2), Z
′′
1 = ϕ4(U4) and
Z′′2,x = φ4(V4,W
′′
x,z,x1,x2,Y
′′
x,z,Z
′′
x
)
be added to M′′x,z, and write Z′′x = (Z′′1 ,Z′′2,x); then
P
(
Y′′
x,z=y
∣∣W′′
x,z=w,X
′′
1 =x1,Z
′′
x
=z
)
=P
(
Y′′
x,z=y
∣∣W′′
x,z=w,X
′′
1 =x1
)
for all (w, y) in the range of (W′′x,z,Y
′′
x,z).
Note that by (A.3), (A.4), and the definitions in C1 and C2 we have
P
(
Y′′
x,z=y,W
′′
x,z=w,X
′′
1 =x1,Z
′′
x
=z
)
= P (Y′
x
=y,W′
x
=w,X′1=x1,Z
′
x
=z) .
Rule 2 follows from this identity, C2 and the exogeneity of X′1 and X
′′
1 :
P(Y′′x,z = y|W′′x,z = w) =
P(Y′′x,z = y,X
′′
1 = x1,W
′′
x,z = w)
P(X′′1 = x1,W′′x,z = w)
= P(Y′′x,z = y|X′′1 = x1,W′′x,z = w)
= P
(
Y′′
x,z=y
∣∣W′′
x,z=w,X
′′
1 =x1,Z
′′
x
=z
)
= P (Y′
x
=y |W′
x
=w,X′1=x1,Z
′
x
=z)
= P (Y′x=y |W′x=w,Z′x=z).
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